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Despite the complexities and decentralization that characterize global supply chains 
in today’s world economy, imperialist relations of exchange continue to prevail, due to 
the fact that the differences between wages of North and South is greater than the 
difference of their productivities. This dissertation examines the global exploitation of 
labor that mostly occurs in the global South, as a form of such imperialist relations, 
particularly under the domination of multinational firms emanating primarily from the 
core of the system.  
I start by laying out the theoretical and empirical groundwork for the labor-value 
commodity chains framework that puts labor, along with the question of control and 
class, at the center of its formulation. By incorporating a calculation of cross-national 
variation in unit labor costs in manufacturing—a measurement that combines labor 
productivity with wage costs in a manner closely related to Marx’s theory of 
exploitation—the labor-value chains framework is a means to operationalize exploitation 
within the framework of the labor theory of value. Findings show that the global 





exploitation of workers in the global South, where not only are wages low, but 
productivity is also high.  
I then show the concrete processes of how global North capital, personified in 
multinational corporations, captures value from the global South by applying systemic 
rationalization and flexible systems as mechanisms to exert control over their dependent 
suppliers in labor-value commodity chains. The burden of such mechanisms is borne by 
the workers —the direct producers of commodities—employed by these dependent 
suppliers. Case studies of two Indonesian companies that supply to multinationals are 
presented to illustrate these phenomena at the point of production. This observation 
further suggests that labor-value commodity chains are a form of unequal exchange and 
thus reveal the imperialistic characteristics of the world economy.  
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 This chapter includes a section adapted from Suwandi, Intan. 2015. “Behind the 
Veil of Globalization.” Monthly Review 67(3):37-53. It also includes several paragraphs 
from Suwandi, Intan and John Bellamy Foster. 2016. “Multinational Corporations and the 
Globalization of Monopoly Capital: From the 1960s to the Present.” Monthly Review 
68(3):114-131. 
 
So all these big developed countries, they have their own protection measures to face 
globalization. But a country like us, we are so naïve, so innocent, so young. We are a 
developing country. We don’t have expertise in making this kind of regulation. Indonesia 
in the end becomes the target market. We have to open [our market], people come in. 
Some investments come in because our labor is very cheap. But in the end of the day, 
what happens? They’re selling their products here, mostly, and we don’t have any 
protections. 




 The quote above was taken from one of the interviews I conducted at two 
Indonesian companies in Indonesia. I interviewed members of these companies’ top 
management as a part of my research presented here. Interestingly, the opinion expressed 
by this interviewee—himself a representative of capital from the global South—reflects 
an understanding of the persistence of the hierarchical world economy, a phenomenon 
that recently has rekindled a debate among scholars, including Marxists.  
 The debate itself largely centers on the question of whether “imperialism” is still 
relevant in today’s world economy—an economy characterized by a new reorganization 
of production on the global level that gave birth to global supply chains or production 





decrease inequalities among nations, since the incorporation of the global South countries 
into the world economy has allegedly allowed these countries to experience economic 
growth. The new success stories of some Asian countries—such as China, India, and 
Indonesia—often serve as the poster child of such an argument (see e.g., Baldwin 2016, 
Milanovic 2016). Numerous figures, even on the left, see the complexities of global 
supply chains or production networks, along with the rise of “emerging economies” (such 
as China, Russia, Brazil, India, South Africa, and Indonesia, among others) as “evidence” 
that what we have now is no longer an imperialist world economy, but merely “shifting 
hegemonies.”1 Economists, sociologists, and geographers, both mainstream and radical, 
often focus on the decentralized characteristics of such chains (see e.g., Gereffi 1994, 
1995, 2005; Milberg and Winkler 2013).  
The crucial questions, however, are: (1) whether such decentralized global supply 
chains or production networks can be seen as constituting a decentralization of power 
among the major actors within these chains or networks, and (2) whether the complexities 
of these chains or networks suggest that the hierarchical, imperialist characteristics of the 
world economy have been superseded.  
This dissertation argues that the answer to both of these questions is “No.” 
Despite the seemingly decentralized networks, and in spite of the existing complexities 
that characterize the global supply chains, the global capital-labor relations inherent in 
these chains are still imperialistic in their characteristics. Imperialism can be defined 
																																																								
1 David Harvey, following Giovanni Arrighi, is one of the contributors to the debate that argues for this 
position (strangely, as he himself admits, despite the fact that he authored the 2005 book, The New 
Imperialism). He wrote about this position in his reply to the Patnaiks’ book (Harvey 2017), but his most 
clear explanation is probably expressed in his talk as a panelist in a panel entitled: “Imperialism: Is It Still a 







broadly, as in Lenin’s conceptualization, as the “complex intermingling of economic and 
political interests, related to the efforts of large capital to control economic territory” 
(Ghosh 2017). Imperialism has several interrelated aspects: (1) geopolitical struggle by 
nation states for position within the international hierarchy of the system, including the 
control of colonies or neocolonies (see Foster 2006), (2) expropriation of petty producers 
outside of capitalist production (see Patnaik and Patnaik 2017), and (3) global 
exploitation of labor in capitalist production (see Smith 2016), particularly under the 
domination of multinational firms emanating primarily from the core of the system. This 
dissertation focuses almost entirely on the third aspect, without in any way denying the 
significance of the other two. At issue is the extraction (or drain) of surplus from the poor 
countries by the rich countries and/or their corporations. I argue that one way to 
understand the persistent imperialist characteristics of the world economy is through 
examining the exploitation that occurs in what Marx calls “the hidden abode of 
production”—which, in the era of global supply chains, is located in the global South. 
Although production has shifted to the South, imperialist relations of exchange continue 
to prevail, due precisely to the fact that the differences between wages of North and 
South is greater than the difference of their productivities.  
In the capitalist mode of production, the capital-labor relation is the central 
relation of exploitation. As Sweezy (1984:238) argues, while “every class society is 
characterized by the necessary/surplus labor dichotomy, hence by an implicit rate of 
exploitation…only in capitalism does this take the value form, with the rate of 
exploitation expressing itself as a rate of surplus value.” It is impossible to examine the 





it without focusing on the issue of exploitation, analyzed through the labor theory of 
value. It is precisely this that becomes one of the main tasks of this dissertation.   
The examination begins with a framework of global supply chains that puts labor 
at the center of its formulation. The framework is called labor-value commodity chains, 
or labor-value chains for short. Unlike mainstream theories on this subject, this 
framework takes into account the questions of power, class, and control—questions that 
must be addressed if we want to bring the exploitation that occurs in global supply chains 
out into the open. Moreover, the theoretical and methodological analysis of labor-value 
chains incorporates a calculation of cross-national variation in unit labor costs in 
manufacturing. The measurement of unit labor costs—typically presented as the average 
cost of labor per unit of real output, or the ratio of total hourly compensation to output per 
hour worked—combines labor productivity with wage costs, in a manner closely related 
to Marx’s theory of exploitation. In this sense, labor-value chains framework is a means 
to operationalize exploitation within the framework of the labor theory of value.  
The maximization of gross profit margins through the reduction of unit costs is 
the goal of capitalists—and this “sets in motion a continuing search for new methods of 
production, new sources of labor, new ways of organizing the labor process.” The 
reduction of unit costs, most importantly, depends on “the portion of total unit costs that 
derives from the labor input, i.e., the unit labor cost.” This in turn depends on two factors: 
the price (wage) of labor power and labor productivity—the two factors integral to 
Marx’s concept of exploitation (Edwards 1978:110). The concept of unit labor costs, in 
this sense, is an operationalization of the rate of exploitation, which considers not only 





The labor-value chains framework, empirically operationalized through the 
examination of unit labor costs, thus allows us to see that, behind the complexities of 
global supply chains, exploitation persists. Global capital (i.e., multinational 
corporations) engage in the search for low unit labor costs around the globe to accrue 
higher profit margins and overall profits. Data on unit labor costs show that countries 
with the highest participation in labor-value chains—the top three being China, India, and 
Indonesia—also have very low unit labor costs. This means that not only are wages low 
in these countries, but productivity is also high. The global organization of labor-value 
chains, then, is a means to extract surplus value through “superexploitation” of workers 
in the global South.  
 But how exactly does this extraction happen? It is difficult to find current works 
in the field that provide a more-or-less complete picture of how global supply chains 
work. On the one hand, there are excellent works by Global Commodity (or Value) Chain 
framework’s proponents that examine firms and how value is added (read: captured) from 
suppliers in the global South. But most of them are not concerned with the question of 
labor exploitation—some of them even represent the view of capital, suggesting that 
corporations in the North grab the opportunity to extract the surplus value “offered” by 
the global South. On the other hand, there are also many excellent works in social 
sciences, including in sociology, that provide detailed examinations of how workers are 
treated in the factories that assemble goods for multinational companies. But these works 
usually omit the connection between the control of the labor process and the intricate 
power relations that govern the supply chains in a way that can bring out the specific 





 This dissertation does not claim that it can give a comprehensive picture—but it 
does try to offer an approach that can address both issues: the macro workings of the 
labor-value chains and the way these mechanisms affect production processes in specific 
firms, in particular how they ultimately affect the workers who make the commodities. 
How do multinationals exert control over their dependent suppliers? And in turn, how do 
these unequal relationships between companies affect the other end of unequal power 
relations—those between the employers and the workers at the firm? Using another set of 
theories—works on systemic rationalization and flexible production—I connect the 
labor-value chains framework with the case studies of two Indonesian companies that I 
conducted. From the examples gained from the case studies, I explain how dominant 
companies (giant multinationals) within the chains extract surplus value through various 
mechanisms of control—both in terms of controlling the production processes of their 
dependent suppliers and in terms of controlling the labor process of workers employed by 
these suppliers. The goal here is to make sure that unit labor costs are stably low—even 
in cases where wage costs are increasing (such as the increase in minimum wage 
enforced by governments), such control mechanisms allow global capital to maintain a 
low unit labor cost by making sure that productivity can be increased.  
 In the end, these observations suggest that labor-value chains, as a part of the 
restructuring of the world economy driven by the imperative of capital accumulation, are 
imperialistic in their characteristics: the very reality captured by the concept of the 
“global labor arbitrage” within global finance. Labor-value chains involve a form of 
unequal exchange based on a worldwide hierarchy of wages, in which global capital 





they capture value from the exploitation of labor of workers that manufacture the goods. 
In essence, more labor is obtained for less. Giant oligopolistic multinationals take 
advantage of differential unit labor costs within an imperialist system of “world value”—
they control much of the world market through their international operations, and the fact 
that capital can move much more freely than labor (the movement of which is restricted 
by factors such as immigration policies) allows multinationals to take advantage of 
immense labor price differences on a global level, and to possess more freedom in 
pursuing higher profits through the substitution of higher-paid labor with low-paid labor 
globally.2  
 This means that, far from moving towards “transnationalization,” the processes 
that occur in labor-value chains reflect the fact that capital accumulation processes are 
tied to the unequal relations among nation-states and to the higher rate of exploitation of 
workers in the global South—with the state still serving as an instrument of and locus of 
capital accumulation.3 Indeed, the complexities of global supply chains that are often 
highlighted in the mainstream discussion of the subject have often disguised the 
relationship of underdevelopment—where export of capital that characterizes our world 
economy, as Baran and Sweezy (1966:107-08) observe, “far from being an outlet for 
domestically generated surplus, is a most efficient device for transferring surplus 
generated abroad to the investing country.”  The concept of labor-value chains, then, is a 
theoretical and empirical device with which to look at this issue from a global South 
																																																								
2 This paragraph is taken from: Suwandi, Intan and John Bellamy Foster. 2016. “Multinational 
Corporations and the Globalization of Monopoly Capital.” Monthly Review 68(3):114-131. Portions taken 
from this work will be referred to as “Suwandi and Foster (2016).”	





perspective—that is, to reveal the exploitative relations that hide behind the veil of 
globalized production.  
 
Globalized Production in the World Economy4   
Both the cheerleaders and the critics of capital can at least agree on one thing: 
there is clear evidence of new characteristics that mark our present day global economy. 
Relatively distinctive patterns of the current wave of globalization that started in the late 
1970s/early 1980s can be seen in both the spheres of production and finance: the dramatic 
increase in trade and direct foreign investment flows, along with the massive expansion 
of international portfolio flows. But what is especially important to note is the 
accelerating pace of offshoring—especially in the manufacturing sector—whether 
through arm’s length contracts (offshore outsourcing) or within the confines of a single 
multinational corporation, or what is known as intra-firm trade (Milberg and Winkler 
2013). 
Foreign direct investment (FDI), which is tied to intra-firm trade, has been rising 
“much faster than world income” in the last few decades, with an increasing trend in FDI 
inward stock—from 7 percent of world GDP in 1980 to about 30 percent in 2009 (Foster 
and McChesney 2012:105). A big portion of global FDI goes to the global South, starting 
with the “slow and steady rise” of these countries’ share of world FDI in the late 1980s. 
In 2010, “for the first time, more than half of all FDI went to third world and transition 
																																																								
4 This segment is adapted from a section taken from Suwandi, Intan. 2015. “Behind the Veil of 






economies” (Hart-Landsberg 2013:18). A 2003 World Bank report claims that FDI is the 
biggest source of external funding for developing countries (Solomon 2010).  
However, direct investments do not tell us the complete story of offshoring. 
Arm’s length contracting (sometimes referred to as subcontracting or “Non-Equity 
Modes of Production,” abbreviated as NEMs) is also an important part of the workings of 
our global economy. This is where multinationals engage in contractual relationships 
with partner firms without equity involvement, generating about $2 trillion in sales in 
2010, “much of it in developing countries” (UNCTAD 2011:131). Through this process, 
firms can capture “extremely high profit margins through their international operations 
and [exert] strategic control over their supply lines—regardless of their relative lack of 
FDI.” Even multinationals with high levels of foreign direct investment are also major 
international subcontractors (Foster and McChesney 2012:111).  
These trends were later echoed by a recent ILO (2015:131) report, which 
confirms that the world economy is now characterized by the “increasing fragmentation 
of production into different activities and tasks” along global supply chains by both direct 
and indirect means, namely, by foreign direct investments or outsourcing practices by 
lead firms and by the purchase of production inputs from a domestic supplier. The 
emphasis here is on the fact that both increases (in intra-firm trade and contracting 
practices) signify globalized production, with increased production in low-wage areas in 
the global South. This pattern has governed the relationship between capital and labor on 
the global level throughout the last three decades, with some distinctive characteristics.  
One such characteristic is the booming of export-oriented industries in the global 





industries are usually located in specific industrial complexes, in which companies 
operate factories that manufacture goods or other materials for foreign clients, including 
multinationals. Since around the mid-1990s, scholars have made important claims about 
the search by multinational corporations for “cheap labor” in the global South. Edna 
Bonacich and her coeditors (1994:16), for example, argued in their introductory chapter 
to Global Production that an “important feature of the new globalization is that 
[multinational corporations] are searching the world for the cheapest available labor and 
are finding it in developing countries.” And if we examine the period between the mid-
1990s and mid-2010s, we can see that there is a rapid increase in the number of jobs 
related to global supply chains. The 2015 ILO report mentioned above claims that there is 
a 157 million increase of such jobs within 18 years, from 296 million workers in 1995 to 
453 million in 2013—with much of this increase occurring before the 2007-09 economic 
crisis. Further, this growth in supply-chain production is concentrated in “emerging 
economies” where such job-growth reached an estimated 116 million—here, export-
oriented manufacturing serves as the predominant sector, with global North countries as 
the main export destination (ILO 2015:132).  
As a consequence, we have seen the formation of a global labor force 
concentrated in the global South. By 2010, 79 percent of the world’s industrial workers 
lived in the global South, compared to 34 percent in 1950 and 53 percent in 1980 (Smith 
2016). At this rate, manufacturers became “the chief source of the third world’s 
dynamism” both in exports and in production, especially in East and Southeast Asia—
where, by 1990, GDP share in manufacturing was higher than other regions (Gereffi 





Southeast Asia, particularly those that are considered developing, experienced an increase 
in their manufacturing output shares from the 1970s to 2000s (Felipe and Estrada 2007).   
 
The Structure of the Dissertation   
Laying the Groundwork for the Labor-Value Commodity Chains Framework  
 The special characteristics of our current global economy discussed above have 
been considered a hot topic in social sciences, including in sociology. As a result, many 
theories and empirical studies about globalization and globalized production in particular 
have been published in the last three decades or so. One of the popular approaches is the 
global commodity chains or global value chains (GCC/GVC) frameworks and their 
derivatives. Coined by Immanuel Wallerstein and Terence Hopkins in the 1970s, the 
concept “commodity chain” was part of the world-systems perspective. Later developed 
by sociologists, economists, and geographers, these frameworks dominated the 
mainstream discourse on global supply chains and, according to their critics, have lost 
their original macrohistorical perspective and succumbed to an organizational analysis 
centered on firms and industries (see Bair and Werner 2011). With it, the frameworks 
have also lost attention to global patterns of uneven development (Yeung and Coe 2015). 
Other critics believe that even the original form of commodity chains theory needs some 
work—the most important being the incorporation of labor and an analysis of capitalism, 
along with its global class relations, into the theory (Selwyn 2012; 2014).  
 This dissertation starts with this task. Chapter 2 is an attempt to lay both 
theoretical and methodological groundwork for the formulation of a perspective on global 





commodity chains. (For that reason, the usual review of the literature and methodological 
discussion is contained principally in Chapter 2 rather than this Introduction.) The labor-
value chains framework is an analysis of global commodity chains that incorporates the 
main point that was missed by its predecessors: an examination of the extraction of 
surplus from the global South within a Marxist perspective. I argue that this is the most 
useful means to analyze the processes of globalized production, since this approach 
allows us to see the power relations—namely, between capital and labor—that underlie 
our present-day world economy.  
To develop this framework, I argue that the following approaches are necessary to 
include in our formulation of the theory: (1) the development of monopoly capitalism and 
the oligopolistic power of multinational corporations, and (2) the process of profiting 
from international wage differentials through “global labor arbitrage.” While the former 
is especially powerful in helping us to examine the current stage of capitalism with 
strategic positions still held by multinational corporations—a discussion whose 
significance was brought to the surface by the seminal work of Paul Baran and Paul 
Sweezy’s (1966) Monopoly Capital—the latter is a useful lens precisely because it looks 
directly through the eyes of capital. Global labor arbitrage is first and foremost a creation 
of capital—the term itself was popularized by Stephen Roach, a former chief economist 
of Morgan Stanley—that was later often used in mainstream analyses (sometimes under 
different terms, such as “Low-Cost Country Strategy,” abbreviated as LCCS) to 
rationalize (in the Weberian sense) inequalities that characterize the globalization of 
production as inevitable market phenomena. For example, global labor arbitrage is seen 





unfortunate macroeconomic factors such as excess supply and the lack of pricing 
leverage (Roach 2004b).  
Interestingly, however, when analyzed with a little “Marxist twist,” the 
mainstream examination of global labor arbitrage often reveals the power dimensions of 
the globalized production processes—as recently shown by British political-economist 
John Smith (2016) in his book Imperialism in the Twenty-First Century, as well in an 
anthology by John Bellamy Foster and Robert McChesney (2012), The Endless Crisis. In 
this perspective, special attention needs to be given to the labor theory of value (Marx 
1976, Amin 1978) to allow us to see who actually benefits and captures value in a global 
commodity or value chain, and how they get these benefits through practices such as 
arm’s length contracts that characterize the global labor arbitrage.  
In addition, a brief presentation of empirical data is given in the discussion of 
labor-value chains to give a general picture about what this framework should highlight 
when it comes to unequal global capital-labor relations. An examination of unit labor 
costs (a measurement that can appropriately combine productivity with wage costs in a 
way that relates to Marx’s theory of exploitation) reveals that participation in global 
supply chains does not necessarily benefit global South labor—instead, the benefits go to 
the global North corporations who are able to maintain their low-cost production, even 
amidst the Great Financial Crisis of 2009. There is a great discrepancy both in wages and 
in unit labor costs between countries in the global North and global South, and most 
importantly, there has been a decline of unit labor costs since the 2009 crisis—these facts 
allow us to unmask the superexploitation, both in absolute and relative terms, of workers 





The Issue of Control in Labor-Value Chains: From Technology to the Labor Process  
 After the formulation of labor-value commodity chains, the next task in Chapter 3 
is to connect this framework to the concrete processes that occur in the production realm, 
including how multinationals with their oligopolistic power control technological 
knowledge within labor-value chains as well as how the labor process is controlled on the 
shop floor. To bridge the gap between the abstract framework and the concrete processes, 
I use the concepts of systemic rationalization and flexible production. The former is a 
concept born out of German industrial sociology (see Altmann, Köhler, and Meil 1992), 
while the latter was popularized by Bennett Harrison’s (1994) book Lean and Mean.  
 These two approaches offer a critical look at production networks and global 
supply chains—a much more critical approach compared to the GCC/GVC framework—
by highlighting the notion that decentralized networks do not necessarily lead to a 
dispersion of power. Both approaches emphasize that huge firms, like global North-based 
multinationals, are able to maintain (and even enhance) their powerful position in 
production and distribution processes within such networks, mainly by exerting control 
over their upstream and/or downstream dependent companies. This allows multinationals 
to engage in “lean” and flexible production—where they are able to accommodate the 
fluctuating market demands in their search for greater profit—by transferring production 
work and responsibilities to the dependent companies.  
Made possible by a rapid development in information technology, new 
rationalization strategies that “address the reorganization of the value creation chain of a 
final product over and beyond the reach of individual companies” are taken by powerful 





strategies such as delivery on demand systems (also known as “just in time” or Toyota 
Production System), a myriad of international certifications issued by a third-party (such 
as the International Organization for Standardization or ISO) that become a requirement 
for supplying to multinationals, as well as an open-costing system where suppliers need 
to reveal their cost structures to their prospective multinational customers. Through these 
means, dominant companies are able to retain their exclusive access to innovations and 
other technological know-how, while putting pressures on their dependent suppliers to 
provide flexibility in production. When we speak of global labor-value chains, many 
companies are located the global South countries like Indonesia. 
In the end, it is workers, the direct producers, who bear the burden that results 
from all the above strategies. This new rationalization and organization of production, 
contrary to the mainstream argument, does not provide a more humanized form of work; 
forms of Tayloristic control of the labor process remain in many segments of production 
within labor-value chains (Altmann and Deiß 1998). Marxist approaches to forms of 
control over the labor process are still relevant to examine the exploitation of workers and 
the extraction of surplus value in our current labor-value chains. And this is where Harry 
Braverman’s seminal work Labor and Monopoly Capital (that examines the control of 
the labor process under monopoly capital), along with other works on the subject, 
become especially useful. With the application of Tayloristic control and the 
development of technology, the deskilling of labor and the degradation of work become 
enhanced under monopoly capitalism. Braverman’s theory and other Marxist approaches 





control is administered on the shop floor in monopoly capitalism, but the aim remains the 
same: exploitation of workers driven by the imperative of capital accumulation.  
Under our present labor-value chains, we will see that these mechanisms of 
control towards the labor process are still present, but the workings are further 
complicated by the layers of power relations within the chains. To provide a concrete 
picture of these processes, I present case studies of two companies in Indonesia in the 
next chapter.  
 
Case Studies of Two Companies in Indonesia 
 Although there are recognitions of the global scope of systemic rationalization 
and flexible production, most studies in this field focus more on national or regional 
levels in the global North—including on European (especially German) industries and 
networks, the United States, and occasionally in some other countries, such as Australia 
(see e.g., Altmann and Deiß 1998, Harrison 1994, Wright and Lund 2003). And although 
there are plenty of studies on the new international division of labor (largely focusing on 
women workers in the global South) that have been published since the 1980s (see e.g., 
Caraway 2007; Enloe 2004; Fuentes and Ehrenreich 1983; Mills 2003, Ong 1991; Pun 
2005; Salzinger 2003), the connection between the issue of control of the labor process 
(that often becomes the focus in these studies) and the complexities of production 
networks is rarely brought up.  
In addition, to fill in that gap, the case studies of two Indonesian companies—
referred to under the pseudonyms of Java Film and Star Inc.—I present in Chapter 4 are 





dependent Indonesian suppliers, who in turn transfer the pressures of flexibility in 
production on the one hand, and the demands of high productivity and efficiency on the 
other hand, to their workers on the shop floor. This is obviously not a form of 
generalization, but only an illustration of cases. In addition, these two Indonesian 
companies are not a stereotypical representation of the classic factory characterized by 
assembly lines and horrid working conditions—such as Foxconn (see e.g, Fair Labor 
Watch 2012) or factories that assemble shoes (see e.g., National Labor Committee and 
China Labor Watch 2004). However, the fact that they are not “sweatshops” does not 
necessarily eliminate the exploitative relations that are realized on their shop floors—as 
we will see from examples discussed in this chapter. Through various forms of control of 
the labor process, ranging from disciplinary actions to incentive systems to ones carried 
out by technological means, workers are exploited—in Marx’s understanding of 
exploitation—and surplus value is extracted.  
I mainly conducted semi-structured interviews of top-management executives in 
these two companies. It is these executives, after all, that manage both their relationships 
with customers and with workers at their plants. As Peter Evans (1979:6) argues, “to 
understand the decision making that goes on within firms, one must talk to the [people] 
who run them.” In addition, I also observed their factories and offices with the limited 
access I had during my visits, as well as analyzing their company documents, ranging 
from annual reports, to brochures and videos, to presentation slides prepared by 
management (for similar methods see Evans 1979, 1995; Wright and Lund 2003). The 
interviews here serve as an important addition to the discussion of labor-value chains. In 





Anderson 1993; Tremblay 1957) who explain the “rules” of corporate management, or 
how they manage their labor force (human resources) and business relations with 
multinational clients. These interviews will give us valuable insights regarding how 
global and local capital affect Indonesian workers who, on factory floors, produce the 
commodities. The executives are the ones who make decisions about various aspects of 
their business, from receiving orders to planning for production to managing its 
execution. They make sure that their companies are in order so that any conflicts are 
quickly resolved. They are the ones who deal directly with their customers, especially the 
top ones, engage in negotiations with them, as well as control the management of labor 
on the shop floors. There have the knowledge and experience that we need in order to 
understand labor-value chains better, particularly since they occupy an important position 
that connects global North capital and global South labor.  
 But why companies in Indonesia? Besides the obvious (i.e., that it is my country 
of origin), there are other aspects that make Indonesia an interesting case to examine 
when it comes to its position within labor-value chains. Indonesia—whose incorporation 
into the global economy has increased since the creation of the Foreign Investment Law 
in 1967 under Suharto (La Botz 2001)—serves as one of the pools of “cheap labor” for 
global North corporations. Its unit labor costs only changed by a mere 0.3 percent from 
2000-09, with changes in average hourly labor compensation of a paltry 24 cents from 
1995 to 2009 (see Chapter 2). Overall, Indonesia is a classic example of a place where 
labor is highly exploited in the labor-value chains. The country has most of the 





the third position, behind only China and India, in terms of share of all jobs in global 
supply chains.  
Indonesia’s FDI started to grow steadily starting from the early 1970s. The FDI 
net inflows increased from around $83 million in 1970 to $4.7 billion by 1997. Despite a 
few downturns after the 1997 crisis, it has steadily risen up again and reached about 
$19.6 billion in 2012 (IMF 2007, World Bank 1999). This shows that the upward trend in 
foreign investments continued to climb even after Suharto’s fall and the New Order 
supposedly ended in 1998. This trend does not even count for other forms of investments, 
including portfolio investments and subcontracting. Interestingly, this upward trend of 
foreign investment is accompanied by an increase in employment in the industrial sector, 
roughly from 13 percent of total employment in 1980 to a little less than 22 percent in 
2012 (OECD 2014). In addition, the manufacturing value added (share of GDP) in 
Indonesia has increased as well throughout the decades—from 9.2 percent in 1960 to 
about 24 percent in 2012—with a dramatic increase in the mid-1960s (OECD 2014). 
 These situations can at least highlight the idea that Indonesia has undergone a 
series of industrialization and growth periods, although recent reports have shown that 
growth has been slowing in the last few years—only 5 percent in 2014 and 4.7 percent in 
the first three months of 2015 (see Tempo 2015, OECD 2015). Debates have emerged 
whether it is time for Indonesia to be categorized as an emerging economy—along with 
Brazil, Russia, India, and China – thus changing the acronym BRIC into BRIIC (Day 
2011).5 According to Bloomberg, Morgan Stanley is one of the supporters of this idea, 
citing the $433 billion economy as the fastest-growing major economy in Southeast Asia, 
and an optimistic claim from the then Finance Minister of an “achievable” 7 percent 
																																																								





growth starting in 2011 (Ghosh 2009)—a forecast that was then proven wrong in later 
years.  
But that aside, optimism was high. Jim O’Neill, a former Goldman Sachs’ 
economist who coined the term BRIC himself, upon his last visit to Indonesia in 2013, 
wrote that he “found a healthy preoccupation with the country’s economic prospects” 
(O’Neill 2013). His writing suggests that Indonesia may be ready to be soon included in 
the “big guys” club, although O’Neill himself has included Indonesia in the group of 
“frontier markets” – relatively smaller economies referred to as MINT—together with 
Mexico, Nigeria, and Turkey (see also Boesler 2013). Either way, these discussions 
suggest that Indonesia is seen by financial analysts and economists from the global North 
as a promising destination for investments and relocation of production—i.e., a major 
player in labor-value chains. According to them, the pressing problems that can prevent 
economic growth and the flow of foreign investments are corruption in politics (Day 
2011) or the lack of human capital and infrastructure (Ghosh 2009).  
What these commentators neglect to point out is that behind the euphoria of 
growth in the economy and in labor productivity in particular, lies the exploitative 
mechanisms of labor-value chains that this dissertation tries to bring out into the open—
the aspects that reveal to us the imperialist characteristics of our world economy.  
 
Labor-Value Chains and the Imperialist World Economy  
In his response to Ellen Meiksins Wood’s avoidance of “the intricacies of value 
theory” in defining the essence of capitalist imperialism, Smith (2016:199) argues that we 





theory of imperialism. As he writes elsewhere, analyses of contemporary imperialism 
must proceed from, and attempt to explain, “the systematic international divergence in 
the rate of exploitation between nations”—particularly between the imperialist nations in 
the global North and the peripheral nations in the global South. He contends that there is 
nothing new about international differences in the value of labor-power, or about 
superexploitation. What is new, Smith writes, is the “centrality these phenomena have 
attained during the past three decades of ‘neoliberal globalization’” (Smith 2011:10). 
The labor-value chains framework is an attempt to provide yet another window to 
view the centrality of the phenomenon of globalized production, especially as represented 
by the practice of global labor arbitrage. It is not meant to be a “theory of imperialism,” 
but it aims to examine the imperialistic characteristics of labor-value chains based on 
approaches that incorporate Marx’s value theory.  
In the conclusion, the imperialistic character of labor-value chains is briefly 
spelled out, in the hope that the main points from the previous chapters can be tied 
together. Not only does global capital engage in global labor arbitrage (a form of unequal 
exchange) to search for low unit labor costs—but it does so with the support of other 
institutions, including international organizations and the state. Through various means 
such as the imposition of multilateral treaties and agreements, powerful states also 
maintain their hegemony in accordance with the interests of capital that originates in 
these countries. There is a notion that is circulating even among the left that imperialism 
is declining, or even disappearing altogether. But along with other works on the subject, 
this study also finds that, contrary to that claim, imperialism is alive and well. It is just 





that workers in the global South are powerless. Strikes and protests provide a real 
constant threat to capital—and workers there have engaged, and will continue to do so, in 
such fights against exploitation.  
This dissertation includes several previously published materials, both solo 
authored and coauthored, as well as an unpublished coauthored material. In Chapter 1, 
the section “Globalized Production in the World Economy” is adapted from a previously 
published solo authored article in Monthly Review 67(3), July-August 2015, entitled 
“Behind the Veil of Globalization.” Both Chapter 1 and Chapter 5 include several 
paragraphs from a previously published coauthored article in Monthly Review 68(3), July-
August 2016, written with John Bellamy Foster, where I served as the first author. 
Chapter 2 is partly based on an unpublished paper with the same title, “Labor-Value 
Commodity Chains: Power and Class Relations in the World Economy,” written with two 
coauthors—R. Jamil Jonna and John Bellamy Foster—where I served as the first author. 
The paper was presented at the American Sociological Association, Political Economy of 





CHAPTER II  
 
LABOR-VALUE COMMODITY CHAINS: 
 




This chapter is based partly on an unpublished paper with the same title, presented 
at the American Sociological Association, Political Economy of the World-System 
section, in Seattle, August 23, 2016, that I wrote with two coauthors—R. Jamil Jonna and 
John Bellamy Foster—where I served as the first author.  
 
 
Multinationals are always looking for the most competitive supplier, wherever they can 
find them. They can make comparisons. There’s a competitiveness index that shows how 
each country is doing, how their labor is, how secure they are. They can easily assess 
that. And this can be a threat to our company. So we need to keep pleasing our customers.  





In the previous chapter, I have provided the background of globalized production 
that has started since approximately the 1970s. This chapter deals with a critical 
evaluation of theories known as Global Commodity Chain or Global Value Chain 
(GCC/GVC) framework—theories that are often used by scholars to understand the 
dynamics of globalized production, including the increase in arm’s-length contracts 
abroad. While GCC/GVC studies have successfully provided us with insights about 
specific chains and have enhanced our understanding of various social linkages within 
commodity chains, they have been less successful in uncovering the unequal capital-labor 





capital and global South labor. In order to understand such relations, we argue that the 
question of labor must be central to the analysis of global commodity chains.  
 This chapter will be centered on a theoretical and methodological groundwork of 
a term that we call labor-value commodity chains (or labor-value chains for short). 
Labor-value chains would allow us to put labor, along with the question of power and 
class analysis, at the center of our examination of global commodity chains. 
Theoretically, labor-value chains will encompass (1) the development of global 
monopoly capital or the oligopolistic power of multinational corporations, and (2) what 
financial analysts refer to as “global labor arbitrage” (also known as the Low-Cost 
Country Strategy [LCCS]), which is a form of unequal exchange. Methodologically, 
labor-value chains is a way of modeling the value of labor power and surplus value, as in 
Marx—based on unit labor costs and gross profit margins.6 Thus, an examination of 
labor-value chains should involve an analysis of unit labor costs, a composite measure 
that combines data on labor productivity and compensation to assess the price 
competitiveness of a given set of countries. Crucial here is the recognition that each node 
in a commodity chain can be conceived in terms of labor-value relations, with the critical 
node in production being the node where labor costs are most concentrated, usually at the 
point of assembly of the product. 
																																																								
6 Profit margins are defined as price minus cost over costs (or the mark-up on prime production costs). The 
primary variable cost associated with net value-added at any stage of production (excluding raw material 
costs and disregarding value carried over from earlier stages of production, which is subject to 
depreciation) consists of wage costs. Profit margins in this conception are thus predominantly determined 
by the mark-up on the value of labor power (the costs of reproduction of labor power) as determined by 
unit labor costs (reflecting both wage costs and productivity). In this Marxian-Kaleckian approach, 
focusing on profit margins and unit labor costs it is possible to distinguish the profitability (surplus value 
generated) of any given node in a labor-value commodity chain. This closely resembles the operational 





 In the end, the labor-value chains framework should serve as a critical tool that its 
previous predecessors could not be, namely, framework that can provide an examination 
of globalized production without ignoring the arguably most important component in it: 
labor, placed amidst power relations in the world economy.  
A Critical Evaluation of Global Commodity Chain Theories  
The “commodity chain” concept was coined by Immanuel Wallerstein and Terence 
Hopkins in the 1970s as part of the world-systems perspective—with an emphasis on the 
“historical reconstruction of industries during the long sixteenth century” (Bair 
2005:156). In the following years, diverging from the world-systems approach to 
commodity chains, several different frameworks emerged in the field of global chain 
studies, including the two main frameworks: global commodity chain (GCC) and global 
value chain (GVC) theories. The GCC framework was popularized in the mid-1990s, 
marked by the publication of Commodity Chains and Global Capitalism, edited by Gary 
Gereffi and Miguel Korzeniewicz. Later, Gereffi also became a prominent figure in the 
forming of the GVC (sometimes also referred to as “global supply chains” [GSC]) 
research network in 2000. This research network was created in the hope of uniting 
several different but similar approaches to value chains analysis (see Bair 2005). The 
GVC framework itself was inspired by the GCC, but mixed in with the neoclassical 
tradition of transaction cost economics (Bair 2009). But even the above “distinctions” are 
not clear-cut. For example, William Milberg and Deborah Winkler (2013) use the GVC 
framework in a way that is critical of transaction cost economics, while adopting GCC’s 





overlapping and the two terms are often used interchangeably, although not without 
differences.  
Within the world-systems or critical political-economy tradition the concept of 
commodity chains continues to be seen in the terms that Hopkins and Wallerstein 
(1994:17) defined it, as “a network of labor and production processes whose end result is 
a finished commodity.” Such chains are usually “geographically extensive and contain 
many kinds of production units within them with multiple modes of remunerating labor” 
(Wallerstein 2000:2). Critical commodity chain scholars use the term “boxes”—or 
“nodes”—to refer to separable processes that constitute a commodity chain. In this 
context, a node signifies a particular or specific production process, and each node within 
a commodity chain involves “the acquisition and/or organization of inputs (e.g., raw 
materials or semi-finished products), labor power (and its provisioning), transportation, 
distribution (via markets or transfers), and consumption” (Gereffi, Korzeniewicz, and 
Korzeniewicz 1994:2). 
One characteristic that differentiates GCC/GVC theories from the earlier world-
systems commodity chains theory is the GCC/GVC’s focus on such chains as reflecting 
“relatively recent and qualitatively novel process[es] of economic integration” (Bair 
2009:10). One pattern that is often discussed as a novel process is a trend in the national 
development strategies of most developing countries that started in the 1970s, namely, 
the shift from import-substituting industrialization to export-oriented industrialization 
(Gereffi 1994). Offshoring practices—defined as the “decision to move the supply of 
goods and services from domestic to overseas locations” (Gereffi 2005:4)—that have 





research. Mainstream GCC/GVC scholars often emphasize the increase in export 
manufacturing in, as well as offshoring practices to, the global South, associated with the 
global reach of multinational corporations. International commodity production more and 
more assumes the form of sophisticated value chains, with higher levels of organization, 
in which the core relies increasingly on imported inputs of goods and services (including 
assembly) in low-income countries (Milberg and Winkler 2013). As in now universally 
recognized, one of the striking features related to global value or supply chains is a “very 
large and growing proportion of the workforce… located in developing economies” 
(Gereffi 2005:5).  
William Milberg and Deborah Winkler argue that a shift in corporate strategy, with 
offshoring as an integral part of this shift, is a key driver in this “new wave” of 
globalization. The strategy involves a search for lower costs and greater flexibility, as 
well as a desire to “allocate more resources to financial activity and short-run shareholder 
value while reducing commitments to long term employment and job security” (Milberg 
and Winkler 2013:12). Further, Gereffi (2005) emphasizes the emergence of corporations 
that do not manufacture their own products which he claims is central to the “new trends” 
of offshoring. Such corporations, which are usually large retailers and branded marketers, 
can be referred to as the “new drivers” in the global chains that have become more 
prominent over the last couple of decades. Arm’s length production by multinational 
corporations—Nike is perhaps the most famous example—is associated with “buyer-
driven” governance structures, in which corporations, usually situated at the center of the 
world economy, play a pivotal role in setting up decentralized production networks in 





manufacturers, but merely merchandisers, i.e., companies who “design and/or market, but 
do not make, the branded products they sell” (Gereffi 1994:99). As opposed to 
“producer-driven” chains characterized by high FDI flows, buyer-driven chains are 
characterized by arm’s length contracts.  
The differences between mainstream GCC/GVC theories and world-systems 
commodity-chain analysis has deeper roots related to historical perspectives. As Jennifer 
Bair and Marion Werner (2011:988) explain, the mainstream GCC/GVC frameworks 
“have shifted from the long-range, macrohistorical perspective of world-systems theory 
to a more industry-centered and firm-centered model of organizational analysis”—with a 
focus on firms as mesolevel actors. Gereffi (1995:103) himself claims that “transnational 
corporations” are “the chief economic organizing agent in global capitalism”—and that 
the GCC framework is distinguished from previous theories (such as dependency theory) 
precisely because those theories “did not have a good way to tie the activities of TNCs 
[transnational corporations] into the structure of the world economy.” Yet GCC/GVC 
analysis increasingly suffers from the opposite shortcoming of hypostatizing the firm 
level of analysis, and losing sight of the structure of the capitalist world economy as a 
whole.  
There is no doubt that GCC and GVC scholars have made important contribution, 
especially in the detailed studies of commodities and firms. Studies of value chains that 
deal directly with exchange value, such as the ones that examine the production of the 
iPod and iPhone, have provided sophisticated institutionalist criticisms of abstract value-
added conceptions in neoclassical economics which fail to see the new forms of 





2010).7 However, as we will see below, both GCC and GVC frameworks lack the radical 
apparatus necessary to analyze power and class relations within global production 
processes. This remains true despite several seemingly critical claims by their 
proponents—who argue that “power relations” among economic actors and institutions 
involved in the value chains are “determinants of the direction and volume of trade” 
(Milberg and Winkler 2013:17).  
Indeed, some scholars have argued that GCC/GVC analysis has led directly away 
from conditions of power. Dicken and Malmberg (paraphrased in Bair and Werner 
2011:989), for example, claim that the GCC/GVC theories’ focus on firms, despite their 
ability to give “insights into the governance dynamics internal to production networks,” 
has translated into an ideological “flattening of power relations.” Economic geographers 
who have developed their own analysis of global value chains called Global Production 
Network (GPN), have similarly claimed that the GCC/GVC framework—due to their 
“industry- or commodity-oriented” approach—is unable to give “justice to the multiactor 
and geographically complex contemporary global economy” and thus, unlikely to explain 
the global patterns of uneven development (see Yeung and Coe 2015:32). Critics charge 
that GCC/GVC analysis is ridden with weaknesses, both analytical and political, 
																																																								
7 Linden, Kraemer, and Dedrick (2009:144), for example, offer a valuable critique of value-added -- along 
with their suggestion that value is actually captured (not added). After showing that U.S. companies such as 
Apple benefit the most (it captures high value, even though the production itself is located in China), they end 
up concluding: “U.S. companies need to work with international partners to bring new products to the market. 
These companies will capture profits commensurate with the extra value they bring to the table. This is simply 
the nature of business in the 21st century, and the fact that many U.S. companies are successful in this 
environment brings significant benefits to the U.S. economy.” Whereas Xing and Detert (2010:10), after 
suggesting that Apple will still have a 50% profit margin even if production is located in the U.S., conclude 
that “in a market economy, there is nothing wrong with a firm pursuing profit maximization. Governments 
should not restrict such behavior in any way.” They then continue to suggest that Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR) is sufficient as an “effective policy option,” with a focus on creating jobs for low skilled 





especially due to its failure to “comprehend the nature of capitalist exploitation and 
indecent work” and to engage in a “bottom-up” perspective on labor (Selwyn 2013:76).  
To be sure, commodity chain theories have not always downplayed (or ignored) the 
unequal power relations that are integral to the maintenance of the chains at the global 
level. The world-systems approach to commodity chains, despite its relative lack of 
empirical development, does not suffer from such a problem, since it is concerned with 
issues of core-periphery, unequal exchange, and inequality of labor. GPN proponents—
who often criticize the world-systems approach due to its “highly problematic conception 
of places and regions as relatively stable and enduring territorialized ensembles”—have 
to admit that the world-systems theory “provides a powerful reminder of the fundamental 
capitalist imperatives at work…leading to highly uneven developmental outcomes” (Coe, 
Dicken, Hess, and Yeung 2010:140-42). 
Although both mainstream global commodity chain and the more critical political-
economic approaches to the same issue take into account, to some extent, the 
international division of labor that characterizes capitalist production, critical political-
economic approaches see commodity chains differently than the mainstream GCC/GVC 
frameworks. One may argue that the commodity chains discourse had a radical inception, 
before it became “power-less” in later developments, where mainstream approaches took 
over.  
First, unlike the GCC/GVC proponents, critical political-economic theorists, 
including world-systems analysts, deal with a holistic and macro approach to commodity 
chains—this leads to a consideration regarding “how commodity chains structure and 





(1983:16), the “commodification of everything” is key to the historical development of 
capitalism itself—including how production processes are “linked to one another in 
complex commodity chains.” In their subsequent works, world-systems theorists continue 
to examine how the unequal distributions of rewards and the persistent “hierarchy of 
wealth of the capitalist world economy” are related to the international division of labor 
(Arrighi 1990:22). As a result, the imperialist nature of the commodity-chain system, 
related to international exploitation, is largely lost sight of or discounted in the 
mainstream analysis.  
As Giovanni Arrighi and Jessica Drangel (1986:16) argue in their study of the 
semiperiphery, to understand this hierarchy of wealth, we need to examine the economic 
activities (or nodes) of the commodity chain. Adopting this approach, they find that 
industrialization—what seems to be taken as a sign of national success by many GCC and 
GVC proponents—does not necessarily reflect widespread development and “catching-
up” success stories. As Arrighi (1990:24) explains elsewhere: “In fact, the focus on 
industrialization is another source of developmentalist illusions…From this perspective, 
the spread of industrialization appears not as development of the semiperiphery but as 
peripheralization of industrial activities.”  
Second, labor was claimed to be integral to the world-systems discourse of 
commodity chains. Building on early formulations of commodity chains by Hopkins and 
Wallerstein, Bair (2009:15) writes how the world-systems tradition emphasizes that 
“labor power is a critical input into every commodity chain and thus seeks to identify the 
various modes of labor control and reproduction that one can find along a chain, or even 





connecting… [the transformation of raw materials into final goods] with the social 
reproduction of human labor power as a critical input into this process” (Bair 2005:155-
56).  
Nevertheless, Selwyn (2012:213-15) argues that even the world-systems theory is still 
unable to incorporate “satisfactorily the study and conceptualization of labour into its 
analysis of differentiated development”—ostensibly as a result of its “limited 
understanding of capitalism.” Thus, considering the weaknesses of the GCC/GVC 
frameworks and the world-systems approach, scholars have argued that the task for the 
next generation of commodity or value chain research is to reboot the world-systems 
commodity-chain approach to take into account more contemporary conditions and 
frameworks of analysis. Bair (2005:171) suggests that, to do this, we need to “expand the 
scope of analysis to encompass the regulatory mechanisms, market institutions and 
structural properties of contemporary capitalism that affect the configuration and 
operation of these chains as well as the developmental outcomes associated with them,” 
and pay attention to how workers can benefit from their participation in the chains. Bair 
and Werner (2011:992) argue that we need “closer analytical attention to the relationship 
between inclusion and exclusion as ongoing processes that are constitutive of commodity 
chains.” But perhaps the most succinct suggestion is given by Selwyn (2012, 2014), who 
urges that the crucial task is to reintegrate labor and a solid analysis of capitalism, along 








Multinational Corporations and the Extraction of Surplus from the Global 
South  
 
The crucial issue from a Marxist perspective is how to integrate a labor-value analysis 
of commodity chains with a wider analysis of capitalist development in the twenty-first 
century, so as to account for new developments with respect to offshoring and the global 
labor arbitrage. The GCC/GVC frameworks’ attention to firms is considered a strength 
by its proponents, but a weakness by its critics. On the one hand, the firm-level analysis 
is regarded as a valuable contribution by these frameworks, especially when compared to 
the inability of the world-systems approach to do so. The examination of inter-firm 
networks is seen as a “methodological advance,” a means to provide “a grounded way to 
study and operationalize the global-local nexus” (Bair 2005:158-59). But others see this 
as a narrow, reductionist approach, a sign of the absence of recognition of the skewed 
power-relations that characterize commodity chains (Selwyn 2013; Bair and Werner 
2011).  
One difficulty is the historic distinction between transnational and multinational 
corporations. Traditionally, multinational corporations have been seen as corporations 
that are headquartered in one country and operate in many. This was distinguished from 
the idea of transnational corporations in which corporations were seen as truly 
transnational or global, thus no longer connected to a particular state (Drucker 1974, 
1997). Recently, both mainstream and radical theorists, particularly in Europe, have 
adopted the conception of transnational corporations, and have evoked a widespread 
process of transnationalization, whereby corporations with global reach are no longer 
seen as necessarily headquartered in the center of the world economy or connected to 





analysis of transnationalization, where nation states are seen increasingly as non-actors 
(or displaced actors) within a globalized economy (Robinson 2004, 2014; Sklair 2001). 
However, other, more realistic thinkers have rejected such notions, insisting on the role of 
the state and the continuation of imperial/core-periphery relations—thereby bringing the 
state back into global political economy. 
Thus economist Ernesto Screpanti (2014) debunks the myth of the trans-
nationalization of big firms in the globalization of production, reminding us that 
multinational corporations are still pretty much national in their governance structure, 
especially if we consider that the center of management and advanced technological 
research of multinationals is still concentrated in the developed global North. Through 
processes such as direct investments, Screpanti (2014:18-19) argues, innovations are 
transferred to the global South, “where they produced a derivative form of technological 
research.” China serves as an example. Despite China’s reputation as the largest exporter 
of high-technology goods in 2006, another economist, Martin Hart-Landsberg (2013), 
points out that 85 percent of the country’s high-technology exports are produced by 
multinationals. This case can illustrate what Stephen Hymer (1979:43) said a few decades 
ago: the headquarters of multinationals “rule from the tops of skyscrapers; on a clear day, 
they can almost see the world.”  
 But why are multinationals able to remain on the tops of skyscrapers and even 
increase their ability to see—and control—“the world” even as production shifts to the 
periphery?  The answer, we suggest, is to be found in the history and development of the 
giant corporations, which then became global-operating corporations. More than a half 





examined using a freely competitive model of market relations, but must be seen in 
monopolistic terms. One of the main reasons is the dominant position held by giant 
multinational corporations, whose defining power is the ability to protect their profit 
margins from ruinous competitions. Under monopoly capital (today monopoly-finance 
capital), corporations “can and do choose what prices to charge for their products,” as the 
system bans the practice of “price cutting” under the assumption that it would lead to 
“economic warfare” among oligopolies (Baran and Sweezy 1966:57-58). This ability was 
non-existent in the traditional freely competitive system. As a result, while price-
cutting—where this would seriously endanger profit margins—rarely happens, “price 
increases by firms generally occur in tandem, most commonly under the price leadership 
of the largest corporation in the industry” (Foster, McChesney, and Jonna 2011:11).  
Through their ability to exert considerable control over output and prices and to 
protect their profit margins while dominating all sectors of production, multinationals—
mostly based in mature capitalist economies—are able to exert oligopolistic power on an 
increasingly global scale, with a small number of multinationals playing a predominant 
role in world production (Smith 2016; Foster and McChesney 2012). As the size and 
global reach of multinationals have grown, their strength and ability to accumulate capital 
have also been enhanced. This has demanded a new structure of management intrinsic to 
the evolution of multinationals. This new management structure, as pointed out by Hymer 
(1979:59), who based his argument on industrial organization theory, enables 
corporations to rationalize production and incorporate the advances of science into 
economic activity “on a systematic basis.” In line with this, multinationals are able to 





head office located in global North countries at the top of the hierarchy. According to 
Hymer (1979:59), this allows the organization to become conscious of itself and gain “a 
certain measure of control over its own evolution and development.”  
Such patterns of power and authority can be clearly seen in one of the main processes 
involved in offshoring: foreign direct investments. Displacing portfolio investment, 
foreign direct investment became primary after the Second World War, especially in the 
realm of manufacturing (Gilpin 1975). As Harry Magdoff (1969:54) argues: “the 
acceleration of investment in foreign manufacturing ventures added a new dimension to 
the internationalization of capital.” Foreign (especially direct) investments are a way to 
penetrate foreign markets. They allow firms from the global North to compete in foreign 
markets directly, rather than through exports only. In addition, they also allow these firms 
to “enter into the foreign trade channels of the competing powers” (Magdoff 1969:58). 
Magdoff’s explanation of foreign investments resonates with Hymer’s (1979:174), who 
emphasizes that (direct) foreign investments are a tool to maintain and expand the 
oligopolistic power of multinationals: “direct investment tends to be associated with 
industries where the market share is largely accounted for by a small number of firms.”  
But offshoring is not always—especially today—about direct investments abroad. 
Instead, it often includes arm’s length contracts or non-equity modes (NEMs). By 2012, 
global value chains coordinated by multinational corporations account for approximately 
80 percent of global trade (UNCTAD 2013), and NEMs have increasingly become a 
major part of such chains, with growth happening mostly in “developing economies.” 
Between 2005-2010 the growth on NEMs in several manufacturing sectors—including 





industry (UNCTAD 2011). As GCC/GVC scholars have noted, lead firms manage such 
inter-firm networks within varying governance structures.  
A popular discussion of the “buyer-driven chains” mentioned above, for example, 
highlighted the “decentralized characteristic” of such chains. Far from representing 
decentralization of control over production (and valorization) as is sometimes assumed, 
the “dispersed” networks associated with the new non-equity modes of production, are 
ultimately governed by the centralized financial headquarters of the giant corporations 
they service, which retain monopolies over information technology, and markets, and 
appropriate the larger portion of the value added. As Foster and McChesney (2012:111) 
argue, arm’s length contracts actually allow firms to capture “extremely high profit 
margins through their international operations and [exert] strategic control over their 
supply lines—regardless of their relative lack of actual FDI.” But this is often difficult to 
examine since, in such a practice, multinational corporations have only an indirect 
connection with the workers/farmers who produce their goods. There are often no visible 
flows of profits from these foreign suppliers to their global North customers, i.e., 
multinationals (see Smith 2016). Empirical analysis thus becomes doubly difficult. 
However, a closer look at the logic behind these forms of offshoring will allow us to 
see the commodity-chain and power relations embedded in them. The question is not 
merely about how lead firms govern commodity chains, but also how they facilitate the 
extraction of surplus from the global South. This is captured in the concept of “global 
labor arbitrage”—defined by Stephen Roach (2004a), the former chief economist of 
Morgan Stanley, as the replacement of high-wage workers in the United States and other 





global labor arbitrage is rationalized as “an urgent survival tactic” for companies in the 
global North, pressured by the need to cut costs and to “search for new efficiencies” 
(Roach 2004b).  
Upon critical examination, this cost control imperative discussed by Roach (2004a, 
2004b) is none other than a form of arbitrage, taking advantage of wage differentials 
within the imperfect global market—illustrated by the unequal freedom of movement of 
capital and labor (Smith 2008). Although labor is still largely constrained within national 
borders due to factors like immigration policies, global capital and commodities have far 
more freedom to move around—further heightened in recent years due to trade 
liberalization—outside certain restrictions such as monopolistic controls and barriers to 
entry placed by firms, as well as protectionism in wealthy countries. Global labor 
arbitrage—the pursuit of higher profits through the substitution of higher-paid labor with 
low-paid labor—thus serves as a means for multinationals to benefit from the “enormous 
international differences in the price of labor” (Smith 2008:16).  
Viewed through a Marxist or critical political-economy perspective, global labor 
arbitrage is exploitation of labor in the global South by global capital. It constitutes 
unequal exchange, understood as the exchange of more labor for less—in which 
capitalists gain much more profit from lower labor costs in the global South (Smith 
2016). The process of unequal exchange at the same time marked the further 
incorporation of the global South countries into the global economy (Amin 1976). In the 
context of the labor theory of value, then, global labor arbitrage is a quest for 
valorization. It is a strategy for both reducing socially necessary labor costs (by 





(by extracting more out of workers through various means, including repressive work 
environments in foreign factories, state-enforced bans on unionization, quota systems or 
piece-rate work, and so on) in an imperfect global market. This, in turn, creates and 
enhances exploitation of the workers in the global South.  
The global labor arbitrage is also associated with what Marx (1976 [1867]:781-94) 
refers to as “the industrial reserve army” of the unemployed—but on a global scale, thus 
a global reserve army of labor. The creation over the last few decades of a larger global 
reserve army is partly connected to the “great doubling” phenomenon, which refers to the 
integration of the workforce of former socialist countries (including China) and 
protectionist countries (such as India) into the global economy, and expands the size of 
the global labor force (see Milberg and Winkler 2013). Also central to the creation of this 
reserve army is the “depeasantization” of a large portion of the global periphery through 
the spread of agribusiness (Araghi 2000). This forced movement of peasants from the 
land has resulted in the growth of urban slum populations (Foster and McChesney 2012). 
Marx (1976 [1867]) connected the “freeing” of peasants (the “latent” part of the reserve 
army) from the land to the process of primitive (or primary) accumulation.  
 Creating this global reserve army of labor is a strategy not only for increasing 
shorter-term profits; it serves as a divide and rule approach to labor on a global scale in 
the interest of long-term accumulation by multinationals and the state structures aligned 
with them (Peoples and Sugden 2000). Although competition among corporations is 
limited to oligopolistic rivalry, competition among workers of the world (especially those 
in the global South) is greatly enhanced. This divide and rule strategy “integrates 





reserve army” who are “made less recalcitrant by insecure employment and the continual 
threat of unemployment” (Foster and McChesney 2012:114-115).  
From the above discussion, we can see that, although the freely competitive model 
(with respect to traditional price competition and a dog-eat-dog competition between 
small firms) has been made obsolete, the “traditional” rule of fighting for low-cost 
production is still alive and well. Indeed, one may argue that it is intensified in the age of 
monopoly capital. The goal of multinationals is always the creation and the perpetuation 
of monopoly power, i.e., “the power to generate persistent, high economic profits through 
a mark-up on prime production costs” (Foster 2000:7). And as production becomes 
globalized, Zak Cope (2012:202) writes, “the leading oligopolies compete to reduce labor 
and raw materials costs. They export capital to the underdeveloped countries in order to 
secure a high return on the exploitation of abundant cheap labor and the control of 
economically pivotal natural resources.” Whether through intra-firm trade or arm’s length 
contracts, the increasing trend of foreign investments in the last few decades is merely a 
continuation of the imperialistic projects of multinationals.  
Labor-Value Commodity Chains and Unit Labor Costs  
 In a recent ILO (2015) report, a chapter is dedicated to how changes in global 
production patterns influenced firms and employment. The number of jobs related to 
global value or supply chains has increased sharply between 1995 and 2013, with about 
one in five jobs estimated to be linked to global supply chains, and with more notable 
increases in the manufacturing sector of “emerging economies.” Interestingly, the report 
also found that, while participation in global supply chains positively influences lead 





wage share of output. This increase in productivity and the absence of any commensurate 
positive impact on wages means that participation in global supply chains leads to a drop 
in “the portion of value added that goes to workers”—indeed, the report concludes, “this 
is the result when relating GSC participation directly to the wage share in both emerging 
and developed economies” (ILO 2015:143, emphasis added).  
Here cross-national variation in unit labor costs is calculated—a measurement that 
gets at the same underlying issues as raised by the ILO, but in terms that aim at 
uncovering gross profit margins or the rate of surplus value. Unit labor costs 
measurement combines productivity with wage costs in the manner closely related to 
Marx’s theory of exploitation (see Gordon 1998; Foster 2000). It combines data on labor 
productivity and compensation to assess the price competitiveness of a given set of 
countries. It is typically presented as the average cost of labor per unit of real output, or 
the ratio of total hourly compensation to output per hour worked (labor productivity). 
Although unit labor cost data can be compiled for the economy as a whole, most analysts 
narrow the focus to the manufacturing sector to improve comparability. Unit labor costs 
can be seen as a more comprehensive indicator—compared to labor productivity growth 
rates—to measure international competitiveness (see Foster 2000; OECD 2014). In a 
capitalist economy, neither relative productivity measures nor relative wages are 
adequate by themselves in analyzing the relative positions of various capitalist 
economies: unit labor costs combine both sets of data. 
For example, a country with a higher rate of productivity growth may lose out in the 
competitive race to a country that has a somewhat lower rate of productivity growth, but 





competitive race to a country with higher productivity growth. By combining both sets of 
data, unit labor costs estimates also reveal where gross profit margins—which, in 
Kaleckian terms (Kalecki 1971:156-64), represent the degree of mark-up (the degree of 
monopoly) on direct production costs—will be the widest. 
In a debate with Brenner on intercapitalist competition, Foster (2000) uses the 
average annual rate of change in unit labor costs (in manufacturing) to compare the G-7 
countries, in two periods ranging from 1985 to 1998. The data shows slower growth of 
unit labor costs in the United States than in other G-7 countries during the period, a fact 
that gained the United States, as concluded by the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ (BLS) 
analysts, a “decisive advantage” in “overall competitive position over its major 
competitors in the period after 1985,” despite its somewhat lower levels of productivity 
growth. This reflects the “effectiveness of the class struggle against labor in the United 
States” (Foster 2000:14).  
This finding suggests that it would be useful to elaborate on what changes in unit 
labor costs can tell us about “capturing value” from labor in the global South through 
offshoring practices—and the figures below will give us the picture.8 To start, Table 1 
lists ten countries with high levels of participation in global supply chains. We can see 
that China and India rank the highest, with shares of all jobs in global supply chains 
																																																								
8 To investigate the connection between unit labor costs and global supply chains, we construct an original 
dataset using the World Input Output Database (WIOD), which was recently made publicly available 
(http://wiod.org/). The power of dataset was showcased in the 2015 edition of the ILO’s “World 
Employment and Social Outlook” (cited above), which focused on measurement of the extent of global 
supply chains. The WIOD dataset contains data on 40 countries from 1995 to 2009, covering 85 percent of 
world GPD and, crucially, includes key countries from the global South, such as China, India, Indonesia, 
and Mexico (Timmer et al. 2015:578). Combining data from the Socio-Economic Accounts (a subset of the 
WIOD database) with new, more rigorous data on relative prices (or purchasing power parity [PPP] 
exchange rates) from the Penn World Tables (see Feenstra, Inklaar, and Timmer 2015), makes it possible to 






reached 40.8 and 16.8 percent, respectively. For China, 17.8 percent of the share are jobs 
designated for primary export destination, while for India, it is 22.5 percent. Mexico, on 
the other hand, while its share of all jobs in global supply chains only reached 2.2 
percent, 54.7 percent of this share are designated for primary export destination. All three 
countries have the same primary export destination: United States.  
The question here is how changes in unit labor costs over time relate to such 
countries’ participation in global supply chains, and how this relationship can help 
explain the extraction of surplus from the global South. The underlying assumption 
driving this analysis is that the global labor arbitrage promoted by multinational 
corporations and international finance is a form of unequal exchange in which the 
difference between the productivities is less than the differences in the wages (Amin 
1977), creating a global siphoning of surplus from South to North, generating crises of 
overaccumulation in the center, while taking advantage and promoting global inequality. 
In order to understand the significance of the unit labor cost data that we shall 
provide, it is useful to look first at a comparison of hourly compensation in dollar terms. 
Although international wage-cost comparisons tend to be sketchy, they are crucial for 
multinational corporations engaged in the global labor arbitrage. Figure 1 provides an 
index of average hourly labor compensation in manufacturing for G7 (North) and non-G7 
countries (South). What stands out in Figure 1, of course, and what can hardly be denied, 
is the vast discrepancy in wage levels between North and South, which is the basis of the 
new phase of globalized monopoly-finance capital, in which production, along with the 
exploitation of labor, now occurs on a global basis, taking advantage of the vast 










Share of All 




Percent of Jobs in 
Primary Export 
Destination 
China 40.8% United States 17.8% 
India 16.8% United States 22.5% 
Indonesia 4.7% China 10.6% 
Russia 4.0% China 9.1% 
Germany 3.6% United States 8.1% 
United States 3.4% Canada 10.5% 
Mexico 2.2% United States 54.7% 
South Korea 1.9% China 19.6% 
United 
Kingdom 
1.9% United States 11.3% 
Japan 1.8% China 18.5% 
France 1.3% Germany 12.5% 
Canada 1.0% United States 49.8% 
TOTAL 83.40%   
 
* The primary export destination here is determined by the number of jobs. 
Source: This is a modified version of data taken from Table 2 of Kizu, Kühn and 
Viegelahn (2016:15). 
 
However, this gap in hourly wage rates tells the whole story, since the exportation of 
state-of-the-art production technology in manufacturing to the global South by 





including patents) virtually guarantees that productivity increases are greater in the South 
than in the North, resulting in rapidly expanding gross profit margins, much of which is 
captured by multinational corporations, disproportionately feeding the coffers of 
Northern capital. 
Figure 1. Index of Average Hourly Labor Compensation Across Manufacturing 
Industries, 2000 and 2009 (U.S.=100) 
 
Sources: Labor Compensation: World Input-Output Database (WIOD), Socio-Economic 
Accounts (SEA), July 2014 Release, http://www.wiod.org; Exchange Rates: Penn World 
Table (PWT) Database, Version 9.0, University of Groningen, DOI: 10.15141/S5J01T; 
U.S. Dollar Conversion Factors: Sahr (2016). 
Notes: For consistency, nominal dollar figures on labor compensation (variable: lab) 
were first converted to 2005 dollars using the value added prices variable (va_p; 
converted from 1995 prices) included in the WIOD dataset. This figure was then 
converted to 2005 US dollars using exchange rate data from PWT. Finally, 2005 dollar 
figures were converted to 2015 dollars using inflation conversion factors from Sahr 
(2016) and then divided by employment (variable: emp). This process was carried for 
each of the nine major industry groups included in the WIOD dataset, and then averaged 





Average hourly wages also stagnated or increased only marginally in economies of 
the global South over the period of 1995–2009. This can be seen in Table 2, which 
presents hourly wage figures in 2015 US dollars at current prices. In Mexico, real hourly 
wages actually decreased while in Indonesia the increase was a paltry 24 cents. The 
picture was different in India and China, where wage gains could be construed as 
“significant” if the figures are only presented in terms of percent change. However, in 
real terms the hourly wages increased by less than $1 over the entire 14-year period. In 
2009, manufacturing workers in these four countries averaged less than $3 per hour, 
compared to an average of close to $40 in the U.S., Germany and Japan. This shows the 
global labor arbitrage at work. The economic surplus siphoned off by the multinational is 
correspondingly huge. This helps explain Apple’s 64 percent profit margins on the 
shipping price of its iPhones assembled in China (Xing and Detert 2010).  
Table 2. Average Hourly Labor Compensation in Manufacturing at Market 
Exchange Rate, 2015 USD 
 
Year Indonesia China Mexico India 
1995 $4.89 $0.69 $3.80 $0.63 
1996 $5.07 $0.76 $3.69 $0.57 
1997 $4.49 $0.81 $3.90 $0.57 
1998 $3.84 $0.90 $4.24 $0.61 
1999 $2.79 $0.96 $4.42 $0.63 
2000 $2.33 $1.07 $4.72 $0.68 
2001 $2.54 $1.30 $4.87 $0.69 
2002 $2.61 $1.49 $4.86 $0.66 
2003 $2.89 $1.53 $4.76 $0.65 
2004 $3.13 $1.56 $4.04 $0.64 
2005 $3.85 $1.61 $4.34 $0.76 
2006 $4.91 $1.30 $3.97 $0.92 
2007 $5.13 $1.37 $3.87 $1.06 
2008 $5.59 $1.43 $3.59 $1.16 
2009 $5.13 $1.51 $3.58 $1.40 





Indeed, if a central issue in critical political-economic analysis today is commodity 
chains, or else value chains, the key element in this relationship from the standpoint of 
workers is consistent, high rates of exploitation, i.e., in the formation of labor-value 
commodity chains that allow the rich-imperial countries to extract surplus from poor 
countries on a scale never before seen in world history. It is in this overall context that we 
can appreciate more fully the international struggle over unit labor costs.  
Figure 2 presents an index of unit labor costs in key developed and developing 
countries in the global economy between 1995 and 2009—a period stretching from the 
development of the high-tech bubble of the 1990s to the onset of the Great Recession.9 
This series is unique in that it covers a much longer time span than other available series, 
allowing us to see the specific annual changes in unit labor costs for economies at each 







9 A final limitation of existing data is the availability of historical figures. The BLS series is by far the longest, 
going back to 1950 for the U.S. and the 1970s for a handful of other countries; while OECD data is spotty 
before the 2000s. However, a few researchers (Ceglowski and Golub 2007, 2011) have recently developed a 
methodology for calculating unit labor cost data from the United Nations Industrial Development 
Organization’s Industrial Statistics Database (INDSTAT). Apart from the availability of historical data, 
INDSTAT database contains a much larger subset of countries, and the figures are specifically on the 
manufacturing sector. Due to the reasons above, we are planning to use this dataset for our research. The 
INDSTAT data is ideal with respect to our conception of labor value commodity chains since it allows us to 
construct a statistically comparable time series (at least back to 1990 for key developed and developing 
economies. The greater coverage allows us to utilize ILO data on global supply chain participation to follow a 






Figure 2. Index of Unit Labor Costs in Manufacturing Relative to the United States 
(1995=100) 
 
Sources: Value Added and Labor Compensation: World Input-Output Database (WIOD), 
Socio-Economic Accounts (SEA), July 2014 Release, http://www.wiod.org; Exchange 
Rates: Penn World Table (PWT) Database, Version 9.0, University of Groningen, DOI: 
10.15141/S5J01T (See also Feenstra, Inklaar, and Timmer 2015); Relative Price 
Deflators: GGDC Productivity Level Database, July 2013 update (2005 benchmark), 
University of Groningen, http://www.rug.nl/research/ggdc/data/ggdc-productivity-level-
database (See also Inklaar and Timmer 2012). 
Notes: Following accepted statistical practice, productivity is based on nominal 
manufacturing value-added per employee, which is converted to U.S. Dollars using 
relative price deflators, while wages are converted to dollars at the market exchange rate. 
Unit labor cost is calculated as labor compensation per person (variables: lab and emp) 
divided by value added per person (variables: va and emp) in constant dollars. Nominal 
dollar figures were first transformed into 2005 dollars using the value added prices 
variable (va_p; converted from 1995 prices); then 2005 exchange rate data taken from the 
Penn World Table database was used to convert from nominal to 2005 US dollars; 
finally, relative price deflators (or PPP exchange rates) from the GGDC Productivity 






Figure 2 above reveals not only the stable or declining unit labor costs in countries of 
the global South, but also significantly lower unit labor costs overall relative to the 
United States. In other words, unit labor costs in the global South countries are stably 
low. In contrast, unit labor costs either increased or were stagnant in all of the countries in 
the global North, apart from the United States. It should be noted that China, which 
experienced the greatest decrease in unit labor costs in this period, was also the fastest 
growing economy in the world, as Chinese wages remained extremely low on average in 
relation to the South itself. This can be seen more clearly in Figure 3, which calculates 
the average annual change in unit labor cost from 2000 to 2009. 
The results in Figures 2 and 3 show clearly why it has been so beneficial—indeed, a 
necessity from the standpoint of profitability—for economies of the global North to 
maintain substantial parts of their labor-value commodity chains in countries like China, 
India, and Mexico (as shown in Table 1). By maintaining these labor-value commodity 
chains, with their critical nodal points (in terms of labor-value) in low-wage countries, 
corporations in the global North are able to maintain low-cost positions essential to their 
global competitive position. Here it is crucial to understand that a given product, such as 
an iPod or an iPhone, often has its parts manufactured in a number of different countries, 
for example, Germany, Korea, and Taiwan, but the assembly occurs in China—a country 
that has among the lowest unit labor costs and offers developed infrastructure, scale 









Figure 3. Average Annual Change in Unit Labor Cost, 2000–2009 
 
Sources: See Figure 2. 
Notes: The method developed in Figure 2 was also used here, but instead of indexing the 
values to that of the U.S. the annual change for each year was averaged for the given 
period. 
 
In other words, while the commodity chain is complex and extended, the country with the 
lowest unit labor cost tends to be the site of final production/assembly and becomes the 
most critical node for the enlargement of gross profit margins.  
The above data reflecting (1) the great discrepancy in wages and in unit labor costs 
between countries in the global North and the global South, as recently as 2009 (marking 





South, as evidenced in the case of Asian economies in Figure 1, show the power of the 
global labor arbitrage. Lowell Bryan (2010), director of the New York office of the high-
level investor’s publication, the McKinsey Quarterly, has stated: “Any company sourcing 
its production or service operations in a lower-wage emerging-market country…can save 
enormously on labor costs….Even today, the cost of labor in China or India is still only a 
fraction (often less than a third) of the equivalent labor in the developed world. Yet the 
productivity of Chinese and Indian labor is rising rapidly and, in specialized areas (such 
as high-tech assembly in China or software development in India), may equal or exceed 
the productivity of workers in wealthier nations.”  
The way in which the labor-value commodity chains work is best illustrated by 
looking at a particular example, like Apple iPhones manufactured in China, which has 
become the global assembly center for much of modern manufacturing. Most for-export 
production in China, catering to the orders from multinational corporations, is in the form 
of assembly work. Low-wage migrant workers who assemble the products usually came 
from the countryside—or those who are referred to as “the floating population” (Foster 
and McChesney 2012). Moreover, the main technology components were manufactured 
in other countries before they were imported into China for final assembly. As Foster 
(2015:13-14) writes:  
Apple subcontracts the production of the component parts of its iPhones in 
a number of countries with the final assembly in China subcontracted to 
Foxconn. Due in large part to low-end wages paid for labor-intensive 
assembly operations, Apple’s [gross] profits on its iPhone 4 in 2010 were 
found to be 59 percent of the final sales price. The share of the final sales 
price actually going to labor in mainland China itself…is only a tiny 
fraction of the whole. For each iPhone 4 imported from China to the 
United States in 2010, retailing at $549, only about $10 went to labor costs 
for production of components and assembly in China, or 1.8 percent of the 






Similar conditions of globalized exploitation, largely hidden in these labor-value 
commodity chains, pertain to other countries, particularly where multinational 
corporations subcontract with other firms (or arm’s length production). In the 
international garment industry, in which production takes place now almost exclusively 
in the global South, direct labor cost per garment is typically around 1-3 percent of the 
final retail price, according to senior World Bank economist Zahid Hussain (2010). In 
1996, a year for which data on the labor-value component of Nike’s commodity chain for 
its shoes is available, a single Nike shoe consisting of 52 components was manufactured 
in five different countries. The entire direct labor cost for the production of a pair of Nike 
basketball shoes in Vietnam in the late 1990s, retailing for $149.50 in the United States, 
was 1 percent, or $1.50 (Ballinger 1997). As reported by the National Labor Committee 
and China Labor Watch in 2004, unit labor costs for the production of a pair of sneakers 
for PUMA, a German multinational, in China were so low that that the hourly profit on 
each pair of sneakers was more than 28 times greater than the wages workers in China 
received to make the sneakers.  
These empirical relations help us to understand the reality of labor-value commodity 
chains and how they relate to the global labor arbitrage. In essence, each node within a 
labor-value chain represents a point of profitability, and can be understood as defined by 
the profit margins associate within that given node in the overall global chain, based 
primarily on differential in unit labor costs, themselves the product of the immobility of 
labor in relation to capital. Each central node (and indeed each link in the chain) 
represents in corporate accounting a link in a chain of value (or labor values). This is 





computing value added. In effect, as numerous analysts have now shown, labor values 
generated by production are “captured” and not registered in the incomes in the 
peripheral countries, due to asymmetries in power relations, in which multinational 
corporations are the key conduits (Smith 2012, 2016). 
Hidden in the pricing and international exchange processes of the capitalist global 
capitalist economy—a reality hardly captured in traditional commodity chain or even 
value-chain analysis—is an enormous gross mark-up on labor costs (rate of surplus 
value) amounting to a kind of superexploitation, both in the relative sense of above 
average rates of exploitation, and also, frequently, in the absolute sense of workers paid 
less than the cost of the reproduction of their labor power. The conditions of political-
economic power in relation to the periphery of the world economy feed widening gross 
profit margins leading to today’s global overaccumulation. So extreme is this 
overaccumulation, manifested in world inequality, that the world was startled by an 
Oxfam (2017) report indicating that the eight wealthiest individuals in the world, six of 
whom are Americans, own as much wealth as the bottom half of the world’s population, 
3.6 billion people. Structurally, this level of inequality has become possible, as the 
present article suggests, as a result of a globalized commodity chain system of 
exploitation, and new, more globalized division of labor, and a new imperialism, 
characterized global monopoly-finance capital. In contrast, those who suggest (e.g., 
Harvey 2017:169) that the relations between the North and South and West and the East 
in the world economy have been “largely reversed,” at the expense of the North and 
West, rely on a superficial analysis of the growth of emerging economies, particularly 





becoming more centralized and hierarchical than ever (Piketty 2014). What we are seeing 
is the emergence of a global pyramid that puts those at the top in a position relative to 
humanity as a whole that places in the shade the Pharaohs of old. As Oxfam (2017) 
indicates, the issue before us is the question of “an economy for the 99%.” In the 
meantime, imperialism, reflected in relations of unequal exchange, continues to cast its 
long shadow over the global economy.   
An examination of labor-value commodity chains reveals the exploitation that is 
hidden in today’s fetishized global commodity chains. This empirical reality reinforces 
the critical political-economic analysis of commodity chains, introduced by Hopkins and 
Wallerstein in the early development of the theory. The labor-value commodity chains 
approach acknowledges the components largely missing from the GCC/GVC framework, 
namely (1) global capital-labor relations; and (2) the deep inequalities between the global 
North and global South in particular. Most importantly, the labor-value chains approach 
incorporates Marx’s labor theory of value as an analytical tool in order to provide a more 
effective critique of the contemporary global political economy (see e.g., Amin 2010, 
2013; Smith 2016). All of this helps us understand how the global commodity chains of 
monopoly-finance capital—the power configuration behind today’s neoliberal 
globalization—are rapidly changing class relations and struggles worldwide. 
The next question that needs to be answered is how these broad, global patterns of 
labor-value chains affect the labor process of workers in the global South? Indeed, Marx 
(1976 [1867]:279) himself elaborates the question of labor process in the first volume of 
Capital, and discuss it as a process that happens in the “hidden abode of production,” 





commodities, and turn it into surplus value. It is in such “hidden” places the exploitative 
class relations that govern the seemingly voluntary exchange between workers who sell 
their labor power and the capitalists who buy it can be brought into the open. And in the 
context of labor-value chains, these places are tucked away in the factories in the global 





CHAPTER III  
 
FLEXIBILITY AND SYSTEMIC RATIONALIZATION:  
 
CONTROL IN LABOR-VALUE COMMODITY CHAINS 
 
 
The way I see it, [our multinational clients] would observe, control how you work. This is 
a challenge for us, especially if we aim to increase our export orders for these 
multinationals… [These clients] control what you do. We can even say that they have 
power over you, ‘You have to do this and that.’ This is what we need to be wary about: 
how far they try to lead you. 
Star Inc. Executive 
 
Well, we’ve already had the procedures for everything [in production], and everybody is 
supposed to follow them. But to make sure that they are done properly, somebody has to 
control [these workers], right? Like you don’t know how Indonesians are. If they are not 
controlled, they’re like…you know. 
Java Film Executive 
 
 
 As explained in Chapter 2, the concept of labor-value commodity chains reveals 
the extraction of surplus from the global South by global North capital in the world 
economy, and the measurement of unit labor costs can illustrate this extraction process. 
In this chapter, I try to examine the impact of labor-value chains on what happens on the 
production floor, in particular regarding how multinational corporations can control 
concrete processes that occur in the production realm. This chapter serves as a theoretical 
bridge between the abstract notion of labor-value chains and concrete issues, such as 
control over technology and, especially, the labor process, before we continue to Chapter 
4, where I will discuss my findings from my fieldwork in two companies in Indonesia.  
The discussion here is divided into several segments. I start with introducing the 
theories that can be useful to connect what happens on the macro-level (i.e., global 





firms)—the theories of systemic rationalization and flexible production—and how they 
can help us understand the impact of globalized production on workers who make the 
commodities. However, regarding the labor process in particular, to successfully bring 
out the logic of capital accumulation that characterizes labor-value chains, both 
approaches need to be used in accordance with a Marxist approach that lays out how the 
persistence of Tayloristic forms of work help perpetuate and even enhance the 
exploitation of labor in the age of globalized production. This approach can also help us 
see how the control of the labor process is central to the development of monopoly 
capitalism.  
Lastly, I try to strengthen some of the main assumptions used in the theories of 
systemic rationalization and flexible production. I argue that we cannot gain a 
comprehensive understanding of the development of supply chains themselves if we fail 
to see the process of capital accumulation that underlies this phenomenon. And in 
monopoly capitalism, with the rising profitability of giant firms holding oligopolistic 
power, this process has led to stagnation whose burden must be borne by the working 
class, both at home and abroad. This understanding of the larger context in which 
systemic rationalization and flexible production occur helps us reevaluate the common 
assumptions that are often used in studies of supply chains or production networks. 
Seeing the emergence of today’s production networks as merely a managerial response to 
the “trauma” caused by economic crises and to the need for increasing productivity, or as 
an inevitable consequence of heightened competition and the rapid development of 





in supply chains is the exploitation of workers driven by the imperative of capital 
accumulation.  
Systemic Rationalization and Flexible Production  
Control and the Supply Chains  
 While the concept of GCC/GVC is popular in the United States, German 
industrial sociologists use the concept of systemic rationalization to refer to the 
technological and organizational changes by corporations, beginning since around the 
1970s (some argue mid-1980s). These changes are enabled and continuously maintained 
by new information technologies, and are a form of new corporate strategies aimed at 
establishing production, administration, and distribution processes that are “more flexible 
and economical” (Sauer, et.al. 1992:47). In many ways, this theory is similar to the 
GCC/GVC framework—especially in its focus on the rise of decentralized production 
throughout the globe, one that includes, as two of the main proponents of the theory, 
Norbert Altmann and Manfred Deiß (1998:139-40), write: the “decentralization of the 
entire production chain through segmentation of the individual processes.”  
If capital representatives such as Stephen Roach (2004b) see the implementation 
of global labor arbitrage as an “urgent survival tactic” to cut costs and search for new 
efficiencies, the discussion of systemic rationalization emphasizes that the “flexibilization 
and economization of manufacturing,” as well as R&D, logistics, and other aspects, are 
the main drivers forcing corporations to seek new strategies (Altmann and Deiß 
1998:139). Economization of manufacturing may not be a stretch from the search for new 
efficiencies, but flexible production is an important addition to the characteristics of 





Also popularized in the 1990s by scholars like radical economist Bennett 
Harrison, “the age of flexibility” had restructured production processes and management 
practices by corporations, especially through the creation of networks among producers. 
As Harrison (1994:190) writes in his popular book Lean and Mean, flexible production 
includes “lean production, downsizing, outsourcing, and the growing importance of 
spatially extensive production networks governed by powerful core firms and their 
strategic allies.” Firms everywhere, big and small, search for greater flexibility “through 
reorganization and technological change, in labor-management relations, and in the 
reconfiguration of each firm’s (and establishment’s) transactional and longer-term 
relations to other companies and operating units”—they become “more integrated into 
one another’s orbits.” This is what British geographer Phillip Cooke identifies as 
“flexible integration” (Harrison 1994:127).  
Specific to management practices within firms, flexibility may include functional 
flexibility, where managers “redefine work tasks, redeploy resources, and reconfigure 
relationships with suppliers.” This may include the strategy of adopting new technologies 
that enable “rapid product design or tool changes,” and that allow “a greater 
decentralization of decision making and responsibility,” thus make it possible to change 
from one design to another in the middle of production operations. Another type of 
flexibility is wage flexibility—or attempts by managers to “reintroduce greater 
competition among individual workers,” including through means such as payment 
through individual performance-based bonuses and systematic union avoidance. There is 
also numerical flexibility, which consists of two forms: first, the redesigning of jobs from 





various kinds of “part-time, contract, and other ‘contingent’ workers who… receive few 
or no benefits.” The second form of this kind of flexibility is the management practice of 
“outsourcing production, maintenance, catering, clerical, and other activities that 
arguably were formerly…undertaken in-house” (Harrison 1994:129-30). 
Two significant consequences of flexibility are the persistence of segmented labor 
markets and growing earnings inequality among groups of workers. Harrison (1994:11) 
explains: “According to a central tenet of best-practice flexible production, managers first 
divide permanent (‘core’) from contingent (‘peripheral’) jobs. The size of the core is then 
cut to the bone—which, along with the minimization of inventory holding, is why 
‘flexible’ firms are often described as practicing ‘lean’ production. These activities, and 
the employees who perform them, are then located as much as possible in different parts 
of the company or network, even in different geographic locations.” And most of these 
peripheral jobs are done by poorly paid workers in low-wage areas—globally, this often 
means workers in the global South.  
Although the discussions of flexible production and systemic rationalization can 
be seen, on the surface, as something similar to the discussion of global supply chains in 
the GCC/GVC framework, the former has something that the latter lacks: an attention to 
the issue of control. Coming from a radical perspective, Harrison (1994:9) strongly 
emphasizes the point that Gereffi and his colleagues could not, that is, the idea that 
“decentralization of production does not imply the end of unequal economic power 
among firms—let alone among the different classes of workers who are employed in the 
different segments of these networks.” Somewhat echoing Hymer, Harrison claims that 





multinational corporations are headquartered—instead of serving as a means to 
decentralize power. Indeed, Harrison argues that flexible production is driven by what he 
calls “concentration without centralization”—that is, “concentrated, powerful business 
enterprises” (Harrison 1994:12) that increasingly run the world “without as much 
centralized organization of production of products (i.e., large factories or formal 
hierarchies) as in the past” (Devine 1996). The persistence of concentrated power held by 
multinational corporations is made clear by Harrison (1994:12) in his argument: “Dressed 
in new costumes, and armed with new techniques for combining control over capital 
allocation, technology, government relations, and the deployment of labor with a 
dramatic decentralization of the location of actual production, the world’s largest 
companies, their allies, and their suppliers have found a way to remain at the center of the 
world stage.” 
The discussion of systemic rationalization also pays attention to control. Even 
though they are probably not considered radical, German industrial sociologists orient 
their theories and studies to the political sphere, and they engage in a more critical 
perspective. Their approach also intersects, in some ways, with Marxist approaches to 
labor and production (see Altmann, Köhler, and Meil 1992; Meil 1992). In general, 
systemic rationalization is often seen as a strategy by big corporations to exert control 
over the dependent companies (such as suppliers) within the value creation chain—and 
all this leads to leads to capital’s main goal, i.e., “to increase overall productivity of the 
entire production chain” (Altmann and Deiß 1998:139). In some cases, however, 
systemic rationalization theorists seem to emphasize the “control” issue, instead of the 





control is not endangered by complications generated by greater recourse to external 
resources” (Sauer, et.al. 1992:49). Core companies in the supply chains, in other words, 
have to make sure that the exclusive access to knowledge, technology, and development, 
remains only within their inner circles—a point that is also explained by other radical 
economists such as Screpanti (2014) and Hart-Landsberg (2013), as mentioned in the 
previous chapter, in their example of China.  
Technology and Labor 
In a way, the concepts of systemic rationalization and flexible production can 
bridge the macro-level discussion of global supply chains to the meso-level analysis of 
firms that in turns enables the examination of how management practices influence 
workers, especially those who work on the shop-floor, on the micro-level. It can also 
bring out the intricate relationship between dominant and dependent firms, and how their 
unequal relations in the end affect workers. This can be a starting point in our attempt to 
concretely examine global capital-labor relations.  
I argue here that the emphasis on control discussed above allows us to examine 
two important components in globalized production that can help us examine such 
relations in a more specific context: (1) the issue of technology, and (2) the impact of 
globalized production on workers. These issues will be further developed later in the 
chapter—where the approaches put forward by both systemic rationalization and flexible 
production scholars will be brought back within the context of monopoly capitalism. But 
here, I will explain how control plays out in both technology and labor issues, as viewed 





Technology is seen as a central component in systemic rationalization—where 
information technology networking serves as a means to integrate “company-wide and 
inter-company production processes” and technology in general serves as an instrument 
to secure flexibility” (Sauer, et.al. 1992:46). As stated above, through systemic 
rationalization, multinationals—who serve as the core companies in global supply 
chains—make sure that they can maintain exclusive access to their manufacturing know-
how, investment strength, as well as to “the heart of company-specific technology for 
reasons of securing innovation and (thus also) market positions” (Sauer, et.al. 1992:49). 
Often, such core companies have to balance their control with occasional “freedom” and 
let the dependent companies have some autonomy. To do this, neither market-related 
interventions nor the reduction of transaction costs is sufficient. Instead, as Altmann and 
Deiß (1998:139) explain, systemic rationalization allows core companies to govern 
(control) their supply chains or production networks “through the supra-company 
regulation of functions such as joint R&D, logistics and quality management.” The point 
here is clear: systemic rationalization serves as a “new form” of control that may often be 
concealed behind a series of “rational systems” and regulations that may look fair and 
benign.  
 The issue of technology also holds a central place in Harrison’s discussion of 
flexible production. One big part of his analysis is a rebuttal to the mainstream liberal 
view of the prospect of small-business egalitarianism. Harrison points out how 
California’s Silicon Valley—often hailed as a prime example of such an idea—is actually 
“enmeshed in networks formed by big business, big government, and big education 





(Devine 1996:50). In addition, companies in Silicon Valley have been “fiercely 
antiunion…since the beginning” (Harrison 1994:109).  
Moreover, Harrison also refutes the idea that small businesses serve as a center of 
job creation and technical change—a view associated with David Birch and George 
Gilder (Devine 1996). Contrary to the suggestion that well-informed small firms can 
defeat big firms due to the former’s flexibility “in identifying new wants and in getting 
new products to market,” as well to take advantage of various new technologies, small 
firms “turn out to be systematically backward when it comes to technology,” especially 
due to their inability to invest in huge-scale innovative technology, such as computer-
controlled factory automation (Harrison 1994:7). Another supposed ability of small firms 
that Harrison debunks is their ability to cater to niche markets, where they produce 
specialty products to certain markets. Harrison refutes this by arguing that the claim 
ignores the fact that the big firms, partly due to their ability to access innovative 
technology, “can produce for both mass and niche markets—a neat trick that the small 
firms can’t pull off.” Therefore, he continues, “Toyota can deliver both its big-selling, 
inexpensive Corolla and the high-priced, world-class Lexus” (Harrison 1994:7). Through 
refuting the argument for small-business egalitarianism, Harrison once again shows that 
big firms continue to take center stage in the realm of global supply chains.  
Another component of globalized production that can be examined through the 
issue of control brought up by both systemic rationalization and flexible production is 
perhaps the most important one: labor. While the GCC/GVC framework fails to deliver a 
sufficient analysis of labor, systemic rationalization and flexible production can help 





with German industrial sociologists on the topic of systemic rationalization, explains, the 
methodological tool that the studies of systemic rationalization scholars use, that is, the 
industrial case study, “leads researchers into the production area where they examine the 
effects of the technological and organizational structures on workers in detail.” And one 
way to examine this issue is through the study of the management of labor within certain 
industries (see Wright and Lund 2003).  
But aside from this methodological question, the theory of systemic 
rationalization, as well as Harrison’s work on flexible production, is a critical response to 
other theories of work published in the 1980s and early 1990s—such as those of Michael 
Piore and Charles Sabel—which put forward the idea that the trend was “toward a 
‘professional’ work pattern in which all workers have greater autonomy and 
responsibility in a more open work and company organization as an important component 
of a new, post-Tayloristic phase of industrial development” (Altmann, et.al. 1992:4-5). 
These patterns, according to such post-Tayloristic or post-Fordism theories, lead to 
supposedly “relatively egalitarian networks embedded in communities of skilled 
workers” (Devine 1996:50). While systemic rationalization scholars claim that some 
forms of work do “break with Tayloristic rationalization strategies” due to pressures from 
the sales markets to produce in a more flexible and integrated manner, what they 
emphasize is the fact that “[a]t the same time, powerful forces remain which push toward 
the continuation of Tayloristic forms of work organization even under altered 
circumstances” (Altmann, et.al. 1992:5). The classic characteristics of Tayloristic forms 






The separation of conception and execution in work; the extension of the 
division of labor according to functions, hierarchical levels and work 
tasks; the tendency to plan fully all production processes and to 
standardize the work process; careful control of performance, based on 
wage incentives; finally, and most strongly tied to the above-mentioned 
points, a widespread simplification of tasks and thus the deskilling and 
polarization of the labor force. (Altmann, et.al. 1992:4) 
 
In fact, systemic rationalization entails “heterogeneous structures” along the value 
chain that enable the persistence of conventional forms of production and work such as 
“Tayloristic forms of work, where economies of scale are still attained for parts of the 
final product; unfavorable working conditions where such conditions are still accepted 
while also incurring low costs, even given low productivity, as long as it is functional for 
the total productivity of the production network, etc.”—this leads to the conclusion that 
“with systemic rationalization there is no ‘good work’ without ‘bad work’!” Such 
heterogeneous production networks still have an “extensive share of areas operating on 
low technological levels with traditional forms of Tayloristic work organization.” The so-
called end of Taylorism is far from reality, and “a vast amount of work forms with a high 
division of labor remains in place in global networks” (Altmann and Deiß 1998:141-2, 
145). Similar with Harrison’s (1994) claim that lean, flexible production perpetuates and 
perhaps enhances the mean aspects of production—i.e., inequality among classes of 
workers and labor market segmentation (the “primary labor market,” where successful 
unions, relatively high wages, and job security exist vs. the “secondary labor market,” 
where workers are paid low wages and hold a precarious position)—systemic 
rationalization scholars argue that workers are polarized. Only in limited positions could 
we find shop-floor workers with greater autonomy and decision-making power as well as 





the hierarchy of the entire production chain” can find their positions become even more 
vulnerable (Altmann, et.al. 1992:7, see also Wright and Lund 2003).  
While the worsening position of workers is often only implied (if at all) in the 
GCC/GVC framework, the studies of systemic rationalization allow us to deal with the 
concrete details of how changes in the macro level—i.e., globalized production and the 
complexity of global supply chains—affect workers through an examination of labor-
management relations. As emphasized above, the supposed “decentralized” networks of 
production do not necessarily lead to the dispersion of power. In line with the problem in 
the control of technology and knowledge, practices such as outsourcing fail to guarantee 
greater autonomy, not only to workers who manufacture the goods, but also to the 
dependent companies along the chain who employ these workers. Systemic, supra-
company rationalization has instead created hierarchical structures in the production 
chain—consisting of dominant (or core) and dependent segments. Dominant firms can 
control the dependent ones through  
indirectly built-in control mechanisms, especially in simultaneous 
engineering, delivery on demand systems (just in time; JIT), ranking of 
suppliers by ABC-evaluation, and so forth, not to mention the continuing 
pressure on competitors for (supply) orders to disclose their costs, to keep 
to target prices, to orient themselves to benchmarks, and so on. This form 
of exerting influence is just as stringent for companies participating in the 
value creation chain as mere price and competitive pressure. Information 
technologies are the precondition and medium of the integration of 
production processes within the chain. (Altmann and Deiß 1998:139) 
 
The impact of such mechanisms for workers and unions is fundamental and tends 
to be devastating. Through their study of German industries, Altmann and Deiß 
(1998:151) argue that systemic rationalization “tends to result in a decentralization and 





influenced by specifications and regulations that are “made outside and beyond the 
boundaries of their companies and enterprises”—most likely shaped by the demands of 
dominant firms within the chain. Harrison (1994:211) argues similarly; the revival of 
labor market segmentation due to flexible production “further weakens the bargaining 
power of labor unions, making it more difficult for them to organize new workers and to 
pressure companies to innovate continually in order to generate the additional 
productivity out of which to meet a rising wage bill.” Especially when we talk about 
dependent firms, they do not have the resources and power needed to control innovative 
technology to begin with.   
The point here is that pressures exerted by dominant firms on dependent firms—
i.e., suppliers along the supply chain—will in the end affect the labor process and the 
bargaining power of workers who make the products. Unfortunately, although the studies 
of systemic rationalization and flexible production pay attention to the impact of these 
new forms of work organization on workers and unions, they often go around—instead of 
tackling—some aspects that are central to this subject: an elaboration of how the labor 
process is controlled through labor-management relations within the context of monopoly 
capitalism. To do this, it is necessary to bring in the analysis of the control of the labor 
process as offered by Marxists in the 1970s—whose emergence was largely influenced 
by the publication of Harry Braverman’s Labor and Monopoly Capital in 1974. In his 
review of Harrison’s Lean and Mean, James Devine (1996:52) mentions that although 
“Harrison’s theory is not based on a Marxian analysis of capitalism’s laws of motion,” he 
did see a “tendency toward deskilling that Harry Braverman stressed in his Labor and 





Braverman’s terms, “the destruction of craftsmanship”) still needs to be discussed as a 
process that, as Braverman sees it, “is not divorced from capitalist exploitation and 
accumulation” (Foster 2009:xviii). Thus, before we can apply the question of the control 
over the labor process to the current mechanisms of systemic rationalization and flexible 
production, we need to review first the approaches proposed by Braverman and other 
Marxist scholars to this issue.  
Control over The Labor Process in Monopoly Capitalism  
In Chapter 7 of the first volume of Capital, Marx (1976 [1867]:283) writes: 
“Labor is, first of all, a process between man and nature, a process by which man, 
through his own actions, mediates, regulates and controls the metabolism between 
himself and nature.” Through labor, humans produce use values to meet their needs—but 
this process differs from one mode of production to another, and for Marx, in the 
capitalist mode of production, the labor process is governed by exploitative capital-labor 
relations expressed through its organization of work. As studies of the labor process that 
emerged in the 1970s show, the organization of work in capitalist societies is not a 
“neutral productive instrument.” Instead, it is a political instrument “molded by the 
attempts of capitalists and their managerial representatives to exert control over 
recalcitrant workers on the shop floor” (Gartman 1978:97). Among these works, 
Braverman’s Labor and Monopoly Capital was one of the most important on the 
subject—a work that has since generated an “abundance of intellectual activity,” ranging 
from books, new courses, to conferences (Zimbalist 1979:xi).  
Braverman adopts Marx’s argument that labor power is transformed by 





“implications of this capitalist logic for the organization of work” (Attewell 1984:96). 
One especially valuable contribution of Braverman’s work to the discussion of the labor 
process is the fact that he developed an impressive analysis of the labor process under 
monopoly capitalism. Baran and Sweezy (1966:8) themselves admit in Monopoly Capital 
that they were aware that their approach in the book “resulted in almost total neglect of a 
subject which occupies a central place in Marx’s study of capitalism: the labor process.” 
And according to Sweezy (1998 [1974]:xxv) in his foreword to Braverman’s book, Labor 
and Monopoly Capital offers a “solidly successful effort to fill a large part of this gap.” 
Indeed, phenomena such as the growth of giant corporations and the “demise of 
internecine competition” are only two among many characteristics that accompanied the 
transition from competitive to monopoly capitalism. In fact, it is precisely this “highly 
successful battle of the employers and an army of industrial engineers to put the 
management of the labor process on a scientific footing”—in other words, as emphasized 
by Braverman, “the implementation of Taylorism” (Foster 1984:66). It was this process, 
“more than anything else,” argues Foster (1984:66), which made the emergence of 
monopoly capital “possible and inevitable.” The growth of the giant corporations and 
Taylor’s scientific management were closely linked. In The Wealth of Nations, Adam 
Smith (1910 [1776]:15) writes that the extent of the division of labor “must always be 
limited by the extent…of the market” and the scale of production. In the context of 
monopoly capitalism, this means that the “growth in firm size made the implementation 
of industrial engineering cost efficient,” and it became “the main source of the 
‘economies of scale’ of big business.” As a result, giant firms accrued “prodigious 





transition from freely competitive capitalism to the new regime of monopolistic 
competition” (Foster 1984:67).  
Marx himself pointed out this form of capitalist development when he wrote 
about the “real subsumption of labor under capital” in “Results of the Immediate Process 
of Production” (included in the first volume of Capital in the Penguin edition)—a 
possible development that did not yet exist in his time. For Marx (1976 [1867]:1035), the 
real subsumption of labor “transforms the nature of the labor process and its actual 
conditions,” and it was “developed in all the forms evolved by relative surplus value” that 
center on the increase of productivity. Further, he states: “With the real subsumption of 
labor under capital, all the changes in the labor process…now become reality. The social 
forces of production of labor are now developed, and with large-scale production comes 
the direct application of science and technology.” What Marx “foresees” here is the 
development of Taylorism—“an attempt to apply the methods of science to the 
increasingly complex problems of the control of labor in rapidly growing capitalist 
enterprises”—along with the scientific-technological revolution, which enabled the 
appropriation and commodification of science and innovative technology by capital to 
respond to its immediate needs (Braverman 1998[1974]:59). Both are used by capital to 
restructure the organization of work and bring the control of the labor process to a whole 
new level, in an effort to increase relative surplus value as driven by capital accumulation 
under monopoly capitalism.  
In general, Braverman expands Marx’s fundamental idea that labor power is 
transformed by management “into work actually done in order to ensure profitability”—





work” (Attewell 1984:96). Rejecting Adam Smith’s assertion that the division of labor is 
merely a matter of technical efficiency and an enhancement of specific work skills that 
would lead to a “proportionable increase of the productive powers of labor” (Smith (1910 
[1776]:6), Braverman starts his analysis from the work of classical liberal theorists of 
management, Charles Babbage and Andrew Ure—whose works provided a rebuttal to 
Smith’s argument, fifty years after The Wealth of Nations was published. These theorists 
argue that the division of labor is a mechanism that serves as a means to reduce labor 
costs “through the systematic degradation of human labor” (Foster 1998:xvi). Adopting 
this, Braverman claims that “the deskilling of work and a fine division of labor” are 
dictated by cost considerations (Attewell 1984:96).  
In other words, capitalist logic creates the necessity to cheapen labor whenever 
possible. Breaking down complex skilled tasks into simple, routinized ones is the easiest 
way to do this. The Babbage principle, writes Braverman (1998 [1974]:57) shows that the 
labor power capable of doing the labor process “may be purchased more cheaply as 
disassociated elements than as a capacity integrated in a single worker.” He then 
concludes that labor power is a commodity, and once it is sold, “its uses are no longer 
organized according to the needs and desires of those who sell it, but rather according to 
the needs of its purchasers, who are, primarily, employers seeking to expand the value of 
their capital. And it is a special and permanent interest of these purchasers to cheapen this 
commodity.” Taylorism embodies this principle to the core—it is a reflection of “nothing 
more than the outlook of the capitalist with regard to the conditions of production” 





But the main point of Braverman’s argument is not merely the issue of cheapened 
labor, but above all else of how capitalists control labor through management, and how 
this whole process is “dominated and shaped by the accumulation of capital” (Braverman 
1998 [1974]:37). Taylorism exerts control through these mechanisms: (1) the 
“dissociation of the labor process from the skills of the workers,” (2) the “separation of 
conception from execution,” and (3) the use of “monopoly over knowledge to control 
each step of the labor process and its mode of execution” (Braverman 1998 [1974]:77-
83). With the implementation of these mechanisms, workers become more dependent on 
management. Whenever workers hold control over their own knowledge of their skilled 
or craft labor, it is management who is dependent upon them. So the strategy is to 
appropriate their knowledge and skills by reorganizing work “into narrow, low-skilled 
jobs with no conceptual content” and transforming workers into “mere executors of 
work”; this, in turn, results in a “steady degradation” and the deskilling of labor (Attewell 
1984:97). Marx himself addresses the issue of control in the labor process in the first 
volume of Capital: “The driving motive and determining purpose of capitalist production 
is the self-valorization of capital to the greatest possible extent, i.e. the greatest possible 
production of surplus-value, hence the greatest possible exploitation of labor-power by 
the capitalist” (Marx 1976 [1867]:449). 
What is also important for Marx is that he sees the issue of control not as merely 
something natural that comes out of the cooperative production of use values, but “by 
antagonistic relations of production under which use values are produced”—namely, 
class struggle (Gartman 1978:103). As Marx (1976 [1867]:449) continues in his quote 





to the domination of capital, and, necessarily, the pressure put on by capital to overcome 
this resistance. The control exercised by the capitalist is not only a special function 
arising from the nature of the social labor process, and peculiar to that process, but it is at 
the same time a function of the exploitation of a social labor process, and is consequently 
conditioned by the unavoidable antagonism between the exploiter and the raw material of 
his exploitation.”  
It is precisely in this spirit that Braverman elaborates the question of control. For 
him, the issue of management control is examined as something that is born out of social 
relations within history—and in the context of the capitalist mode of production, the 
relations are in the form of class struggle. In modern capitalism, (Braverman 1998 
[1974]:47) writes, it was not the “modern” element that gave birth to the new situation, 
he claims. Rather, it was “the new social relations which now frame the production 
process, and the antagonism between those who carry on the process and those for whose 
benefit it is carried on, those who manage and those who execute, those who bring to the 
factory their labor power, and those who undertake to extract from this labor power the 
maximum advantage for the capitalist.” This position was later clarified by Andrew 
Zimbalist (1979:xii) in his introduction to an anthology of case studies on the labor 
process inspired by Braverman’s work: “Indeed, a central argument of the book is that 
the antagonism between classes gives rise to the problem of management and the 
degradation of labor.”  
Braverman was not the only author who dealt with the question of control and the 
labor process during that period. In the same year in which Braverman’s published his 





published in the Review of Radical Political Economics. Marglin’s paper was partly a 
critique of Adam Smith; similar to Braverman, Marglin (1974:62) argues that “the social 
function of hierarchical work organization is not technical efficiency, but accumulation.” 
Further, Marglin views specialization and separation of tasks in the division of labor 
under capitalism as a means to grant capitalists an essential role in the production 
process, namely, the role of integrator. Tracing his analysis to the period of nascent 
capitalism, Marglin uses the example of the “putting-out system”—in which workers 
made textiles by using their own simple machinery at home, with materials and specific 
tasks assigned by the capitalist, but no single workers produced the entire product—to 
highlight the first distinctly capitalist attempt to remove “individual producers from 
access to a market” and to allow the capitalist middle-man to gain profit (Attewell 
1984:109). Here, the role of capitalist as integrator is highlighted:   
Separating the tasks assigned to each workman was the sole means by 
which the capitalist could, in the days preceding costly machinery, ensure 
that he would remain essential to the production process as integrator of 
these separate operations into a product for which a wide market existed; 
and specialization of men to tasks at the sub-product level was the 
hallmark of putting-out system.  
The capitalist division of labor, as developed under the putting-out 
system, embodied the same principle that “successful” imperial powers 
have utilized to rule their colonies: divide and conquer. (Marglin 1974:70) 
 
In this early stage of capitalism, the putting-out system only eliminated the producer’s 
control over their own product, according to Marglin. It was not until the factory existed 
that this system was developed into one that managed to deprive the producer not only 
from the control over their product but also from the control over their labor process 
(Marglin 1974). But what needs to be emphasized here is Marglin’s attention to the issue 





how this origin of the fine division of labor “derived from the need to make workers 
dependent on the capitalist, and not from increased efficiency or other technological 
factors” (Attewell 1983:110).  
In conversation with Braverman’s work, David Gartman and Richard Edwards 
also elaborated the question of control in the labor process in their articles in The 
Insurgent Sociologist in 1978. Interpreting Marx’s discussion of control, Gartman 
(1978:103) argues that there are two types of control. The first one is basic control, a type 
of control that is necessary in any large-scale production of use values in order to 
“coordinate and direct the action of individual workers, no matter who appropriates the 
surplus, or how this is done.” The other type of control, surplus control, is the control that 
is specifically born out of the antagonistic relations of production—the class struggle—
where use values are produced. It takes the control of the labor process out of the hands 
workers. Driven by the motive to repress the resistance of the exploited workers, surplus 
control increases the rate of surplus value through means that allow capitalists “to make 
work more intense, extensive, and productive than laborers would voluntarily make it.”   
Richard Edwards (1979:111) offers a similar argument. He claims that the 
workplace is a “perpetual battleground”—the continuing conflict in the labor process is 
driven by the class division between workers and capitalists, and expressed in the effort 
by the latter to “extract the maximum effort from workers [who] necessarily resist their 
bosses’ impositions.” But what is especially worth noting from Edwards article is his 
attempt to expand Braverman’s analysis by offering three categories of control under 
monopoly capitalism, focusing on the organization of work in large corporations in 





personal control of individual workers by their employers. This type of control is actually 
no longer the “principal organizing device in today’s corporate sector” in advanced 
capitalist societies, although it may also accompany the execution of the other forms of 
control. The second one is technical control, where “the entire production process of the 
plant, or large segments of the plant, are based on a technology which paces and directs 
the labor process.” Technical control is not merely simple mechanization or simple 
machine pacing—but a form of technological evolution that is based on “the inherent 
class nature of capitalist production” and involves “designing machinery and planning the 
flow of work to minimize the labor/labor-power problem.” The last one is bureaucratic 
control, where workers are governed by “the firm’s law”—a rationalized set of rules and 
criteria determined by the top-echelon management. Through this form of control, the job 
of an individual worker is defined more by “formalized job descriptions or ‘work criteria’ 
attached to the job”—interpreted by their supervisors—“than by specific orders, 
directions, and whims of the supervisor.” Workers are evaluated, namely, disciplined and 
rewarded, using these criteria (Edwards 1978:115-119).  
These three forms of control can be a useful basis in our examination of the 
organization of work in its more complex forms—including the ones that can be seen 
from the relationship between core and dependent companies in labor-value chains, 
which in turn affects labor in the dependent companies, as alluded to by systemic 
rationalization scholars above. The point is, these types of control illustrate that the labor 
process continues to be an “arena of class conflict” under monopoly capitalism—and 





years have attempted to resolve the matter by reorganizing, indeed revolutionizing, the 
labor process itself” (Edwards 1978:112).  
 This, of course, brings us back to Braverman, whose work inspired Edwards’s 
elaboration of the control typology. One of Braverman’s most important arguments was 
in recognizing how the development of monopoly capitalism went simultaneously with 
the development of “scientific management”—also known as Taylorism, an organization 
of work based on the study of F.W. Taylor. Also starting during the late 1800s was the 
development of corporate research laboratories in the United States, with the first 
research organization “established for the specific purpose of systematic invention 
[being] set up by Thomas Edison at Menlo Park, New Jersey, in 1876, and the first 
government laboratories … established by the Department of Agriculture under the Hatch 
Act of 1887” (Braverman 1998 [1974]:112). This ties monopoly capitalism to scientific 
management and the scientific-technical revolution that is based on “the systematic use of 
science for the more rapid transformation of labor power into capital” (Braverman 1998 
[1974]:175). As Zimbalist (1979:xiii) writes, Braverman was “concerned with Taylorism 
as the expression of capitalist management ideology, as well as the reflection of a new 
division of labor and basic reorganization within the workplace.” Zimbalist reminds his 
readers that, for Braverman, the emphasis was on the idea that “the central lesson of 
Taylorism is the separation of skill and knowledge from the workers in the production 
process.” 
In its development, Tayloristic forms of work became the foundation of the 
(in)famous assembly lines in factories, a development that took place mostly in the late 





credited in the country to the system of work organization and technological innovation 
by Ford Motor Company, the giant corporation that manufactured automobiles—an 
association that later gave the alias “Fordism” to Tayloristic forms of work. What 
happened on the Ford shop floor was a prime example of what Braverman was alluding 
to: the application of the Babbage principle and the use of control over workers. In the 
case of Ford and similar U.S.-based companies (such as General Motors), as David 
Gartman (1979:196-7) points out, their “innovative” work organization was made 
possible by technological innovation of “precisely machined and thus interchangeable 
parts”—a development that was achieved as early as 1908 in the manufacturing industries 
of farm equipment, fire arms, and sewing machine, but was taken up by Ford Motor at an 
unprecedented pace and they soon surpassed other firms. In the same work, Gartman 
(1979:196) details an example of Fordism in his study of the company:  
Skilled assemblers became tied to one spot, and their discretionary time—
their wandering about—was cut down. They had to remain busy at their 
assembly work or suffer the harassment of Ford foremen. The pores of the 
working day were beginning to fill up, thus intensifying labor. In a further 
development, stock handlers, who transported the parts for an entire car on 
a truck, became specialized in handling one part only. Work within 
assembly gangs was also becoming progressively more divided. There 
seems to have been a division within the work gang first…then there 
emerged a specialization between gangs. One group of two to five men 
handled the attachment of the motor to the frame; other groups specialized 
in axles, springs, transmissions, etc. The gangs moved from one stationary 
chassis to the next as they completed their particular jobs. Thus, in the 
assembly department, the “all-round” mechanic slowly gave way to the 
specialized worker.  
 
Such “specialized” worker was easily replaced many others from the industrial 
reserve army, enabling the company to hire low-wage workers and decrease labor costs. 
This was a significant change from the company’s early years, where the labor process at 





intensity and productiveness of work” (Gartman 1979:195). But due to the reorganization 
of work described above, what was left in the labor process was only a series of 
fragmented, “specialized,” degraded tasks that were meaningless and of no importance 
when done on its own. This is captured well in the following conversation between a 
superintendent of an automobile factory in Geneva, Switzerland and his newly hired 
employee who happened to be an ex-Ford worker. The superintendent just found out that 
the new employee “did not even know where or how to commence the assembly” (cited 
from a Federal Trade Commission document in Gartman 1979:203):  
“We thought you were a skilled erector of automobiles.” 
“I thought I was,” replied the new employee.  
“Where did you work?”  
“At the plant of Ford Motor Co.”  
“What did you do?”  
“I screwed on nut No. 58.” 
 
Such an understanding and description of the Tayloristic forms of work are of 
course not news in sociology and other related social sciences. In addition to the studies 
about this subject in the United States, in the last two decades or so, studies about 
assembly lines performed in the global South by low-wage workers, mostly women, have 
also deepened our understanding about the impact of such forms of work on workers and 
their vulnerable, precarious position—down to the discussion of how such labor process 
affects their bodies (see e.g., Caraway 2007; Enloe 2004; Fuentes and Ehrenreich 1983; 
Mills 2003, Ong 1991; Pun 2005; Salzinger 2003). But what Braverman and other 
Marxist scholars discussed here offer us an understanding of the fundamental 
mechanisms that underlie working life: the implementation of control over the labor 
process that gives capital “the ability to increase exploitation and hence surplus value” 





 In the light of the works on the labor process above, through the concept of labor-
value chains, we need to rethink the main goal of the implementation of control in such 
chains: it is not merely to increase efficiency and productivity, as capitalists seem to have 
expressed (and as echoed by many theories of supply chains), but at its core is the 
extraction of surplus driven by capital accumulation, as reflected in the quest for low unit 
labor costs by multinationals. This, and some misconceptions perpetuated in the 
discussion of supply chains—including those that belong to systemic rationalization and 
flexible production schools—will be briefly examined below.  
Straightening the Assumptions  
Both systemic rationalization scholars and the “lean and mean production” 
proponent Bennett Harrison seem to mostly point to heightened competition—both on 
national and international levels—as the main drive for changes in production, 
administration, and distribution processes to forms that are deemed more flexible and 
economical. For Dieter Sauer and his coauthors (1992:46), German sociologists and 
proponents of systemic rationalization, heightened competition is included with other 
factors, including increasing market saturation, shorter product life cycles, and “the 
pressure exerted by rising internal costs.” But in general, these scholars often only 
mention the causes of the emergence of these “new” strategies in passing, driven mostly 
by the increasing national and global competition. The emphasis was more on the enabler 
of such strategies, namely, the “availability of computer-aided organization and control 






Similarly, Harrison (1994:126) sees the emergence of production networks as a 
result of “a veritable sea change in the nature of international economic competition” 
geared by the declining profits influenced by economic crisis; further, with the 
development of new technologies onto the factory and office floor, this then created the 
increase in the number of competing firms both in developed and developing countries. 
Thus flexible production and the rise of production networks were a response to this 
growing competition: “Of all the reactions, all the experiments, the most far-reaching 
may well turn out to be the creation by managers of boundary-spanning networks of 
firms, linking together big and small companies operating in different industries, regions, 
and even countries. This development—not an explosion of individual entrepreneurship 
or a proliferation of geographically concentrated industrial districts, per se—is the signal 
economic experience of our era.” In this sense, lean production—that entails the greater 
use of outsourcing of work to smaller suppliers, or the increase in the employment of 
contingent, low-wage workers by big corporations—is a form of “experimental reactions 
by big business to the trauma of the worldwide economic crisis of the 1970s and early 
1980s” (Harrison 1994:127).  
 The fact that the emergence of production networks was a response to such 
corporate trauma is not much of a debatable subject. Inventing strategies to create more 
profit and offset loses is probably a “natural” task for corporate management everywhere 
at anytime, let alone when their losses are large, as in the time of economic crisis. But I 
argue that this alone is not enough to explain the driving forces that underlie the creation 
of production networks that are viewed by both Harrison and the German industrial 





control—not only over workers, but over smaller, dependent companies. It is also 
necessary to see the larger macro processes that are related to monopoly capitalism, 
including stagnation.  
As we see in Chapter 2, unlike what could happen under competitive capitalism, 
practices such as price-cutting—where this would seriously endanger profit margins—
rarely occur in monopoly capitalism. Instead, price increases occur in tandem, usually 
under the leadership of the most powerful corporations in the industry. As a result, we are 
witnessing the “law of rising surplus” under monopoly capitalism (Baran and Sweezy 
1966:72).10 And as discussed above, since its earlier development in the late 1800s, 
monopoly capitalism has been accompanied by the massive reorganization of work 
enabled by a systematic application of scientific management and a commodification and 
appropriation of science and technology. This led to the ability of giant firms to accrue 
large amount of profits due to the increase in productivity. With the growing 
concentration (the growth in scale of individual firms) and centralization (as illustrated by 
phenomena like mergers) of capital under monopoly capitalism, surplus production also 
keeps growing, and productive capacity becomes larger than the market. This, in turn, 
contributes to stagnation.  
Indeed, as Baran and Sweezy (1966:108) argue, stagnation—marked by “a pattern 
of slow growth and rising unemployment and excess capacity, with capital formation 
fluctuating around the level of zero net investment” (Foster 1987:62)—has become “the 
																																																								
10 Baran and Sweezy (1966:9-10) define surplus as “the difference between what a society produces and the 
costs of producing it. The size of the surplus is an index of productivity and wealth, of how much freedom 
a society has to accomplish whatever goals it may set for itself. The composition of the surplus shows how 
it uses that freedom: how much it invests in expanding its productive capacity, how much it consumes in 






normal state of the monopoly capitalist economy” since it has become its defining, most 
persistent characteristic. In an oligopolistic system, high productivity and the ban on 
price-cutting together create such a huge and growing surplus that cannot be absorbed by 
investment and capitalist consumption. Constrained by capital’s “neurosis” towards state 
intervention in private profit, surplus cannot be absorbed by government civilian 
spending. This results in the dependence on great waste in areas such as military 
spending and speculative finance, which function as “external stimulants boosting 
production”—but stimulants are just drugs: they are “bound to prove inadequate to 
support the economy over time, since bigger and bigger injections [are] needed just to get 
it going” (Foster and Magdoff 2009:15).  
The financial sector uses a lot of resources, and it “does its part to offset the 
surplus productivity of modern industry” (Sweezy and Magdoff 1987:102).11 However, 
the financial sector does not produce any commodities with significant use value. One 
main consequence is that the production sector becomes idle—investments hardly flow to 
the production sector, and demand becomes stagnant. In turn, the cost of production is 
trimmed, and workers are usually the main victims; their wages are cut or they get laid 
off. Another consequence is the rise of “speculative psychology” in the financial 
community, namely, the search for bigger profits through quick, speculative means that 
result in crises. In the end, we can say that the dominating presence of the financial 
sphere perpetuates stagnation in the sphere of production, and inflation in the financial 
																																																								
11 Sweezy and Magdoff (1987:102-3) claim the following as examples of “real resources”: the high 
consumption by millions of employees in the financial sector—who “consume on the average as much as 
(and perhaps even more than) employees in the rest of the economy; fancy buildings where financial 
offices, including banks, are located; and a “very substantial part of the output of the hi-tech industries 






sector.12 Overall, this is the situation under monopoly capitalism—where stagnation has 
become the normal state.  
Interestingly, the issue of “secular stagnation” has now occupied the hot seat and 
been discussed widely by orthodox (neoclassical) economists, especially since it was 
brought up by Larry Summers in a 2013 IMF meeting—who referred back to the work of 
Alvin Hansen, a prominent Keynesian in the United States, in the 1930s and 1940s. In a 
Foreign Affairs article, titled “The Age of Secular Stagnation,” Summers (2016) 
continues to write about how the recovery from current crises and recessions, in the U.S. 
and the world, “has fallen significantly short of predictions” and “far weaker than its 
predecessors”—this is dangerous and thus, alleviating the pain caused by secular 
stagnation, Summers argues, is “of profound importance.” But sadly, as the editors of 
Monthly Review said in their notes in January 2016, these discussions fail to take into 
account “the role of Marxian and heterodox thinkers, who have been developing the 
stagnation thesis in great historical and theoretical detail for more than half a century, 
building on the debates of the 1930s.” This prompted several critical responses from the 
left, including one from Charles Mudede (2013), who wrote a column for Seattle’s 
weekly The Stranger, titled “What If Economists for Once Give Marxists Some Fucking 
Credit?” There, he criticizes Paul Krugman—who writes about how today’s stagnation 
could be the “new normal”—for ignoring the decades of work “on this very subject by 
Marxists (most notably the late Paul Sweezy) at the Monthly Review since the 1970s.”  
																																																								
12 This is a critique of a position held by many economists, even ones on the left, who often disregard the 
fundamental logic of financialization. They instead see it as the culprit that causes stagnation, while 
disregarding the real problem. In this view, phenomena such as wage stagnation and increased income 
inequality are a result of “changes wrought by financial sector interests” (see Foster and Magdoff 
2009:106). The idea can be traced back to Hyman Minsky, who puts financialization in the execution chair 





Not long after Summers delivered the speech at the IMF meeting, Krugman also 
wrote several essays in the New York Times, supporting Summers’ argument—in one of 
them, Krugman (2013) went as far as claiming that not only was Summers right, but that 
he presented a “radical manifesto.” In his recent column entitled “Robber Baron 
Recessions,” writing about Verizon’s monopoly power, Krugman (2016) writes: “And 
Verizon’s case isn’t unique. In recent years many economists, including people like Larry 
Summers and [myself], have come to the conclusion that growing monopoly power is a 
big problem for the U.S. economy.” No mention of the decades of work by Marxists on 
monopoly capitalism and the stagnation thesis. But “ignorance” aside, the fact that 
stagnation has even entered the mainstream discourse suggests not only the significance 
of Marxist approaches but also that of the analysis of crises that pays attention to the 
dynamics of capitalism itself, as offered by overaccumulation theorists and their 
examination of monopoly capital.  
There are several points that can be evaluated here. First, in relation to the claim 
proposed by systemic rationalization scholars and by Harrison regarding the heightened 
competition that is said to drive the emergence of production networks or supply chains. 
The so-called competition is not in the form of what these scholars imply in their 
discussions: it is not based on a system where everybody—big and small firms in both 
global North and global South—is engaged in fighting amidst competition. Dependent 
suppliers in production networks, due to their small size and lack of power, may have to 
face such a heightened competition to get “high-class” multinational customers, for 
example, but it is a different story for these very high-class customers themselves. Even 





respects, “the goal is always the creation [or] perpetuation of monopoly power—that is, 
the power to generate persistent, high, economic profits through a markup on prime 
production costs” (Foster 2000:7). Systemic rationalization and lean, flexible production 
are not merely new management strategies to be more economical—just like global labor 
arbitrage is not only an imperative to search for efficiencies needed for survival. Viewing 
it within the context of the oligopolistic nature of monopoly capital, it is an attempt to 
extract surplus from workers in places where they can be superexploited. In the context 
of global commodity chains, these are mostly workers from the global South.  
Second, monopoly (or monopoly-finance) capital’s severe “addiction” to 
stimulants needed to boost growth is not a mere abstract economic process. To deal with 
the financial fragility problem, the system always needs “constant new infusions of 
cash”—but instead of cutting profit, giant corporations obtains this cash from the 
“working population through drastic increases in exploitation” (Foster and Magdoff 
2009:74). And as Sweezy and Magdoff (1987: 103-4) emphasizes, stagnation in the 
productive sector means, among others, “trimming costs of production (especially by 
firing workers and cutting wages).” On the global level, global labor arbitrage, through its 
specific practices such as arm’s length contracting, does precisely that—corporations are 
cutting their costs at the expense of labor by moving production to places that have the 
lowest unit labor costs possible.   
This also means the idea that the search for greater productivity is the main aim of 
the creation of production networks, as proposed by systemic rationalization scholars, 
does not tell the whole story. After the crisis of 1974-75, the mainstream and business 





the severe recession on the “supposed slowing down” of labor productivity (defined as 
the output per man-hour of its workers)—this simply means that rather than focusing on 
the persistent stagnation and the growing oligopolistic power in the U.S. economy, the 
representatives of capital think that “workers are simply not producing enough” (Magdoff 
and Sweezy 1979:1). This supposed drop in U.S. productivity is seen as threatening to the 
nation’s economic growth as well as leading to the danger of increasing inflation and 
unemployment. But what was addressed by the economists, businessmen, and 
government officials during that period was not precisely a decline in labor productivity; 
instead, what was actually being claimed was that “the rate of increase in labor 
productivity in recent years has not been as large as it was in the early postwar decades” 
(Magdoff and Sweezy 1979:2). Most importantly, this rhetoric conceals the fact that 
productivity never stopped increasing. Accompanied by examples from the U.S. 
automotive industry, in another article published a year later, Magdoff and Sweezy 
(1980:7) conclude that:  
all this statistical flimflamming has effectively served to conceal the 
deeper implications of productivity changes in the recent history of 
capitalism. The truth is that it is the enormous and persistent growth of 
productivity in the factory and on the farm that has provided a sufficient 
surplus of goods to support the growth of an expanding and increasingly 
complex service economy…. And if this very real increase in labor 
productivity shows up less and less in benefits for the mass of people, the 
reason is the growing irrationality and wastefulness of monopoly 
capitalism as it channels more and more labor into activities having to do 
with the making and spending of profits and less and less into useful 
pursuits that could serve the needs of the people.  
 
 Seen in this light, then, increasing productivity in the era of labor-value chains is 
not a goal in itself. What global capital is after through global labor arbitrage is, as 





labor productivity but also on wage or the price of labor power (see also Edwards 1978). 
Yes, the systemic rationalization and the lean, flexible production may provide means to 
increase productivity—but not forced merely by the development of information 
technology or to offset a loss experienced by capital in the times of crisis. Instead, labor 
productivity is “powered by the needs of the capital accumulation process,” where means 
to exploit labor are continuously searched for and applied to production (Braverman 
1998[1974]:141].  
But that issue aside, the studies of systemic rationalization and flexible production 
are particularly useful in placing the significant question of control into the realm of 
production networks, bridging the abstract workings of the world capitalist economy and 
the concrete processes that happen between firms as well as inside the firms (i.e., labor-
management relations and the labor process)—as long as we are able to re-contextualize 
the issue within the frame of the workings of exploitation and capital accumulation under 
monopoly capitalism.  
In addition, we also need to consider the geographical context of our approach. 
While the GCC/GVC studies lack the component of power and control, they are usually 
global in scope—a characteristic lacking in most studies conducted using the systemic 
rationalization framework, since they usually focus on the European (especially German) 
industries. The same issue can be applied to Harrison’s work, which, although he 
includes the discussion of Nike’s global reach in one of his chapters, still mainly focuses 
on the forming of networks in the triad and their consequences for U.S. workers and 
unions. As Devine (1996) points out, “capitalism’s globalization pushes us to transcend 





conversation. By using examples from Indonesia’s local companies who are catering to 
multinational corporations in labor-value chains, I wish to deliver an analysis of such 








“WE’RE JUST A SEAMSTRESS”: 
 




I know that the sales department is supposed to service customers, but we also need to 
educate them, so that our company can run smoothly. This way, it’s not always the case 
when a customer tells us to do A, we do A. If they want B, we give them B. As it is now, 
we only follow their lead, and because we have a lot of customers, we have to run all 
over the place. 
Star Inc. Executive 
 
That’s why, in management, we can’t afford not to be vague. We’re not supposed to. We 
must be strict. If yes, say yes. Be clear…. It’s not easy to manage human resource…. We 
must be careful, if we make a mistake in our decision, that’s it. All would go to shambles. 
Workers would become uncomfortable, and finally, they would reach out to a third party, 
to a labor union. Then [chaos] would ensue. 
Star Inc. Executive 
 
 
 In a 2016 online article written by an Asian Development Bank economist, 
Indonesia is hailed as a country with “dynamic, youthful labor” that has become “a 
magnet for foreign investment” and “a driver of economic growth” over the last twenty 
years (Allen 2016). Indeed, as mentioned in the Introduction, Indonesia has been a “hot 
bed” for foreign direct investment, with FDI net inflows continuing to increase since the 
1970s, and only minor downturns after the 1997 crisis. In addition to FDI, as we saw in 
Chapter 2, Indonesia holds the third place—“defeated” only by China and India (although 
the percentage is much lower than these two countries)—in share of all jobs in global 
supply chains. This suggests that Indonesia has also become a destination for the Low-
Cost Country Strategy, or global labor arbitrage, where local companies produce 





corporations. Nike Corporation is an example. It moved its production from South Korea 
to Indonesia in the 1980s, before it pulled out and moved to China (see Enloe 2004), in 
its relentless quest to find the lowest unit labor costs.  
But the classic example of Indonesian low-wage workers, mostly women, 
assembling shoes or electronics for multinationals in “sweatshops” located in Export 
Processing Zones is not the only way that global South countries are incorporated into 
globalized production. Some variations exist—among them are the two Indonesian 
companies who are the subjects of case studies here: Java Film and Star Inc.13 Both are 
B2B (business-to-business) companies that often refer to themselves as companies that 
belong to the “capital-intensive” category—as opposed to “labor-intensive” industries 
such as textiles and electronics, although the number of workers varies according to 
different segments of their production. Java Film is a plastic manufacturer. Their plastic 
(film) is usually sold as a material for what is referred to as “flexible packaging” used for 
a variety of FMCG (fast-moving consumer goods, or also as known as consumer 
packaged goods) products—from cigarette wrappers to shampoo labels to food packages. 
Their customers can be (1) the main companies who produce these cigarettes, shampoo, 
and food varieties—to which they sell the film directly; or (2) companies who serve as 
converters, i.e., converting companies that put logos, texts, etc. on the plain film and 
transform them into labels used for packaging. Star Inc. is an example of this latter type. 
They buy materials from companies like Java Film and print on them for their customers, 
which belong to the first type of customers of Java Film. Depending on the customers’ 
																																																								
13 These are pseudonyms. See Appendix (“Some Notes on the Methodology for the Case Studies”) for more 





orders, sometimes the finished goods produced by Star Inc. are in the form of printed 
plastic film, or packaging “bags,” such as standing pouches for cooking oil.  
So, it is possible that Java Film and Star Inc. have the same customers, and they 
often do. Included in their list of customers are several giant multinational corporations. 
Most of them are based in the triad—the United States, Western Europe, and Japan—to 
where they export their goods directly (or, in very few cases, to their subsidiaries in 
neighboring Southeast Asian countries). This portion of their production is a 
straightforward example of these companies’ participation in labor-value chains. They 
supply to multinational corporations based in the global North by exporting the 
packaging materials used for the brands owned by these multinationals, to be consumed 
in the home market.  
In addition to that, there are variations in the destination of where their products 
go once they are finished. The majority of their finished goods (approximately 70 percent 
for each company) are sent to other factories that process the final products for their 
customers, also in Indonesia. There, the packaging is filled with the appropriate content 
until it becomes the final product. There are variations in this portion as well. If the 
customers are local (some of their customers are big Indonesian conglomerates), the 
finished packaging is sent to their customers’ factories. If the customers are 
multinationals, it is sent to their subsidiaries in Indonesia. After the packaging is filled 
with their products, these multinational brands are then exported somewhere else, 
including to their home market, by these subsidiaries themselves. A large portion of these 
brands, however, is sold directly to retail within the national market. The executives I 





a common strategy for giant multinational corporations, in an effort to minimize the risks 
and cut production costs. Obviously, it is a much more cost efficient option compared to 
producing these products in the countries where the multinationals are located and then 
exporting them to their markets abroad.  
Export orders are deemed important and significant for these two companies. 
Although the share of exports in their production output is not as large as the domestic 
component, they assign special managers—whom I also interviewed—to deal with 
exports. Regardless of this fact, even though Java Film and Star Inc. do not exclusively 
engage in direct exports and their products are also consumed in Indonesia, as we shall 
see, the main customers who order these products include big multinationals and, due to 
that, they deal with a lot of issues in relation to flexible production driven by dominant 
multinational companies—even when the multinationals are represented by their 
subsidiaries. The operating procedures are the same in their production of packaging for 
multinationals, whether the goods are for export or for the local market. Their business 
deal with multinationals is key here, and it is their relationship with their multinational 
clients that will be the focus of this chapter. Regardless of the difference in the final 
destination of their production output, these companies are still subject to the same 
processes that characterize systemic rationalization and flexible production. They are 
third-party subcontractors that supply to multinationals, while they also have their own 
suppliers—both national- and foreign-based. In this sense, they take the role of dependent 
companies within labor-value chains.  
In this chapter, I use the case studies of these companies to illustrate the processes 





generalization, but rather a complementary analysis that can help provide a concrete 
picture of what actually happens at factory plants where the commodities are produced. 
While there are already plenty of academic analyses as well as journalistic reports on how 
factories in the global South are run and how it affects their workers, through this study, I 
present the viewpoint of management from the dependent companies to examine their 
relationship with multinational customers, as well as with their workforce—amidst the 
processes of systemic rationalization and flexible production that govern this relationship. 
Their views give us a window into their position within labor-value chains: as a 
representative of global South capital who, on the one hand, is subordinate to global 
North-based multinationals but, on the other hand, is exploitative of its own labor.  
The discussion is divided into three sections. The first section examines how 
dominant, multinational companies control the technological knowledge in labor-value 
chains, depriving the dependent companies of their autonomy. The second section 
focuses on the issue of flexibility, especially in terms of the specific processes demanded 
by multinationals from their suppliers, while the third one examines how such processes 
enable various forms of control over labor and the labor process.  
Control of Technology  
 Technology is a central component of present day labor-value chains. As 
discussed earlier, the development of technology, particularly information technology, 
allows production to be done outside the core companies but with control largely 
remaining held by these core, dominant companies. Both systemic rationalization theories 
and the discussion of flexible production reject the idea that the supposed decentralized 





firms. This, of course, holds true on the global level as well. Examples from Java Film 
and Star Inc. can illustrate this situation. As dependent suppliers, they lack control of 
many aspects, as we will see throughout the discussion in this chapter. One of the most 
important aspects is technology. Seen from a critical lens, even when the companies see 
technology as their way to excel in their respective industries, their business relationship 
with their customers, especially multinationals, suggests that, at the end of the day, the 
control over technology is still held by the latter. Thus, it would be very difficult for 
dependent companies to have significant autonomy in terms of their technological 
development and innovation.  
 Java Film and Star Inc. are not shoes or electronics factories depicted in various 
studies, journalistic reports, or campaigns about the devastating impact of globalized 
production on assembly workers, mostly women. Most of their executives differentiated 
their companies from those in “labor-intensive” industries and emphasized their 
technological and R&D (Research and Development) components. Inside their 
factories—except in very few segments of their production sites, where some form of 
assembly lines still exist (although they are nothing like what one would find in Foxconn 
plants, for example)—you would only find lines of machines working automatically, with 
a few workers here and there across the shop floors, and the majority of them are men.14 
																																																								
14 Workers on the shop floor in both companies are mostly men, except in some segments of production 
where the labor intensity is higher—the “finishing” segment at Java Film and the “bag-making” segment at 
Star Inc. The latter is particularly filled with women workers. This is a topic that I cannot discuss here—but 
it is worth noting that this gender composition of workers is based on gendered assumptions that underlie 
the division of labor. It is in line with the arguments of studies that focus on the gendered international 
division of labor, where workers in labor-intensive, export-oriented industries are overwhelmingly women 
due to the stereotypes regarding their “dexterity” and “docility” (see e.g., Fuentes and Ehrenreich 1983, 
Salzinger 2003). The executives I interviewed told me that the reason behind hiring mostly men was 
because their companies were considered heavy-industry, where jobs performed required “heavy-duty” 
tasks in needed of “men’s strength.” The claimed reason behind the hiring of mostly women in segments 





These machines are operated remotely from a room filled with computers. Of course, 
labor still holds a major role in these two companies, and as we shall see later, their labor 
process is subject to control and working conditions can be problematic. But seen from 
“outside,” what comes to mind is the idea of high-tech, modern factories that are neat and 
clean. One Java Film executive even told me, “I can confidently say, we are the cleanest 
[factory] in Indonesia already… When our machines suppliers’ technicians visited us 
from Germany, they said, ‘Wow, you’re really clean.’” At the Star Inc. plant, one can 
visit their R&D office and would find a modern laboratory equipped with high-tech tools.  
 The point here is not only that these factories can be considered exceptional in 
terms of their cleanliness—these two factories produce plain film or packaging materials 
for a lot of food companies, so it follows that hygiene is an important factor—but also 
that their top management claims that their companies excel in technology and R&D. In 
fact, both Java Film and Star Inc. see themselves as players in the niche market of their 
respective industries—a specialty that focuses on “high-end,” “high-margin” products. In 
the case of Java Film, this means that, with very few exceptions (in cases where they 
produce low-end products “just to keep the relationship going with certain customers”), 
they do not produce what they call “commodity products” like plastic bags. They only 
produce specialized products, like plain plastic film that serves as material for cigarette 
packages or food products (such as snacks or tea boxes), or laminating material for 
magazine covers or smart phone boxes.  These products are considered high-end due to at 
																																																																																																																																																																					
and able to “pay attention to details.” These qualities were considered important by my interviewees 
because in the bag-making segment, workers have to work really carefully to avoid mistakes and minimize 
the risk of having the products returned by customers. Also, they had to pay attention to small things, such 
as making sure that there were no little bugs like mosquitos trapped in the bags they make. If there were 
even one mosquito stuck in one bag, the whole batch of products would be returned—creating a big loss in 





least two reasons, according to the Java Film executives: either (1) their specifications 
cannot be easily produced by just any plastic company, or (2) even though the 
specifications are not that special, the products are designed specifically to fit well with 
their customers’ machines. For Star Inc., “high-end” (or “middle-high”) products are 
related to the complexities of the product materials. For example, packaging that is made 
out of aluminum foil—a material that apparently is difficult to handle.  
 For both of these companies, focusing their production on such high-end products 
is above all a strategy to survive the competition within their respective industries, by 
reducing the scope of their competition. Java Film executives often expressed their 
inability to compete with Chinese and Indian plastic manufacturers due to their scale. As 
one of them said, “A lot of the big Indian and Chinese manufacturers that are our 
competitors, they have a lot of lines, like 15, 16 machines, big ones. But they sell very 
basic film, like plastic bags….We don’t compete on that. We try to have our own niche 
market. So niche market means…price is stable, doesn’t fluctuate much. That’s the kind 
of market we want.” The case is similar for Star Inc., who “prefers” to compete with a 
few of the established converting companies who also produce middle-high products 
instead of competing with a bunch of other companies, big and small, who still produce 
low-end products such as candy wrappers. With this, Star Inc. does not have to worry 
about the emergence of many new smaller-size converting plants, since they do not 
consider them as threatening competitors.  
 When I talked to the executives in both companies, “innovation” seemed to be the 
buzzword. Because they played in the niche market, they told me, innovation and 





their emphasis on product diversification, where they produce various specialty film (for 
Java Film) or packaging materials (for Star Inc.), follows from this idea.  Again, with the 
aim of reducing competition, a Java Film executive argued that they had to “make use of 
the technology and product development techniques” that they currently had so that they 
did not have to face competition from the big plastic manufacturers with giant plants. 
This notion was also entertained at Star Inc. as well. One executive expressed this in 
terms of being a leader in the converting industry: “We used to be a follower, but now we 
want to be a leader. That’s why we must look for new innovations—new technology, the 
latest innovations, and top-of-the-line machinery.” Some seemed more optimistic than 
others about this issue, but there was a consensus among the executives at the two 
companies that they were at least “forced” to be more “technology-minded” than other 
similar companies because they were playing in the niche market.  
On the surface, this situation seems to correspond with the “thriving of small 
firms” idea that Harrison (1994) rejects: smaller size firms like Java Film and Star Inc. 
could excel because they focus on the niche market centered on technological 
development. But once we dig deeper, things are not as they seem to be. As I elaborated 
further on the issue of technology and R&D, it became clear that the executives 
themselves were aware that they had very limited autonomy and control in technology, 
among other problems. There are of course some kinds of “innovative” application of 
technology in both companies. At Star Inc., for example, they try to apply the most 
efficient printing techniques that in general create better results for their products. But the 
technology itself came from other more developed companies in the industries, often 





technicians. At Java Film, they try to excel, for example, in their choosing of the perfect 
materials, including in terms of using better additives (materials that are not the main raw 
materials such as resin) that can increase the quality of their products. They also made 
small “innovations” such as creating materials for window envelopes that do not require 
adhesives.  
But most of the time, for these two companies, what is considered “innovation” is 
often nothing more than meeting a customer’s need, namely, finding a product mix that is 
suitable for what is asked by the customer. For example, a packaging product that is 
designated for liquid shampoo whose shelf life is five years is different than a packaging 
product that is designated for a food product whose shelf life is only six months. In 
addition, they need to think about the climate—what kind of material that is suitable for 
storing goods in a humid Indonesian climate, or that is suitable for the climate of the 
countries they ship their goods to, in the case of exports. At Star Inc., for example, they 
often have to “develop” (read: copy) a material composition that is new to them in order 
to correctly cater to the specification given by a customer. They have to test this new 
product in their laboratory and everything else before giving it to the customer to test it in 
their machines. For example, not long before the interviews, Star Inc. had to “develop” a 
packaging for cooking oil that had to pass the drop test of two meters. They had to find 
the optimal composition for this packaging, based on specifications given by their 
customer—how many microns should be applied for the thickness, and what is the ratio 
of the raw materials (how much nylon and how much low-density polyethylene should be 





Sometimes, there is room for “suggestions,” where Java Film and Star Inc.’s 
R&D departments would suggest several product developments to their customers. One 
interesting example is the use of oxo-biodegradable materials. Java Film was able to 
adopt this technology from outside and then suggested it to some multinational customers 
that produced packaged snacks such as potato chips—whose packaging was not yet 
biodegradable. The customers refused the suggestion, citing that the price was too high, 
as well as the lack of guarantee of safe storage practices. As told by a Java Film 
executive: “Customers don’t want to pay a higher price for that one. And then the storage 
condition, Indonesia is quite different. Direct exposure to sunlight. When you have a 
biodegradable film, it will deteriorate after some [exposure] to sunlight and oxygen. So 
it’s difficult, since the supply chain management in Indonesia is still chaotic.”  
Customers often do, however, ask for “suggestions” when it comes to cost 
reduction. Multinational customers are good at this. And sometimes this phenomenon is 
conflated with the idea of “innovation”—perhaps influenced by the rhetoric of the 
customers themselves, in which they push their dependent suppliers to “innovate” to 
accommodate their need to cut costs. One common request from multinationals is for 
Java Film and Star Inc. to provide materials that are as thin as possible that can still work 
for their specifications and do not reduce their quality by much. An example was given 
by a member of Star Inc. marketing team: “[a Europe-based multinational customer] is 
very eager to ask us to innovate—what kinds of cost cutting can you give us? Every year 
they invite us to attend their [innovation seminar]. We have to come up with ideas, to 





them or by us. [We have to tell them] oh, we have a new machine now, we can do this or 
that now. They suggest that we update them every three months.”  
For the executives of dependent suppliers whose companies lack control of 
technology, sometimes this “order” to “innovate” is translated into an opportunity to 
learn. What is important, in their minds, is that their companies have access to the know-
hows of multinationals and use them to their own advantage. This was illustrated in this 
example about yet another Europe-based multinational customer of Star Inc. It is 
common for multinational customers to ask Java Film and Star Inc. to reduce the 
thickness of their materials—such as by reducing the microns or the layers—in a quest 
for cost reduction:  
They told us to come and meet them. They said, “We want to make this 
packaging product.” Let’s say, it used to be 12 microns [in thickness], now 
they wanted it to be 8 microns only. And then, they asked us to share, 
“How much can you save? How much savings can you offer if you used 
such-and-such materials?” It was to the point that they called the supplier 
of that 8-microns material to come meet us so that Star Inc. could buy 
from them. If then our factory produces too much waste, they would tell 
us to come again. They demanded that we fix the problem…. But 
packaging like that, there’s a lot of development surrounding it. That’s 
why, actually, one of the benefits of having multinationals as customers is 
that they always create trends, they have innovations. And since we are 
already their preferred supplier, we will be the one who will be given the 
opportunity, before others, to [learn from them]. We must grab this 
opportunity.  
 
This “encouragement” to “innovate” from customers like this often creates 
conflicts and misunderstanding within Java Film and Star Inc. management. When 
marketing relays such a message to the R&D team, the former expects the latter to 
engage in groundbreaking innovation. As expressed by another executive at Star Inc.: 
“This is where the marketing team misunderstands. They demand that our R&D develop 





not have the facility to manipulate materials. What we can do is merely changing one 
material with another—from another supplier, I mean.” But even plastic manufacturers 
like Java Film have very limited abilities to innovate groundbreaking materials. They, 
too, just like Star Inc., are occupied by the demands given by their own customers, 
especially multinational ones. A Java Film executive told me, “[multinationals] often 
request to us, ‘Can you make this and that?’…. Well, they have better technology, so 
what they already know, we don’t, that’s why they give us a lot of requests. For the local 
customers, it’s the other way around… we can say to them, ‘Why don’t we change it this 
way, isn’t it better?’”  
Multinationals may well be a “role model” for dependent suppliers who can only 
wish that they could achieve such status, especially in terms of research and 
development. Even when people from the R&D or production departments are willing to 
engage in efforts to contribute to meaningful innovations, their attempts are often halted 
by the executives from other departments—especially those who focus on the flexibility 
of the company, such as the marketing or finance departments. As a Star Inc. executive 
said, it is actually possible to make an effort, “but the problem is, are we willing to spend 
the money? Research needs funding…. If we look at multinationals, they always have a 
budget for their R&D, and it’s huge.” Another Star Inc. executive concludes, at least for a 
while, their company “would still be a follower,” because the technology they have, “it 
all came from outside!” The best thing they can do, according to another Star Inc. 
executive, is to copy this technology: “The knowledge is there, it’s being shared. You 
cannot say that you can build your own without the help of the U.S. or [Europe], because 





this technology. This is what China has been doing. They developed it, China copied it…. 
So it’s up to us to grab those resources and make use of them.” 
Such a cheery tone, however, hides an important concern by many of the 
executives: a fear that they are really dependent on the dominant companies that feed 
them. Although not everyone shared this feeling, there was a term that was well-known 
among the executives I interviewed: seamstress. There were conversations going on 
among them that expressed the fear that they were merely tailoring in accordance with 
specifications given by their customers without having any significant agency or 
autonomy. The relationship between them and their multinational costumers in particular 
is clearly not equal. This was expressed succinctly by one of Star Inc. executives: “The 
way I see it, as a converting company, when we deal with multinationals, it feels that 
we’re just a seamstress. That’s what we are.” In Indonesian, the word “seamstress” 
(tukang jahit) denotes a person who accepts various orders from people at his or her 
house or little shop. Unlike a distinguished, skilled tailor, a seamstress often accepts 
menial jobs such as fixing pants that are too big, sewing buttons to a shirt, etc. This is 
how they see themselves as companies. They have to accept any orders from powerful 
customers who dictate to them what to do in the process. 
All of the examples above illustrate the fate of dependent companies. As 
downstream suppliers of dominant companies—often multinationals—they do not have 
the capacity to engage in meaningful innovations that can allow them to “catch up” in the 
intricate web of labor-value chains. The knowledge, the know-how, is tightly controlled 
by dominant companies through various means, including steering the way research and 





become leaders may well remain a dream. The technology they have is mostly 
technology given to them by their customers—the introduction to new materials for 
certain product specifications; the application of certain processes in accordance with 
customers’ needs; the manipulation of product mixes to accommodate cost reduction 
imperatives of their customers; and so on. Core multinational companies—with their top-
notch facilities and first-hand access to innovative technologies in their first-world 
headquarters—are most likely to remain at the top of the hierarchies. Their “global 
reach”—borrowing the term used by radical scholars Richard Barnet and Ronald Müller 
(1974)—enables them to also control where their technological knowledge goes and how 
it should be applied. As expressed by a Star Inc. executive: “Multinationals usually are 
ahead in terms of technology because they are world-wide in scope. What the world is 
doing, they would be the first at the scene to understand it, compared to [us] local 
companies. That’s the difference. Their technology is much advanced. But that forces us 
to keep improving our own technology, our R&D.”  
The problem is, as implied above, such efforts by dependent suppliers to improve 
their technological knowledge or autonomy is often aborted by the constant demands of 
multinational customers to do things in ways that cater to their needs, and only to their 
needs. Systemic rationalization has allowed dominant companies to transfer their 
responsibilities in most aspects of production to their dependent suppliers. In terms of 
technology, as we saw above, the imperative to cut costs is given to their suppliers 
through various requests. But as we shall see below, technology is not the only means in 
which dominant companies try to sustain and enhance control in labor-value chains. 





systematically allow dominant companies to govern these chains. These companies are 
not merely a seamstress in the sense of their lack of control of technology, but also in 
other areas.  
 
Demanded Flexibility  
Indonesia: Where Production Happens and the Market Is Targeted 
 Flexibility is one of the major characteristics in today’s labor-value chains. And 
one form of flexibility, as Harrison (1994) points out, is functional flexibility, where 
dominant companies within the chains adopt new technologies and other means that 
allow them to engage in rapid product design or changes in the instruments of production. 
This “necessity” to engage in flexible production is often driven by the “fluctuating and 
changing” demands of the market (Altmann and Deiß 1998:140). In the context of 
monopoly capitalism, such “demands” drive oligopolistic dominant companies, such as 
Europe or U.S.-based multinationals, to compete among each other in product 
innovations and marketing strategies aimed at capturing increased market share.  
In some cases, the targeted market is the one in which production occurs. Nike, 
for example, not only relocated their production to China, but it also took advantage of 
the market potential of the most populated country in the world. As Walter LaFeber 
(1999:107) writes: “For if cheap labor provided large profit margins, 1.5 billion Chinese 
consumers could provide net profits beyond imagination.” Indonesia—the fourth most 
populated country with more than 250 million people and growing—is another case of 
this. Not only is their workforce targeted, but through their subsidiaries in Indonesia, 





through the views of Java Film and Star Inc. executives based on the orders that came 
from customers, the market situation seems quite optimistic for the flexible packaging 
business. Many of my interviewees cited a high growth in packaged goods consumption 
in Indonesia as a reason for the booming of their current business and their optimism for 
the near future. One Java Film executive that holds a high position in the management 
hierarchy expressed this clearly—citing information gained from a Europe-based giant 
multinational client with hundreds of brands around the world, he said: “I think, you 
know, this country [Indonesia] is booming. At a ridiculous rate. FMCG growth, [our 
multinational customer] told me, it’s 30% year to year. From the past three years to the 
next ten years, it’s crazy you know, 30%.” The same interviewee also cited the increased 
capacity of their top local conglomerate customer as a positive indicator that business is 
doing well.  
When I later interviewed management executives of Star Inc. in 2015, the market 
story was not quite as optimistic, with some personnel citing a slowdown in demand in 
the Indonesian market in the last six months (see Tempo 2015)—quite a strange anomaly, 
according to them, and it happened across industries, including automobile, textile, and 
FMCG industries—a pattern that affected their customers as well. One executive argued 
that it was largely influenced by the devaluation of the Indonesian rupiah. What they did 
not cite is the fact that Indonesia’s economic growth as a whole has, in fact, as shown in 
an OECD (2015:2) report in the same year, “moderated in recent years, reflecting weaker 
international demand and slow investment growth” (see also BBC Indonesia 2014). Most 
importantly, average wage growth “has been slow,” as an Asian Development Bank 





last five years.” Not to mention the annual per capital income of merely US $9,300 in 
purchasing power parity terms, and a rising Gini coefficient in the last decade (OECD 
2015).   
But this bad news on the macro level did not seem to significantly affect Star Inc. 
The factors that influence it may vary, including a big strike that occurred at their main 
competitor’s plant—forcing these competitor’s customers to go to Star Inc. instead. Or, 
as one executive who knows the company’s financial situation well stated, Star Inc. is 
“not widely affected” by slowdowns because of their customers profile: “Our top twenty 
customers are at the top in their business. These customers, most of their products are the 
top brands in Indonesia.” Although it’s not clear if the same characteristics can be applied 
to Java Film, the fact that some of the company’s major customers are cigarette 
companies—both local and multinational companies that cater to both local and foreign 
markets, including one of the biggest player in the industry, a leading U.S.-based 
cigarette company who, in the last decade or so has acquired one of the major Indonesian 
cigarette companies—means that a small slowdown in growth in other products can be 
somewhat offset by relatively stable demand for cigarettes, according to one Java Film 
executive who constantly monitored the Purchasing Managers Index.    
This “faith” in the promising pattern of FMCG growth rate was also cited as the 
reason for the companies’ expansion. During my interviews, both Java Film and Star Inc. 
were undergoing expansion—while Java Film was adding a production line in their 
factory, Star Inc. was building an additional factory complex altogether. As expressed by 
another Java Film executive: “Why do we expand? Because there are needs to do so. Of 





converting industry, the packaged food industry—their growth has never slowed down. 
Just look at [one of our top local customers], we can monitor them. Every time they 
added their machines, we knew. [These big customers] alone have taken a lot of our 
[production] capacity… If their capacity increased, of course we need to increase ours as 
well.”  
Java Film is not the only firm within the supply chain that studies its market. 
What is more interesting is how the dominant companies at the end of the chains, such as 
multinationals, study their targeted markets like Indonesia. Companies that sell daily care 
products such as soap or shampoo, for example, or that sell food such as coffee or snacks, 
adjust the size and packaging of their products in accordance to market preferences. This 
knowledge seems to be well-known across management teams at Star Inc. They told me 
that that a large segment of Indonesian consumers show a pattern of “unique” 
behaviors—one particular characteristic, according to some of my interviewees, is that 
their lower purchasing power leads to needing to buy in small quantities. As a Star Inc. 
executive puts it:  
Indonesia is still relatively poor. So, in the advanced countries, it is 
probably difficult to find shampoo packaged in small sachet bags. You 
cannot buy one sachet of shampoo, or a sachet of seasoning for cooking. 
They prefer buying in bottles, which are actually cheaper [considering 
what you get for the price]. I can use the whole bottle of shampoo for a 
month. But here, buying in bottles is often considered too expensive. So 
they buy only one sachet. It is actually in the end more expensive, but 
since they have limited amount of money to spend, they can only buy it 
that way. Who is benefitting from this behavior? Well, indirectly, 
packaging suppliers like us.  
 
Whether or not the success of these kinds of small packaging in Indonesia is 
indeed caused by socioeconomic status of Indonesian consumers, the above quote implies 





because selling products in small packages is deemed more profitable (at the expense of 
customers because they are more costly). So at the end of the day, such buying behaviors 
are indeed beneficial for suppliers like Star Inc. who, due to that, experience an increase 
in orders from dominant companies—local and multinational—who compete to capture 
the market with such distinctive characteristics. As a result, not only do dominant 
companies produce hundreds of brands, but also various varieties within the same brand. 
In Indonesia, you can have many types of SKU (Stock Keeping Unit) of, say, a particular 
anti-dandruff shampoo brand. The bottles will be mostly sold in the grocery stores, but 
the sachets will be sold in warung, or tiny stores in the neighborhoods that sell everything 
from salt and sugar to daily care products.  
The question is how this “good for business” strategy is actually implemented in 
labor-value chains, and what the consequences are for companies like Star Inc. to be the 
executor of such production processes. As suggested by its scholars, systemic 
rationalization enables dominant companies to shift the dynamic demands of the markets 
“in a flexible manner and within increasingly tighter schedules to the dependent 
companies and segments of the production chain” (Altmann and Deiß 1998:140). In other 
words, the responsibility to engage in such flexible processes is transferred to the 
suppliers (see Sauer, et.al. 1992)—namely, the dependent companies in the global South, 
like Java Film or Star Inc. As we will see in the next sections, not only does such 
rationalization affect the organization of work within dependent firms—including 
problems created by their “flexible approach” in production processes—but also the labor 






“We Offer Higher Flexibility”: What Dependent Suppliers Must Do to Survive 
  One of the main points that Java Film sells to their customers is that they always 
aim to provide quality products and excellent service to meet customers’ needs. They call 
this “market oriented.” This idea of being “market oriented” has aspects of flexible 
production—including the company’s willingness to engage in “flexible approaches” in 
dealing with customers’ demands. At Star Inc., flexibility is even more pronounced. It is 
indeed one of the main selling points they offer to their customers. All of the Star Inc. 
executives I interviewed were fully rehearsed in this understanding, and the idea of 
flexibility seemed to govern their organization of work as a whole.  
 Flexibility can mean several things for these companies, but some of its common 
aspects include the ability to deliver on demands and to anticipate a certain amount of 
increase or decrease in shipping, as well as a willingness to accept rush orders. A Star 
Inc. executive who often deals directly with customers told me: “For example, the regular 
lead time is 30 days. So, after we receive our purchasing order, say, today, we will 
deliver the goods 30 days from now. But for certain cases, we can help make it faster, 
less than 30 days.” This often means that the production team needs to halt whatever 
projects they are doing on some of their machines and change the settings to 
accommodate the new order. After this rush order is done, they need to go back and 
continue the disrupted process. All of these aspects will be discussed in the next 
subsection.  
What needs to be noted here is the fact that flexibility seems to be a “strategy” 
undertaken by Java Film and Star Inc. to survive amidst competition from both other 
converting companies in Indonesia and those located in neighboring countries. 





countries—but companies like Star Inc. seem to worry more about competing with strong 
competitors on the national level, because they target the same big customers. Especially 
with their claimed focus on playing within the niche market by producing high-end 
products, Star Inc. worries more about the competitors in the same league who can offer 
good quality products. One of them is an established multinational in the converting 
industry, Sun Printing (also a pseudonym). Once a “role model” to follow, Sun Printing 
has now become more of a rival of almost equal quality, according to Star Inc. executives 
I interviewed. In the converting industry, it is a common practice that flexible packaging 
companies like Star Inc. do not serve as single suppliers to their customers. Customers 
prefer having multiple ones, in particular for safety reasons, in case one of their suppliers 
cannot deliver their shipment on time. But competition among dependent suppliers is still 
present and alive, especially in terms of being able to take the lion share of customers’ 
orders.  
Sun Printing is well known for its exceptional quality, but they are also infamous 
among their customers, according to the Star Inc. executives, for their rigidity. Due to 
their established system of production, Sun Printing requires all customers to follow their 
rules. For example, there is no exception to the delivery time—everything has to be done 
in accordance to their Standard Operating Procedure (SOP). The Star Inc. executives I 
interviewed seemed to agree on one thing: that Sun Printing could survive with such a 
rigid system because they are a big multinational that already has bargaining power and a 
strong basis of customers, many of whom being from the same country in which this 
company is based. Star Inc. would not be able to experience the same fate, according to 





Printing. Star Inc. has no choice other than to offer flexibility. As voiced by one 
executive: “[Flexibility] cannot be eliminated. I don’t think so. If we want to grow big, 
considering the scale that we’re in now, we do need to sell flexibility. That’s a 
challenge.” Another executive emphasized the competition aspect: “We are trying to be a 
‘strategic supplier,’ one who can be relied on by our customers. Flexibility leads us to 
opportunities, so that what can’t be gained by our competitors can be our gain.... 
Whatever our competitors cannot supply due to unreasonable time constraints, we must 
be able to take over.”  
Similar reasons were given by the executives at Java Film. One of their biggest 
national competitors, Techno Plastic (also a pseudonym) is not as flexible as them. If 
customers ask for a rush delivery, or faster than what was originally agreed upon, Java 
Film is willing to accommodate it. “We are market-oriented,” said one of the executives. 
“We are flexible in meeting our customers’ needs. Meaning, if they want us to deliver the 
product faster, we can do that, as long as they inform us in advance. Techno Plastic, not 
so much. Because to accommodate such changes, the machine settings need to be reset, 
and they’re not willing to do that. At Java Film, we can manage such a thing. That’s why 
we’re great. Or so I heard.” 
 This strategy to open up opportunities, however, is not applicable to every single 
customer. I later learned that the more “high-class” the customer is, the more flexible 
these companies can be. There is a consensus among executives, both at Java Film and at 
Star Inc., that high-class customers consist of basically two groups: (1) big local 
conglomerates who are leaders in their markets, and (2) multinational companies. Each 





than the latter, but multinationals give orders in big volumes. In addition, the owners of 
some companies that belong to the first group are friends with the owners of Java Film 
and Star Inc., and that automatically gives them some privileges. But in one way or 
another, these two groups are considered high-class because they offer mainly these 
factors: high profit margins and stable volumes.  
 What is interesting is that, even though both are considered high-class, the way 
business is done with the privileged local customers is not the same as with the 
multinationals. This is where the characteristics of labor-value chains can be seen clearly. 
While giant local customers may have more leeway, say, in getting a rush order done due 
to their owners’ personal connection to the bosses at Java Film or Star Inc., or solely 
because they have established a good relationship with the company due to their stable 
flows of repeat orders, the way multinationals exert control and push for flexibility are 
done through systemic rationalization. In this context, the power relations are clearly 
unequal—the processes involved in systemic rationalization, as we shall see in the next 
subsection, are reflected through the ability of multinationals to exert control over their 
dependent suppliers. And hardly any executives expressed eagerness in dealing with 
multinationals. On the contrary, many of the interviewees expressed their preference to 
deal with local customers instead of multinationals. The question is, then, what is the 
most irresistible benefit of having multinationals as customers—other than big volumes 
that some executives cited as one of the main reasons why multinationals are considered 
as desired customers?  
 One answer is, of course, the more high-class customers you get, the better. But 





according to these executives, are an important source of some kind of a “guarantee seal.” 
Once you can gain a trust of a (giant) multinational company with worldwide operations 
and engage in business with them, you will gain a name in the industry. A Java Film 
executive called this “brand equity”—he said, “Let’s say, I supply to this customer A, 
which is a well known [multinational]. And we can take that as brand equity as well. 
Then we can take it as a referral: We have supplied to customer A.” Another Java Film 
executive gave a specific example about how difficult it was to win the heart of a leading 
U.S.-based cigarette multinational company in an effort to be their supplier—an effort 
that was worth it in the end since the multinational had since become their regular 
customer: “It was not easy to get them, two years. Tests, trials, all of that, almost two 
years. But once we got in, [we’re set], because they do not easily change their supplier…. 
I heard from people at the marketing department that if our film is bad, [their production] 
would automatically be [disrupted]. I heard that [the machines in their cigarette factory] 
could wrap 600 packs of cigarettes in one minute. It means 10 packs in one second. Can 
you imagine the speed? If our film is bad, I’m sure all those cigarettes would become 
waste.” The point here is that the cigarette multinational company would not risk 
changing their supplier if they were not sure about the quality of the film, along with its 
technical compatibility with their machines.  
 It seems that these executives took the benefit of having multinational customers 
seriously, and they believed that it had been proven to help boost their companies’ 
business, especially in eliminating competitors and gaining stability in incoming orders. 
This view was expressed clearly by a Star Inc. executive, who also stated that the top 





So, like last month, when we had a meeting with our creditors, I asked, 
“How are our competitors doing, and how do you compare us with our 
competitors, considering the economy slowdowns and the depreciation of 
the USD?” And they said, “You are different. We cannot compare you 
with your competitors.” I asked, “Why?” “It’s because of your customers 
profile.” So, if you see like [the Europe-based giant multinational]—even 
though we have a slowdown, they continue doing their expansion. They 
have a budget of more than 8 trillion rupiah [approximately US$ 600 
million] for 2010-15, and they haven’t stopped doing this expansion. They 
have several factories in different areas in Indonesia, and [this 
multinational] is the #1 customer of Star Inc.  
 
This prestige, however, comes with a high price. Many kinds of this “payment” 
can be seen throughout our discussion in this chapter—namely, through various demands 
that Java Film and Star Inc. have to meet in order to please their big multinational 
customers. Some executives were being “honest” and said that they would otherwise 
prefer local customers because often, their price is actually better. This is partly 
influenced by a form of bureaucratic control exercised in systemic rationalization 
processes called an open-cost system. It is common for multinationals to demand their 
potential suppliers to reveal their cost structure openly to them—often as a requirement 
for participating in a bid for orders. This enables multinationals to have access to the 
detailed structure of their potential suppliers’ costs (including material costs, labor costs, 
compression costs, and expected profit). Sometimes “advertised” as a practice that can 
reinforce a clean and transparent business, this system allows multinationals to evaluate 
the costs according to their own price benchmark and control their suppliers’ costs to 
reduce their own (see Altmann and Deiß 1998).  
It is also not uncommon for them to apply an international benchmark for the 
price, as told by one Java Film executive: “Mostly a multinational would squeeze your 





information on] global purchasing and procurement, so they know which areas give them 
the best [price]. With that, then they know how to apply a benchmark…. So they will use 
the [lower] Indian price as a benchmark to get the [higher] Indonesian quality, for 
instance, or Chinese price to get our service.” This can create challenges for the two 
companies, especially when they are pitted against competitors from the neighboring 
countries that can offer a much lower price. Even competition within the niche market 
itself can still be alarming at times. For Java Film, Thailand plastic manufacturers are 
tough competitors, while for Star Inc., it is the Malaysian companies: “Many of my 
customers import from Malaysia. And their price is indeed good. I don’t know how they 
do it, to be honest. Their price doesn’t even cover our total cost!”  
Even the suppliers’ profit margins are controlled. As a Star Inc. executive reveals, 
“So [these multinationals] just say, ‘OK, your overhead costs should be this much, X 
percent. And this X percent should already contain your profit.’ Yes, they can even go 
that far!...We can’t fool them, say, oh, this material, for example, costs 20 cents, while 
it’s actually 10. They would tell us to change our cost structure. How do they know? 
They compare it to the other suppliers’ costs. That’s how cunning they are!” As another 
Star Inc. executive puts it, “If they only gave you a 20 percent margin, well, that’s how 
much you get: 20 percent.” If multinationals feel like some costs, say, raw material costs, 
in the list are too high, they will, in the words of yet another Star Inc. executive, “help 
their suppliers improve,” by suggesting “how to reduce our material costs.” This may 
include technical suggestions about how to reduce waste, or suggestions about where to 
buy the materials—a suggestion that is often difficult to follow because Star Inc. already 





There are also times when the kind of control exerted by multinationals is reduced 
to its simplest form. Highlighting the unequal bargaining power between them, a Star Inc. 
executive who deals a lot with customers explains how (local subsidiaries of) big 
multinationals often offer business opportunities accompanied by threats:  
They always threaten us, “Can you help us or not? If you can’t [fulfill 
these demands], we’ll go to someone else. And once we’ve done it, don’t 
you dare beg us for orders!” I’ve been treated that way by them. Another 
time, they told me to come and challenged me, “You want this order? Two 
weeks completion—can you do that?” I said, “We can’t, ‘Maam.” She was 
mad, saying, “I gave you the opportunity and you refused!”… Well, that’s 
multinational for ya. If you take their offer, that’s it, you have to serve 
them ‘till death, and sacrifice your other customers… All their demands, 
we have to meet them. They act as if they’re kings! 
 
Precisely because multinationals are aware of the prestige gained by their suppliers when 
working with them, they play the game really well. They know that many will “line up” 
to get orders from them. On the contrary, suppliers like Java Film and Star Inc. have to 
abide by an unwritten rule that they cannot work with oligopolistic multinationals that are 
the competitors of their (also) oligopolistic multinational customers. One of Star Inc. 
customers is one of such multinationals. During my visit there, their toughest competitor, 
another multinational that was also a market leader, started to “knock on their door” for a 
business deal. But Star Inc. was hesitant to accept the offer, claiming that they “had to be 
careful” about it, since they feared the wrath of their current customer, whose share in 
their production output is too big to risk.  
When I asked a Java Film executive who also expressed her concern about the 
pressure to succumb to their multinational customers’ demands, why their company 
continued to succumb, she responded with a laugh, followed by a short answer: “Because 





series of demands and rationalization processes that dependent suppliers like Star Inc. 
have to comply with in order to survive the competition on the “small fish” level. The 
next subsection will further elaborate these control mechanisms within labor-value 
chains.  
Just In Time Delivery and Other Problems  
  In the previous chapter, I have addressed several means in which dominant firms 
control the dependent ones, including their suppliers—made possible by development in 
information technologies. Among them are delivery on demand systems, which is often 
referred to as the JIT (just in time) delivery system. Systemic rationalization processes 
also enable dominant companies to demand other aspects of flexible production, 
especially in terms of functional flexibility, including increased speed in the completion 
of purchase orders, an ability to accommodate rapid changes in product designs and 
varieties, and other aspects.  
Although both local and multinational customers can demand these things from 
Java Film and Star Inc., examples given by their executives when it comes to this subject 
revolve around their multinational customers. Given the emphasis made by them above 
regarding the importance of multinationals for their business and their prestige, it is 
possible that they are more willing to accept such demands from their multinational 
customers. But the more probable reason is the fact that, unlike the more traditional 
relationship between these companies with their local customers, their relationship with 
multinational customers are more regulated through systemic rationalization—where 
practices like JIT delivery are integral to their business processes. Sometimes this 





multinationals as “very demanding” customers, if compared to their local counterparts. 
And the demand for flexible delivery takes a large share of their concern.  
Delivery on demand systems or JIT is one of the core practices in lean production, 
and it is often associated with the Japanese management “mantra,” kaizen, which can 
roughly be translated as “continuous improvement.” The JIT system was originally 
developed by Toyota Motor Company, and thus is often referred to as the Toyota 
Production System. According to Japanese management guru Masaaki Imai (1997:xxv)—
who popularized the term kaizen in management and wrote two books on the subject, 
Kaizen and Gemba Kaizen, as well as founded the Kaizen Institute—JIT is “a system 
designed to achieve the best possible quality, cost, and delivery of products and services 
by eliminating all kinds of muda [waste; non-value adding activities] in a company’s 
internal processes and deliver products just-in-time to meet customers’ requirements.” 
Further, Imai (1997:8-9) states, JIT aims to achieve a “lean production system flexible 
enough to accommodate fluctuations in customer needs…. JIT dramatically reduces cost, 
delivers the product in time, and greatly enhances company profits.”  
Another way to put it, JIT is a way for dominant companies to put pressure on and 
transfer responsibility to dependent companies through a series of “just in time” delivery 
demands. It is an inventory strategy—as the online Investopedia website blatantly puts 
it—that “companies employ to increase efficiency and decrease waste by receiving goods 
only as they are needed in the production process, thereby reducing inventory costs. This 
method requires producers to forecast demand accurately.” This often means that 
dependent suppliers, for example, must deal with the inventory problems, often resulting 





implementing this system. From the viewpoint of systemic rationalization theories, 
systems such as JIT “impact the working situations in upstream and downstream 
companies. In these areas hectic everyday manufacturing operations offer neither scope 
nor capacity to deal with such additional demands. In many instances this results in a 
considerable intensification of work and a concurrent extension of working hours” 
(Altmann and Deiß 1998:148). Concrete examples of this can be found at Java Film and 
Star Inc.  
Forecasts are tricky to begin with, especially when dealing with FMCG (which, 
true to its name, involves “fast-moving” goods) and markets like Indonesia, according to 
my interviewees. A Java Film executive addressed this specific issue as one of the most 
difficult challenges in his company: “The biggest challenge, Indonesia, for me, is 
forecasting. We manufacture plastic. So I sell a lot of food packaging, liquid shampoo 
packaging. The tough part is getting forecasts. A lot of goods are sold on the street, on 
bicycles. Not like in the U.S., you can’t actually ask your distributors to give you 
accurate figures of sales and so on. So we deal with fluctuations…meaning that today, 
this customer can have no order, tomorrow ten tons, and the next day a hundred tons.”  
But the problems created by the JIT delivery system are not always created by 
missed forecasts. Sometimes, delivery on demands is done solely to help dominant 
companies save inventory costs. This was expressed by another Java Film executive, who 
explained that they had to accommodate customers’ demand of flexible delivery because 
many companies already adopted this system in order to “save as much inventory cost as 
possible.” He continued: “So, some customers would say, ‘OK, I’ll order 200 tons from 





The request is not always that simple, however, and Star Inc. knows this very well. Often, 
the JIT system is indeed set to transfer responsibilities of dealing with the consequence of 
missed forecasts to dependent companies.  
The issues include how the management of Star Inc. has to deal with the 
“buffering” problem. Due to the delivery on demand procedure, suppliers like Star Inc. 
have to implement a buffering policy—which means that they have to get their finished 
goods ready and store them in their warehouses, to be sent only when their customers 
need them. Not only do these goods have to be shipped whenever the customers 
command them, but the supplier also has to be ready to accommodate any sudden 
increase or decrease in product demands missed by the initial forecasts given by these 
customers. At Star Inc., they created a policy to accommodate up to 20 percent increase 
or decrease of their top customers’ needs. As told by a Star Inc. executive who was 
involved in production planning:  
OK, for example, we have these two big [Europe-based] multinational 
customers. One of them put a big order for the packaging of this seasoning 
brand [let’s call it B]. When I just joined the company, there were pressing 
issues—they said that the customer was screaming at us so many times, 
and that we were struggling with the time requirements needed to send B. 
Once, the customer made a mistake in their planning and finally came to 
us for help, and we helped them by shipping the goods on a Sunday! I was 
told that they at least appreciated it. Our marketing team always reminds 
us that, “We have agreed that we need to buffer up to 20 percent.” But the 
order for B is humongous. The amount needed to supply B in a month is 
almost equivalent to one warehouse. On the one hand, [it’s a problem to 
anticipate a 20 percent increase] by storing all of the goods there. It’s 
impossible. But on the other hand, we also must be ready to anticipate a 
decrease by 20 percent out of what they promised us to take in the 
following month. It’s like that.  
 
 Storing the finished goods is not the only problem created by the JIT procedure. 





other end of production: planning for the purchase and storing of raw materials. As a Star 
Inc. executive who deals with suppliers for their materials explains, the readjustments of 
delivery have a significant impact on the situation at the purchasing end:  
Forecasts can also miss. Even after the purchasing order was finalized. For 
example, a customer had a three-month purchasing order, 10000 [rolls] in 
September, 20000 in October, 30000 in November. The planning 
department has calculated, right? And we have received that calculation. 
But in the process, the customer can say, “Oh, our warehouse is full for 
September,” and they only want to receive 8000. It means that we have a 
surplus of 2000 rolls. The planning department will forward this info to 
[the purchasing department]. And we need to readjust. Or say in 
September the customer asks us to deliver 15000 instead of 10000. We 
need to readjust as well. That’s how we work. But sometimes the materials 
we purchase are already on their way. If they are imported, we cannot 
cancel… Or [for domestic suppliers], even after we tried to be adamant 
about postponing the shipping, they are not willing to do it. Like it or not, 
our storage will have to accommodate them.  
 
The issue above also shows that companies like Star Inc. do not only deal with their 
customers, but also with their suppliers. But unlike multinationals who can exert pressure 
on and make unreasonable demands of their suppliers, dependent companies cannot do 
the same thing to the upstream companies who supply their materials. To an extent, Star 
Inc.’s notable growth has gained them some status in front of their material suppliers, but 
it is not comparable to that of multinationals who are their customers. Constrained by 
various factors such as limited availability of certain materials and the domestic 
monopoly of certain industries that produce the needed materials, Star Inc. is quite 
powerless. Moreover, unlike the multinational customers who can demand flexibility 
from Star Inc., the U.S.-based multinationals that become Star Inc.’s suppliers are often 
inflexible in their business. Perhaps, according to the same executive quoted above, 





available, Star Inc. prefers to buy their imported materials from other companies, like 
South Korea. But more often than not, there are no other options.  
 In general, both Java Film and Star Inc. executives—especially those who deal 
directly with production and planning—prefer more limited forms of flexibility, precisely 
because they create problems, and are often at odds with the production goals of 
increased productivity and efficiency, including the decrease in waste. Sauer, et.al. 
(1992:49) argue, “The ‘new type of rationalization’ pursues contradictory goals: the 
increase of flexibility in company administration and manufacturing processes in order 
better to fulfill constantly changing market requirements with respect to quality and 
quantity, and the achievement of a more cost-effective production system under 
conditions of fiercer competition.” In a sense, then, flexible production provides 
contradictory processes for these two companies. On the one hand, they have to offer 
flexibility to meet the “needs” of their customers and to get ahead of their competitors, 
which will result in greater profit. On the other hand, as firms, the imperative of capital 
accumulation forces them to increase productivity and efficiency through cost reduction 
strategies and other means. Flexible production, however, often results in inefficient and 
wasteful production. Let us examine this contradiction first.  
 Both Java Film and Star Inc. have limited capacities in their production, and they 
have to work with this limitation to accommodate a variety of products ordered by their 
customers. When they offer flexibility to their customers, these varieties become more 
complex and they create challenges for production. People from the production and 
planning department would say that they prefer “long-run” orders—that is, when they can 





and this requires only one-time preparation (where they set the machines, and so on) at 
the beginning of each process. This kind of production process would enable production 
teams to easily ensure higher efficiencies and the reduction of waste. But such an ideal 
process is difficult to achieve. Due to the functional flexibility demanded by their 
customers, they often have to interrupt production processes to fulfill rush orders due to 
fluctuating market demands that their customers aim to meet. Concrete examples will 
help illustrate this problem.  
 One of the simplest examples is given by a Java Film executive, who explained 
that long-run orders are hard to come by because many customers demand just in time 
delivery. When a customer, say, demands Java Film to ship products only twice a week, 
they have to divide the production several times into smaller orders, even though the 
product was ordered in a large quantity. Otherwise, they would not be able to use the 
machines for other orders from other customers. This creates problems because it 
requires the production department to engage in multiple programming changes for their 
machines, among others—which is bad for efficiency and risks the increase of waste. 
Sometimes Java Film sales department is able to sell the wasted film for a cheaper price 
to other companies, but that alone does not serve as a sufficient remedy for the waste 
issue.  
 Another example was provided by a Star Inc. executive. Multinationals—
according to my interviewees—often engage in a product variation strategy in an effort to 
capture the dynamic (both domestic and export) market demands and defeat their 
competitors (also other big multinationals). This is where they create several types (or 





different designs. For example, a juice drink brand marketed for kids has a few variations 
of packaging with cartoon characters on it: Spiderman, Elsa from the movie Frozen, 
Beauty and the Beast, etc. But more often, the product is also packed in different sizes—
each with its own design variations as well. Let’s go back to product B, the packaging for 
a seasoning brand owned by a European multinational who is one of the main customers 
of Star Inc. This brand has multiple SKUs, each with a different volume: 7 grams, 20 
grams, and so on. The 7 grams one is packaged as a simple sachet, where you can throw 
it away once it is used, while the 20 grams one is packaged in a standing pouch and 
designed for multiple uses. Star Inc. then has to apply a different product design for each 
SKU, and each SKU has to be manufactured separately.  
 This practice illustrates what Baran and Sweezy call the interpenetration of the 
sales effort and production process. They note that sales efforts such as product variations 
mentioned here no longer serve as a mere addition to production under monopoly 
capitalism—instead, they now reach back into the process of production; they 
“increasingly invade factory and shop, dictating what is to be produced according to 
criteria laid down by the sales department and its consultants and advisers in the 
advertising industries.” This interpenetration has made the two processes (sales efforts 
and production) so indistinguishable to an extent that it causes a “profound change in 
what constitutes socially necessary cost of production as well as in the nature of the 
social product itself” (Baran and Sweezy 1966:130-31). For the supplier who actually 
makes the products, the product variations strategy requires a high degree of flexibility on 





Multinational customers who deploy such a strategy can demand flexible 
production depending on what is highly demanded in the market. So, rather than sticking 
with what was agreed in the SOP and expressed in their purchase order, this customer can 
change their order in the middle of production. If the customer sees that the Spiderman 
packaging sells more dearly one month, they would ask Star Inc. to send only the 
Spiderman the following month—regardless of what the original order was. Or, in the 
case of brand B, as explained by the executive: “If all of a sudden, say, because of certain 
promotional periods [that increase market demands], [one SKU is needed more than the 
others], this customer would suddenly change their plans. ‘This week I need you to send 
me the 20 grams one instead of the 7 grams one.’ If you’re a rigid supplier, you would 
definitely say no, because it would disrupt the whole production process… They have to 
reprint stuff, everything. Most converting companies would refuse to do this, because it 
would create inefficiencies and plenty of waste.”  
 Though this executive claimed that Star Inc. started to try limiting these kinds of 
orders, they still could not get away from it. And this got on their nerves, as management 
had to face conflicts every time. Weekly meetings become inter-departmental 
“battlegrounds,” where different teams would argue back and forth about which orders 
needed to be prioritized, and which orders could be postponed, and how much disruption 
could be tolerated on the shop floor. While the marketing department would push for 
flexibility to get more orders from their top customers, people in production and other 
departments would try to resist this trend because their efficiencies suffer. At the same 
time, both flexibility and efficiencies are demanded by the company’s owners. The same 





management policies on how to do this…. Now, everything seems vague. Production 
teams would say, ‘We’ve told you that we are pressured to reduce the variant waste by 
such-and-such amount!’ But the other party [marketing teams] faces pressures to increase 
[sales]. So what would you do?” From what I gathered from the interviews, the winner 
seemed to be flexibility. As a member of production team told me, “We sometimes have 
to make sacrifices, meaning, we allow the waste to be high, because we have to cut the 
ongoing production of a certain product in order to fit in a different product.” 
 The important question now becomes: who bears the burden of such a 
contradiction in systemic rationalization processes? Surely the executives I interviewed 
had to deal with the customers and all the chaotic consequences of their demands for 
flexibility, but in the end, the ones who deal directly with production are the direct 
producers of the commodities these companies make: workers. In the following 
discussion, I will examine how the mechanisms described above influence the 
organization of work that creates control over the labor process.  
Management and Control over the Labor Process 
 Even though Java Film and Star Inc. do not fit the stereotypical image of factories 
in the global South, the issues of labor and the labor process are still central to their 
production. Out of approximately 800 employees of Java Film and 1500 of Star Inc., a 
majority of them work on the shop floors. Certain segments of their production are more 
“labor-intensive” than others, with the majority of shop floor workers placed in the 
finishing area at Java Film and in the “bag-making” area at Star Inc. And although the 
rest of the segments are mainly computerized (automatic), labor still plays an important 





other related processes, is held by workers. Sometimes these tasks are done manually. As 
an example, when I observed the Java Film plant, I saw that a worker had to stand still 
next to a running machine to make sure that the product did not have any stains or other 
defects in it. This worker had to immediately notify others if he saw any defects.  
 Even though the executives of both companies would prefer to see their 
companies as “high-tech” oriented, or even refer to them as “capital-intensive,” they 
could not dismiss the fact that labor and the labor process were issues that kept showing 
up again and again. This was especially prominent among the executives in the human 
resource and production departments, because they were the ones who managed labor on 
a daily basis. And when it came to the discussion of wages and unions, our conversations 
sometimes became heated. When I visited Java Film in 2012, they were in the middle of 
bargaining with the labor unions with minimum wage as the main issue discussed at the 
table—then, the provincial government just issued an increase in the minimum wage, but 
vagueness related to categories of wages based on types of industry, among with other 
factors in relation to this increase, led to a series of tough bargaining sessions. In 
addition, protests were many in the industrial complex where they were located. At a 
Japanese automobile factory nearby, production was disrupted for about a week due to a 
labor strike. Combined with threats to protest by their own workers and a suspected 
“infiltration” by a militant labor union at their own plant made the management nervous. 
Although they never exposed their “dirty laundry” in the management meetings I 
attended then, during those meetings, the issue of productivity and efficiency was 





When I visited Star Inc. in 2015, the management was also a little bit nervous. 
Their main competitor, Sun Printing, experienced a major strike at their plant—a strike 
that led them to terminate employment of more than a thousand workers and caused their 
production to halt. Star Inc. was afraid that the same thing would happen to them, for 
good reasons. The main factor that caused the strike was a regulation on overtime 
imposed by a standardized rule applied by Sun Printing’s multinational customers—some 
of them were also the customers of Star Inc. Although this rule was already issued by the 
Indonesian government since 2003 through federal labor laws,15 only then did it become 
a major problem, since the biggest multinationals, through a third-party evaluation 
system called URSA (Understanding the Responsible Sourcing Audit), required their 
suppliers to comply with the overtime rule. If not, suppliers would not pass the audit and 
the business between them and their multinational customers would be terminated. The 
rule states that workers can only work overtime as many as three hours a day, fourteen 
hours a week. Sun Printing workers were not happy about it, because overtime work gave 
them more earnings. And before the rule was imposed, the way work was organized at 
plants such as Sun Printing and Star Inc. often depended on their workers’ overtime 
labor, especially when rush orders were involved.  
There might be more to the cause of the strike, but that alone forced Star Inc. 
management to reorganize their incentive system in a way that would compensate the 
loss from the “new” overtime rule. Workers would still get the same amount of earnings 
through the new incentive system without having to work overtime—but forced to work 
more efficiently and productively. At a glance, this case seems like a regular strategy by 
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the company’s management to fix things and avoid further problems, but if we look 
closely, what happened here is an example of how management organizes work to extract 
surplus value from their workers, driven by systemic rationalization processes imposed 
by their multinational customers.  
One characteristic of systemic rationalization is the use of evaluation criteria that 
dominant companies impose on their dependent suppliers (Altmann and Deiß 1998). In 
global supply chains, such certifications bear many names, each with its own claimed 
measurements aimed at evaluating suppliers’ compliance with rules regarding safe 
working conditions, hygienic environments (especially for food-related industries), wages 
and overtime, whistleblower protections, etc. Among them are URSA (as mentioned 
above), the many versions of International Standardization for Organization (ISO 9001, 
ISO 14001, ISO 18001, ISO FSSC 22000), and Sedex. Both Java Film and Star Inc. had 
to undergo several of these audits in their attempt to get big multinational customers. The 
audits were done by a third-party who would then issue the certificates and report it to 
their prospective customers, or publish the reports that could be accessed by prospective 
customers. While certifications like this certainly impact workers positively in some 
areas, the reason behind such certifications is not always workers’ wellbeing. One can 
argue that this is a form of bureaucratic control as proposed by Edwards (1978), where 
the labor process is subject to the firm’s law rather than direct supervisor’s control. In this 
case, however, the scope is global, where the firm’s law itself is affected by international 
regulations that become an integral part of production networks led by multinationals.  
First, as a part of the outsourcing process, transferring production to dependent 





but it also serves as a means to transfer responsibilities and criticisms of possible labor 
violations to such suppliers (see Foster and McChesney 2012; Smith 2016). Through the 
application of these international certifications, multinationals can have their ammunition 
ready: audits have been done, and these suppliers are supposed to comply with the rules; 
thus, if there are violations, the responsibility is on the suppliers, not on them. Second, for 
the suppliers themselves, the wellbeing of workers is not the main reason why they 
bother to get these certifications—whose process, according to my interviewees, is really 
complicated and takes a lot of their time. As implied above, without these certifications, 
these suppliers would not be able to do business with the big multinational corporations. 
As Braverman (1998[1974]:25) writes, “the humanization of work” has never been the 
focus of management—who is “habituated of carrying the labor processes in a setting of 
social antagonism and…has never known it to be otherwise”—instead, it is always about 
costs and controls. 
Third, as systemic rationalization theories show, such evaluation criteria imposed 
by dominant companies are one of the strategies aimed at increasing the overall 
productivity of the entire production chain. They are a means for dominant companies to 
force their dependent suppliers to reevaluate and, if necessary, change their organization 
of work in ways that are deemed more productive and efficient. But as I explained in the 
previous chapter, productivity is not the main goal—lower unit labor costs is. Through 
the enforcement of more productive and efficient ways to work, multinationals aim for a 
reduction in production costs by their suppliers. With the open costing system discussed 





control suppliers’ costs and profits means that, when suppliers’ costs are lower, their 
selling price is lower too.  
During my interviews period in 2013 at Java Film, not long after they passed an 
audit for yet another international certification, a big banner was displayed in front of the 
factory. It read: “Safe and Healthy Work Is a Mandatory Condition for an Increase in 
Productivity and Efficiency.” This saying, although it appears as a mere slogan, actually 
reflects what such certifications mean for capital within labor-value chains. When an 
organization of work is very structured and everybody follows the rules—say, in the 
name of work safety or a healthy environment—it leads to an increase in productivity and 
efficiency, and productive and efficient work leads to a reduction in production costs. 
Accidents, for example, create distractions at the shop floor. As this executive explains:  
We had this one accident in 2011. Until today, that employee can’t work 
at his previous position. We had to move him to an administrative 
position. That was after a year of [sick leave]. So, how productive is he in 
his current position? Two years, zero. His productivity is zero… Until 
today he has back problems, and that really interferes with his 
productivity. Not to mention the employee who, due to his own 
carelessness, fell in the elevator… luckily it was not bad. But we lost 
another person. And what does that mean for HR? HR needs to ask the 
other employees to do overtime, or find new employees, right? Obviously, 
safety matters for productivity. And then health issues. Well, if we have a 
lot of employees who are sick, even with proper medical notes… Say an 
employee calls in sick—either the productivity at his section [within his 
department] will go down, or we need to hire a replacement. 
 
Moreover, the imposed rule about overtime, for example, is not merely a means to 
make sure that workers do not overwork (and, as the case of Sun Printing suggests, when 
overwork pay is given, workers prefer to do overtime so that their earnings would 
increase), but to make sure that they work more productively and efficiently. If we refer 





the capitalist’s effort to increase absolute surplus value, has become more limited, the 
options are to increase absolute surplus value elsewhere, i.e., through increasing the 
intensity of labor—in which non-productive “pores” in the working day are minimized—
and to increase relative surplus value through increasing the productiveness of labor, 
which is “the quantity of products yielded by the same quantity of labor in a given time” 
(Gartman 1978:102). As a Java Film executive told me, “We are trying a lot of things 
right now—revitalizations, relocations [of work], so that productivity can be increased, so 
that our overtime rate would not be like in 2012. Our target is that overtime should be 
reduced by a minimum of 30 percent.”  
Star Inc.’s reorganization of their incentive system mentioned above can also 
illustrate this point. The reduction of the amount of overtime hours led their management 
to create a “better” system in which work could be carried out more productively—and 
this created an impact on the labor process. The incentive system is applied for workers 
who were below the supervisor level. Production workers get full incentives, while non-
production workers get less. But within each of these segments, incentives are distributed 
evenly to the workers there. The evaluation that becomes the basis of how much 
incentives are earned by workers is based on three criteria: production output, variant 
waste, and returns (how much goods are returned by customers due to defects). All three 
are related to productivity and efficiency. Production output is connected to the speed of 
workers. This “technical control” (Edwards 1978) of the labor process by the mechanism 
of machines is applied to large segments of Star Inc. plant and influences the production 
flow as a whole. But the simplest one to understand is the process in printing division. 





they do not set the output level this high, and if they work slowly instead to obtain their 
output, then productivity will not be high.  
This criterion is related to the second one, variant waste. Variant waste means the 
difference between the projected (“allowed”) waste and the actual waste produced. 
Interestingly, this factor also influences output. If your goal is only to reduce waste, then 
your productivity can also slow down. For example, they can set the machine to the lower 
speed just to reduce the waste. So, in this case, workers are expected to juggle the speed 
of their work and the attention to waste reduction. As Braverman (1998[1974]:134) 
writes, “Machinery offers to management the opportunity to do by wholly mechanical 
means that which it had previously attempted to do by organizational and disciplinary 
means.” For Braverman, what is worth noting is that machines can be controlled and 
paced in accordance to “centralized decisions” by management stationed in the office—
suggesting that control can be removed from the site of production. In this case, machines 
were also a means to control the labor process away from the shop floor, but its execution 
is mediated by the incentive system, designed by management to direct the labor process 
in ways that can increase production output and minimize waste at the same time. In 
addition, workers also have to make sure that defects can be minimized, since the 
“returns” criterion is measured by this aspect. On the one hand, workers can get more 
earnings with the incentive system. But on the other hand, their labor process is a subject 
to an invisible control, namely, the possibility of losing their extra earnings. For 
management, this system allows them to avoid conflicts due to the loss of overtime 
earnings, as well as receive a “bonus”—the productivity and efficiency increase expected 





However, aside from the influence of certification systems on the organization of 
work, the contradiction that was born out of the demands for flexibility and for increasing 
productivity does in the end affect workers and their labor process. The bureaucratic 
control imposed by multinationals is just one means among others. What cannot be 
“controlled” by management, such as waste and other productivity aspects that are lost 
due to the changing order priorities demanded by customers in their pursuit of flexibility, 
as well as the increase in the minimum wage, is offset by a relentless effort to increase 
productivity and efficiencies in other areas. As someone from the Java Film human 
resource department said, with the recent increase in minimum wage, “it naturally 
follows that the challenge is how to increase employee’s productivity. What we don’t 
want to happen is that this wage increase is not accompanied by an increase in 
productivity—or that the productivity goes down instead!” A similar sentiment was 
expressed by Star Inc. executives, such as this: “If [workers] want to be paid more, I need 
to know how high is their labor productivity, per hour. It needs to be measured first.” 
Although many of my interviewees recognized the fact that wages should increase 
following inflation and other factors, in the end, these increases were never “free.” 
Also in a continuous effort to cut costs, Java Film tried to maintain the practice of 
hiring subcontractors for certain positions (such as security and cleaning service)—a kind 
of numerical flexibility (Harrison 1994)—although during that period, there were 
pressures from labor unions, as a part of their ongoing bargaining, to hire these 
subcontractors as permanent employees. And the company had already started hiring 
subcontractors as their employees. The increase in labor cost was thus inevitable, and 





bargaining with the labor unions. Although some of their executives denied that this wage 
increase mattered for them (since they are not “labor intensive” and that labor costs only 
make up a fraction of their total costs), others expressed their concerns. Especially for the 
human resource department, this was quite a big deal, since certain segments of 
production—namely, the “finishing” segments—still need many workers.  
This was further influenced by their multinational customers’ refusal to consider 
buying at a higher price in accordance with the rising labor cost. When asked whether 
Java Film could increase their selling price due to the increase in minimum wage in 2013, 
one of their executives told me that sometimes they could, since the open-costing system 
allowed them to incorporate such increases in their calculation of total cost. “But a lot of 
times,” he said, “such increases cannot be passed on to the clients, to be honest with you. 
It’s not easy. Especially multinationals, they would say, ‘Yes, true, wages have gone up, 
but your efficiencies need to be increased as well!’ So they would try to offset it that way. 
It’s up to negotiating. Different results per customer.” Thus, the means to increase 
productivity was directed towards tightening the control of the labor process instead.  
These means include different forms of control. During my interviews at Java 
Film, they were just beginning to develop a performance-based incentive system based 
on new Key Performance Indicators (KPI), aimed at creating “continuous improvement” 
or kaizen. During that period, their executives were all about kaizen, since they were 
actively pursuing Japanese customers. These customers flew from Japan directly to visit 
the factory and demanded they make changes, including installing an air shower, and 
inspected minor details to suggest improvements. In his second book on kaizen, Imai 





he calls gemba or “where real action occurs”). One of the main arguments that Imai 
(1997:13) offers is that, once managers are reluctant to be involved in gemba affairs, 
“management has lost control of the workplace.” Taking inspiration from the concept of 
kaizen, Java Film executives created specific measurements of their workers’ 
performance that include discipline factors, such as how many sick leaves, days when 
workers arrive late (measured in minutes), absence without notice, warning letters 
received, and so on. Each department would also set their own measurements of workers’ 
performance, based on their own indicators. But examples given include the volume of 
product returns, operation performance, as well as customer complaints. Similar to Star 
Inc.’s incentive system, this is a way for management to control the labor process—
discipline through the promise of rewards.  
Other strategies take many kinds, from reconfiguring their work-shifts schedules 
(such as eliminating “long-shifts” to reduce overtime) to reinforcing discipline to cutting 
energy use in the office space. Reducing overtime was done despite the risk of labor 
unrest. I was told that workers were already expressing their dissatisfactions then, but the 
management refused to back down and instead use the issue of overtime as a bargaining 
chip. One executive told me: “I just told [the workers], ‘I’ll be blunt with you. You want 
this much increase [in wages], OK, fine, but I will eliminate all your overtime!’ I would 
take that measure. If necessary, I will change the three work-shifts to four, so there won’t 
be any overtime. ‘Very sorry,’ I said.”  
Since Java Film management could not really do much with the rest of the 
segments—which are computerized and only require a small amount of manual labor—





segments because it is still difficult to mechanize the tasks. Why is it difficult? A Java 
Film executive tried to explain: “Because each customer has different requests. Some ask 
for such-and-such size, the product has to be this way, one roll of plastic has to be this 
long, even up to the requirement of how hard the bundling should be, and a lot of other 
things. That makes it difficult to mechanize. So in the end, we still require a lot of labor.” 
This difficulty of managing labor seemed to be perceived as a persistent problem, both at 
Java Film and Star Inc. The top executives at the factories were trying to design a more 
“cost-effective” system that would reduce errors in production and thus reduce 
unnecessary rework or double handling activities. Often, then, mechanization is 
preferable whenever it is possible. During that time, efforts were taken to reduce the 
number of workers in every task, such as implementing new machines that can 
automatically detect errors.   
When asked whether they would prefer robots or robotic equipment than human 
labor, many interviewees said “yes” without hesitation. This reflects a global pattern of 
automation, where manufacturers in North America and Western Europe see the move to 
the use of robots and other automated systems as a viable option to “reduce labor costs, 
enhance quality control, and improve throughput” (AlixPartners 2017:3). There are some 
areas in which mechanization has been applied at both Java Film and Star Inc. At Star 
Inc. in particular, there were already talks within management circles to implement a new 
warehouse system, equipped with robotic components. A Star Inc. executive told me, 
“We’ve done it several times—laying off employees because we adopted new 
technology. What was done manually before, it is now automated.” These executives 





eliminated altogether, the productivity is higher, and waste can be detected early. Citing 
another executive from another company, one interviewee said, “And machines never 
complain.”  
However, some also expressed that the human role in their production processes 
cannot be eliminated. They still need human decisions and labor in operating the system, 
even on the lowest level at the plant. This is in line with what systemic rationalization 
scholars argue to begin with—that “the development of system technology did not aim 
for total automation since a system of this size and complexity would demand the 
presence of several operators” (von Behr, et. al. 1992:164). But the importance of human 
role especially remains important in the company’s pursuit of flexibility. As expressed by 
another Star Inc. executive, “If all is done by an automated system, we won’t be able to 
continue being flexible. If the order was given today and then, with 30-days lead time, [if 
there are changes in delivery time or order priority], in the end we will need a human 
being to intervene so an exception to the system can be authorized.” And considering 
how flexible their company tries to be, he said, “it is likely that our exceptions exceed the 
normal, ongoing setting.”  
For other executives, the consideration is related to the ability to invest in 
expensive technology. If the implemented technology is not too expensive, such as the 
automatic reject system in the “bag-making” segment on the shop floor, it is likely that 
management would do it. But unlike North American or European manufacturers who are 
eager to invest in such technology (AlixPartners 2017), companies with weaker capital do 
not have an equivalent ability to execute their plans whenever they please, even if they 





“We’ve been talking about this, putting robots in the warehouse—how many people can 
they cut? …. How much is the cost? And I want to compare to the investment cost, is it 
beneficial or not? I want to know whether, if our labor, at this moment and for the next 
five or ten years, would not be as expensive, as it is in the U.S. or in China, would it be 
really beneficial for me to invest in technology? So I need to know, I need to see first. 
Because if I look at our labor cost now and compare it to our investment cost of having 
this, you know, huge investment, it’s not that [good].”  
So in the meantime, when manual labor is still involved, the management can 
only enforce stricter discipline or apply a more structured organization of work to the 
current workforce to better control the labor process and hence reduce the chance of 
human errors. A few of Star Inc. executives expressed their concerns about how difficult 
it was to enforce discipline on the shop floor. One of them, who was involved in the 
production team and helped develop the incentive system at Star Inc., told me that 
everybody should “do their best,” down to the workers in the lowest position. Inspired by 
the concept of gemba kaizen, he emphasized the importance of management control on 
the shop floor. “It’s not as simple as I say, of course,” he said. “Even after being 
encouraged by the incentive system, there’s no guarantee that they can work well. That’s 
why we need management’s presence. Every single deviation needs to be evaluated. If, at 
one point, there are employees who need to be reprimanded, or even given a warning 
letter—we have to do that to provide some deterrent effect.” The same executive told me 
later in the interview that “discipline is the most important thing for Indonesia” and 
expressed his opinion about the virtue of military training as an instrument in shaping 





 Another Star Inc. executive told me the importance of implementing “awareness” 
to workers about the value they added to the company’s products: “Whenever we have an 
employee gathering, we tell them, ‘There’s your stamp on this product.’ Then we also 
relay our customers’ complaints to our employees. ‘See, if you don’t work well, this is 
the result.’ That way they can understand.” This rhetoric is especially important for 
managers who lead production teams. As one of them said, they always told the workers 
on the shop floor that “added value originates from our department… If we talk about 
engineering, planning, or quality control, they’re just supporting elements. The added 
value, the converter in a converting company, is located within production.” This 
“awareness” about the importance of workers’ labor in production—the value workers 
added to and embedded in the finished goods—ironically is used as an instrument of 
control with the illusion that workers perform skilled labor to produce these goods and 
are not in any way separated from the product of their labor. The line of reasoning here is 
that, since workers are the ones contributing to the production of these goods, they need 
to care more about the products—it does not matter that the these workers have almost no 
control over the direct production of use values, or that their labor has been degraded to 
an unskilled variety.  
Other times, management applies the “home” rhetoric to pacify workers. As 
someone from the human resource team told me, “We make it clear to our workers, 
‘Remember, this is our home. The company where we work at is the paddy field whose 
soil we plow. We work together here to build…. If our business grows, if the results are 
good, we get our share [of this success].’” Similarly, this rhetoric provides an illusion that 





the control over their own labor once their employer buys their labor power. Also, this 
kind of rhetoric is a way to curb union activities at the plant. In an effort to push labor 
unions out, management at Star Inc. encourages their workers to see the company and its 
management as “a family” that they can turn to whenever there are problems. In 2015, 
Star Inc. had only one union, and it was the company’s internal union that was only 
affiliated with, but was not a subsidiary of, an outside labor union independent of the 
company. The management was eager to keep things as they were. They wanted to avoid 
the problems and headaches that executives in companies like Java Film experienced (in 
2013, Java Film had three unions) every time they had to deal with the “unruliness,” as a 
Star Inc. executive called it, created by the presence of independent unions. But such 
“motivational” rhetoric does not always work, or does not work on its own. To keep 
things “safe,” Star Inc. executives instructed their supervisors and superintendents—who 
led daily factory briefings at the beginning of each work-shift—to always watch out for 
rumors of gatherings or meetings organized by “infiltrating” unions. They also trained 
their supervisors and superintendents about what to do should such things happen.  
More direct and simple forms of control like that are utilized not only in relation 
to pushing unions out, but also in the general process of production. Often, this use of 
simple control is justified by a stereotypical view of Indonesian workers, namely, that 
they are either lazy or intellectually challenged and thus difficult to manage. As a Star 
Inc. executive said, “You know, Indonesians. You always need to monitor them.” A Java 
Film executive expressed the same concern. He even went as far as claiming that, on the 
level of machine operators, it was really hopeless. What you can do, he said, is to focus 





then the operators will be too.” But at least, he continued, “Indonesians can still obey 
orders if you watch their back.” David Gordon (1996:66) refers to this use of simple 
forms of control as “the stick strategy,” where firms “exercise control with the armies of 
supervisory staff.” Mockingly channeling management’s voice, Gordon writes: “Can’t 
trust your workers when left to their own devices? Peer over their shoulders. Watch 
behind their backs. Record their movements. Monitor them. Supervise them. Boss them. 
Above all else, don’t leave them alone.”  
 These simple forms of control complement the other forms of control discussed 
previously. Braverman (1998[1974]:62) writes that the labor process has been subject to 
control even before Taylorism prevailed. But Taylor “raised the concept of control to an 
entirely new plane when he asserted as an absolute necessity for adequate management 
the dictation to the worker of the precise manner in which work is to be performed.” 
Even though Tayloristic work may not be as pervasive and omnipresent in the era of 
systemic rationalization, some forms remain—as illustrated in the discussion above. And 
at its core, Tayloristic organization of work “drastically reduced the skill and discretion 
of worker in the labor process” (Gartman 1979:199). On the shop floor at Java Film or 
Star Inc., workers who occupy low positions are not required to have meaningful skills. 
Any significant training that could actually increase skills is reserved for workers who are 
in certain strategic positions (see Wright and Lund 2003), especially ones that are 
groomed to be managers.16 For the rest of the workforce, what they need is a capacity to 
obey and follow orders. This was expressed clearly by a Java Film executive: “[Machine] 
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operators’ work is repetitive: this, that, this, that. If we talk about skills… I think the 
skills needed to operate those machines are minimal. It’s not like operators of the CNC 
machine [used in other types of manufacturing], who always need to have an updated 
knowledge of the software. Our machines just require repetitive tasks.”  
The work is “so simple” not merely because it is the nature of the job or the 
machine per se, as the executive above seems to imply, but because the organization of 
work has been structured in such a way that enables the deskilling to happen. “This is the 
pivot upon which all modern management turns,” writes Braverman (1998[1974]:73-4): 
“the control over work through the control over the decisions that are made in the course 
of work.” Taylorism and the practice of modern management revolves around the 
“dissociation of the labor process from the skills of the workers” through means such as 
“the separation of conception from execution” that, in turn, reflects the use of “monopoly 
over knowledge to control each step of the labor process and its mode of execution” 
(1998[1974]:78-82). In this context, the majority of workers on the shop floors—
especially the “operators” or those who only operate the machines—are divorced from 
any knowledge regarding the technological know-hows of production. They merely 
execute, but are not involved in any conception of production itself—which is done in the 
management circle, at the offices, away from the shop floors.  
The executives I interviewed possess the knowledge of the technology and have 
the power to control the extremely expensive machines—the same machines that “do not 
require any skills” from the workers who operate them on the shop floor. As they told me 
themselves, it took a lot of time and plenty of trial-and-error for them to figure out many 





relayed to their workers were merely a list of strict procedures about what to do and, 
especially, what not to do—in order to avoid lost output caused by mistakes in the 
operation of the machines. Obviously, the machines are not so simple. It is the 
detachment of knowledge from the work performed by these operators that makes it 
meaningless. And it is the decisions controlled by management—influenced largely by 
the control exerted on them by their multinational customers—that enable the 
degradation of work to happen.  
What Can Be Learned?  
 Since Java Film and Star Inc. do not represent the stereotype of global South 
factories that cater to multinationals, they actually reveal several interesting variations 
that can be found in globalized production. First, they can illustrate the classic role of 
dependent suppliers in labor-value chains due to their export-geared production—about 
30 percent of their production output—for multinationals based in advanced economies 
such as the United States and Western Europe, where the commodities are consumed. Big 
multinationals, from U.S.-based food-related companies to a leading U.S.-based cigarette 
company, as well as Europe-based giant multinationals with brands in daily care 
products, all serve as “high-class” customers for both Java Film and Star Inc. in the 
exports segment. Second, in addition to this, an unknown percentage of their production 
is also geared towards exports, although they are exported by their multinational 
subsidiaries customers and not by these suppliers themselves. This characteristic shows 
that, even in cases where multinationals engage in direct foreign investment in Indonesia 





consumed, they still outsource their packaging-related production to outside suppliers 
like Java Film and Star Inc.  
The third characteristic of production in these two companies, the one where they 
produce multinational brands for the local market—even though it does not quite fit the 
common case of global labor arbitrage—illustrates yet another form of participation by 
global South companies in labor-value chains. This is deemed much more effective as 
means to cut costs, rather than directly exporting their products to the targeted markets 
outside of where these multinationals are based. In this context, multinationals target 
huge markets like Indonesia, directly invest in the country and build their subsidiaries so 
that production can be done near to the market itself and, in the process, outsource parts 
of their production processes to third-party suppliers. Thus, even though it involves intra-
firm trade relations by multinationals through their subsidiaries, it does not precisely 
illustrate “producer-driven” chains (see Gereffi 1994, Milberg and Winkler 2013)—
which are solely characterized by foreign direct investment—because these chains also 
involve arm’s length contracting practices in which multinational subsidiaries outsource 
the production of their packaging materials to third-party suppliers.  
In all three of these characteristics, Java Film and Star Inc. serve the role of 
dependent companies in labor-value chains—driven by the search for low unit labor costs 
by global North capital that seeks to capture value from the global South labor, which is 
realized in the price of the commodities consumed both in the home market or in 
Indonesia. The price of these multinational goods sold in Indonesia may be lower than 
that in the global North, but this does not translate into lower profits for multinationals. 





marketing strategy that involves many product diversifications of a specific item 
(including cases in which consumers have to pay a higher price by buying the product in 
tiny packages), it is very reasonable to assume that the profit rate is high. In either case, 
mechanisms of both systemic rationalization and flexibility are applied in all of these 
characteristics, and most importantly, there are practices by multinationals that capture 
value at the end of the chain, since a large share of profits (or the surplus value extracted 
from the exploitation of workers that make their products) that results from these 
practices goes to the multinationals in the global North. The search for low unit labor 
costs is the main drive behind the decision to move production outside of Western 
Europe, the United States, or Japan. And it is due to this attainment of low unit labor 
costs that such multinationals are able to reduce their total production costs.  
We know from the interview results that these multinational corporations have—
and indeed, control—the knowledge and technological know-how of flexible packaging 
in their area. My interviewers expressed that they were often genuinely surprised that 
their customers “actually knew better about packaging” than their own best experts. 
Through this kind of control, they maintain their monopoly over knowledge and use it to 
dictate and direct the production of their packaging materials in ways that are absolutely 
beneficial for them. It follows, then, that other than additional practical reasons, 
multinationals, even those who go as far as directly investing in the country through 
having their subsidiaries and factories there, are reluctant to deal with their own 
production of packaging not because they do not know how to do it, nor because they do 
not have the resources needed to execute it, but because they think that it helps them 





oligopolistic power, as discussed in Chapter 2. In a way, there is an interesting and rather 
complicated combination of how surplus is extracted. For example, not only do 
multinationals perform extraction at their own subsidiaries’ plants in the global South 
through the attainment of low unit labor costs, but also at their third-party suppliers’ 
plants. And the latter involves arrangements that hide more aspects of the unequal 
capital-labor relations on the global scale—executed through systemic rationalization and 
flexible production mechanisms.  
The main goal of such mechanisms that is clear throughout the case studies 
presented in this chapter is the externalization of costs—a process that is perhaps most 
clearly seen when companies like Java Film and Star Inc. produce packaging materials 
directly for exports to the multinationals’ home countries. But whether geared towards 
export or the local market, multinationals outsource their production in an effort to 
externalize the costs resulting from flexible production to accommodate fluctuating 
market demands. This way, their profit rate is not at risk. As we learned from the case 
studies, Java Film and Star Inc. have to bear the responsibility for fulfilling flexibility that 
is problematic for productivity and efficiency measures. Multinationals do not want to 
place the totality of this burden on their own subsidiaries, since they still have to pay the 
price that way, so they transfer a large part of this burden to their suppliers. Waste 
management becomes a major issue in these two companies—both waste of products and 
waste of labor created from the customer demands of product variations and a flexible 
delivery system that requires them to buffer in cases where forecasts are missed or sales 
projections altered. This fact alone disrupts their productivity and efficiency to a high 





well as change their organization of work in ways that can offset the loss resulting from 
this wasteful production.  
Materials and energy use make up the two highest components in their production 
costs—and the requirement to be flexible leads to a big waste in relation to these two 
factors. Many parts of the process of flexible production cannot be controlled; no matter 
how productive and efficient their planning is, in the face of flexibility demands, there 
would still be plenty of materials and energy wasted in the process. In the end, the main 
thing they can do is to control the labor process of their workers through a series of 
reorganizations of work that aims to cut costs in places that can still be manipulated by 
management—another responsibility that is transferred to them by their multinational 
customers, who make sure that they can avoid their own responsibility by requiring their 
suppliers pass third-party audits and international certifications. Then, the rest follows: 
the control over the labor process is enhanced in the era of systemic rationalization and 
flexible production. Confirming what the theories discussed in Chapter 3 suggest, the 
case studies presented here show that modern management has not been largely 
characterized by the elimination of alienation of labor, a trend towards professional and 
skilled work, or an extensive “humanization of work” in general, as authors like Robert 
Blaunder, Michael Piore, and Charles Sabel try to claim (see Zimbalist 1979; Altmann, 
Köhler, and Meil 1992). Tayloristic organization of work still prevails, and is even 
enhanced, especially in the periphery where production happens and the global reserve 
army of labor is large. This occurs within layers of unequal capital-labor relations in 
which dominant multinationals based in the global North can find numerous ways to 





companies where the latter is employed—often without direct involvement or visible 









THE IMPERIALIST WORLD ECONOMY:  
 




This chapter contains several paragraphs from Suwandi, Intan and John Bellamy 
Foster. 2016. “Multinational Corporations and the Globalization of Monopoly Capital: 
From the 1960s to the Present.” Monthly Review 68(3):114-131.  
 
Indeed, an important part of the modus operandi of imperialism is in the intellectual 
domain, where it promotes incorrect theories of trade and of unemployment combined 
with illogical methods of measuring poverty to show a decline when deprivation is 
actually on the rise. 
Utsa Patnaik and Prabhat Patnaik, A Theory of Imperialism 
 
 
 In his commentary to Indian economists Utsa Patnaik and Prabhat Patnaik’s 
(2017) latest book, A Theory of Imperialism, David Harvey (2017:169-71) writes that the 
“historical draining of wealth from East to West for more than two centuries has…been 
largely reversed over the last thirty years.” He also claims that it is useful heuristically to 
entertain the idea displayed by some authors—such as world system theorist Giovanni 
Arrighi—of abandoning the whole concept of imperialism “in favor of a more fluid 
understanding of competing and shifting hegemonies within the global state system.” As 
mentioned in the first chapter of this dissertation, positions like Harvey’s often rely on a 
superficial analysis of the growth of emerging economies, such as Taiwan, South Korea, 





countries seek to respond to what Harvey refers to (following Baran and Sweezy) as the 
absorption of surplus capital “piling up in their home countries” by exporting capital 
abroad, even in the form of their own multinationals—thus gaining some degree of 
control over labor-value chains. It may also be true that China has been one of the major 
players in “the ongoing struggle for control over economic territory across the world 
(Ghosh 2017), such as some regions in Africa (see e.g., Albert 2017); or that Taiwanese 
and South Korean factory owners exploit Indonesian workers in their export-oriented 
production for Europe or U.S.-based multinationals. There are indeed some variations in 
such complex global power relations.  
 However, the argument that the “draining” of wealth has been “largely reversed” 
and that the concept of imperialism in its classic sense (particularly the notion of the 
exploitation of the core by the periphery) should be abandoned on this basis is not 
empirically or theoretically sound. To begin, the so-called “growth” of the emerging 
countries (outside China which is a special case) may not be as extravagant as some of 
authors claim it to be. The Economist reported in a 2014 article “The Headwinds Return” 
that the hype about emerging countries (excluding China) catching up to developed ones 
was “an aberration.” Citing an IMF report, the article states that the current gap in 
economic growth between emerging and developed economies was at a mere 0.39 
percent that year: “This would put off full convergence for more than 300 years—
indistinguishable from never as far as today’s societies are concerned.” And as mentioned 
in the previous chapters, in the case of Indonesia (as one of the Is in BRIICS), economic 
growth has been slow in the last few years (Tempo 2015; BBC Indonesia 2014; OECD 





But what about the “growth miracle” of China—which has become the leading 
emerging economy in the world? Another Indian economist, Jayati Ghosh, is one of the 
authors who discuss this issue. She posits that, even though China is “the most significant 
source of manufactured goods imports for most countries” (if we recall from Chapter 2, 
they rank first in shares of jobs in global supply chains participation), there’s a tendency 
to exaggerate the significance of China’s growth, as well as that of other emerging 
countries (Ghosh 2015:156). This exaggeration, according to Ghosh, is partly because 
many analyses that compare cross-country incomes “are not based on nominal exchange 
rates, but rather on Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) exchange rates”—a measurement that 
has many problems, ranging from the assumption that the basket of goods is unchanging 
over time, the treatment of poverty of the large segment of wage earners as an “economic 
advantage,” and many others (see also Smith 2016 for criticism of PPP). If we look at the 
nominal terms instead, even today, China only accounts for less than 9 percent of global 
output (in constant 2005 USD), and its per capita GDP is around 45 percent of the global 
average, “still many multiples below the average of the so-called ‘developed’ capitalist 
economies that form part of the imperialist core” (Ghosh 2015:156-57). This, of course 
does not necessarily negate the fact that these countries, especially China, do experience 
economic growth and are “emerging” to some degree—enough, as we shall see below, to 
create a backlash from advanced countries who try to halt their development as much as 
possible through various means, including multilateral agreements.  
Nevertheless, what we need to examine is what really happens behind the 
euphoria of growth. The fact that China leads in the participation in global supply chains 





relation to the larger context of global inequalities. This can be applied to other emerging 
countries as well, including the place where the two companies discussed in the previous 
chapter are located: Indonesia. Is it true that, as commentators like Harvey claim, the 
“draining” of the global South by the global North has been largely reversed? In their 
reply to this specific claim, the Patnaiks (2017:196) question whether Harvey is familiar 
with the concept of “drain”—a concept that, according to them, has been explained by 
many academics from the South but, with only some exceptions, ignored by the northern 
academia, including most present day Marxists.  
They, however, quote Paul Baran’s (1957) The Political Economy of Growth as 
the earliest, sharpest analysis of this phenomenon. “Drain” refers not only to the 
“direction of capital flows” but also to “the phenomenon of sucking out the surplus of an 
economy without any quid pro quo.” During colonialism, this was realized in the form of 
taking out commodities for free from the colonies by the colonial power. In the present 
day, things have certainly changed. There are no (at least totally) gratis commodities 
simply taken from the periphery, and other extreme versions of “sucking out surplus” are 
no longer relevant. However, the Patnaiks emphasize that many mechanisms of sucking 
out the surplus from the global South by the global North remain alive—unequal 
exchange is one of them—and these imperialist practices are a continuation of the 
colonial heyday.  
The concept of labor-value chains that I use throughout this dissertation is 
precisely a form of unequal exchange that can be considered one of the imperialist 
mechanisms that still remain in place today. Unequal exchange, or the exchange of more 





monopolies, which enables the capitalist centers to raise the rate of profit. Especially in 
the early emergence of monopolies (in the late nineteenth century), the export of capital 
allowed the establishment of the forms of production in the periphery, which, although 
modern (e.g., same production techniques), possessed the “advantage” of low wage-cost. 
And with this, unequal exchange occurred, indicating a “hidden transfer of value”—or 
“imperial rent”—on a global scale, rooted in the unequal power relations among nations, 
and fueled by the oligopolistic power of multinationals and their ability to control prices 
(see Foster and Holleman 2014). 
As explained in Chapter 2, the mechanisms that occur within labor-value chains—
including an application of systemic rationalization and flexible production—are an 
“exploitation of the wage differentials worldwide” (Foster and McChesney 2012:26), a 
quest by capital for valorization. The emphasis on efficiencies and higher productivity in 
capital’s justification for engaging in arm’s length contracting abroad is one of the keys 
here. Viewed in this way, we can associate the search for low unit labor costs that 
characterized labor-value chains with a quest by capital for valorization. The emphasis on 
efficiencies and higher productivity in capital’s justification for engaging in arm’s length 
contracting abroad is one of the keys here. As we have learned from the examples given 
in Chapter 4, multinationals have the power and ability to control the production 
processes of their dependent suppliers so that they can externalize costs that are needed to 
accommodate the “necessity” to take advantage of fluctuating market demands. It is 
obvious that multinationals are not internalizing transaction costs—instead, they are 






Oligopolistic multinationals compete against each other to capture lush markets—
at home and abroad—and to survive this monopolistic competition, they have to engage 
in flexible production, in such a way that it will not pose a danger to their profit rate. 
Hence, they place that responsibility on the dependent companies within labor-value 
chains whenever they can through various mechanisms, the main being: (1) the control of 
technological knowledge through which multinationals can demand suppliers to apply or 
not to apply certain materials or techniques—“transferred” to the latter only according to 
the former’s needs—in an effort to cut production costs; (2) the application of demanding 
requirements, such as the ability of suppliers to deliver on demands or to accommodate 
fluctuating orders through the “buffering” policies; and (3) standardization of procedures, 
where multinationals can require a series of regulations in their dealing with suppliers 
that are often disguised as “fair business” practices such as international certifications or 
open-cost structures imposed upon their suppliers.  
Further, as shown through the case studies, dependent companies within labor-
value chains would “defer” the burden placed upon them by their customers to their 
workers through reorganizing work and enhancing the control over their labor process—
since this is one among the very few places where they can still save their own profit 
margins through increasing productivity and efficiencies that are otherwise largely 
sacrificed in the fulfillment of their customers’ demands. Here, we can see that the search 
for low unit labor costs is not merely an abstract imperative of capital. It is realized 
through concrete processes within labor-value chains, including at the point of 
production, where commodities are produced by workers, the direct producers. Through 





their subsidiaries (another practice of capital export that is also a form of unequal 
exchange)—can gain what they intended: to protect and increase their rate of profit.  
These profits in the end are captured by multinationals and are often counted as 
the GDP (which is “essentially the sum of the ‘value added’ generated by each firm 
within the nation” of their home countries in the global North), a phenomenon that hides 
the exploitation that occurs in places where commodities are produced or assembled: 
“Labor’s share of GDP within a country is not directly and simply related to the 
prevailing rate of exploitation in that country, since a large component of ‘GDP’ in the 
imperialist nations represents the proceeds of exploited labor” captured from abroad 
(Smith 2012:99). This is another factor that reflects the unequal exchange inherent in 
global labor-value chains—the process that is imperialistic in its characteristics even 
when used without the direct force of militarization or colonialism.  
In the case of arm’s length contracts, where, as mentioned previously, there is no 
visible profit flows from the global South suppliers to their Northern customers, the 
capturing of profits is especially hidden. To begin, Smith (2012) shows that we can see 
the problem by tracing profits generated by multinationals’ goods, such as smart phones, 
T-shirts, and coffee. Let us take an iPod, for example. In 2006, the retail price of a 30Gb 
Apple iPod was $299. The total cost of production (that was performed entirely abroad) 
was $144.40 – meaning, the gross profit margin on the shipping price was 52 percent. 
The “gross profit” of $154.60 is divided among Apple, its retailers and distributors, and, 
by taxes, the government. But here is where the “magic” kicks in: this 52 percent of the 
final sale price is counted as value added in the United States and is added to U.S. Gross 





was performed outside of the United States. Even though a large share of the jobs 
required to produce the iPod are located abroad (in this case China, where Foxconn 
factories are located), the total Chinese wage bill for iPod production was only $19 
million, compared to the U.S. wage bill of $719 million. A major factor that contributes 
to this inequality is the fact that the “professional workers” category – those employed in 
the United States – captures more than two-thirds of the total U.S. wage bill. Moreover, 
citing Tony Norfield’s study of Bangladesh-made H&M t-shirts sold in Germany, Smith 
(2012) explains that core citizens cannot only buy cheap commodities, but they also 
benefit from the profit that these commodities generate. A major part of revenue from the 
sales price goes to the state in taxes, as well as to a number of groups, including workers, 
executives, landlords, and businesses in core countries.  
Further, this case illustrates what Smith (2012) calls the “GDP illusion.” Standard 
data on GDP and trade flows exaggerate the global North’s contribution to global wealth 
and, at the same time, decrease that of the global South. As seen from the examples 
above, when we buy say, a T-shirt, the country where it was produced receives in its 
GDP only a small proportion of the final sales price. Meanwhile, the larger part shows up 
in the GDP of the country where it is consumed. Such an approach leads to absurd 
“facts”—in poorer countries where production happens, i.e., countries that are actually 
making a greater contribution to global wealth, GDPs are much smaller than countries 
that are not productive. Why is this the case? Smith argues that the GDP and trade data 
only account for marketplace transactions. But nothing is produced in markets—coming 
back to Marx’s argument, we should go instead to the hidden abode of production. Smith 





and have a prior and separate existence from the prices finally realized when they are 
sold.” 
The failure to take this into account leads to another fallacy: the conflation of 
value with price. In the framework of neoclassical economics, GDP is “essentially the 
sum of the ‘value added’ generated by each firm within a nation,” where value added is 
defined as “the difference between the prices paid for all inputs and the prices received 
for all outputs.” Hence, in this understanding, “the amount by which the price of outputs 
exceeds the price of inputs is automatically and exactly equal to the value that it has 
generated in its own production process, and cannot leak to other firms or be captured 
from them.” Taking a Marxist approach, Smith rejects this “absurdity” and provides a 
counterargument: value added is really value captured. Meaning, “it measures the share 
of total economy-wide value added that is captured by a firm, and does not in any way 
correspond to the value created by the living labor employed within that individual firm.” 
He also points out that mainstream economics fails to note that many firms that 
supposedly generate value added “are actually engaged in nonproduction activities such 
as finance and administration that produce no value at all” (Smith 2012:99). The GDP 
problem explains why the global South is underestimated in the dominant paradigms – its 
contribution to global wealth is overlooked. In the end, this means that, “Labor’s share of 
GDP within a country is not directly and simply related to the prevailing rate of 
exploitation in that country, since a large component of ‘GDP’ in the imperialist nations 
represents the proceeds of exploited labor” captured from abroad (Smith 2012:100-01). 





Mainstream measurements of national economic performance have also been 
questioned within environmental perspectives. Among them are the work of Herman 
Daly and John Cobb (1989), who provide a critique of GNP (Gross National Product) in 
their book For the Common Good. The discussion of the GDP illusion above, however, 
shows that there is a pressing need to develop such critique of dominant paradigms in a 
way that takes into account the global South perspective. To reveal the imperialist 
relations between the global North and the global South that is hidden in such economic 
measurements, we should at least start from an examination of how the global South’s 
contribution to global wealth is ignored – and how this ignorance further conceals the 
labor exploitation that occurs in the hidden abode of production in the global South.  
If we evaluate processes that happen in labor-value chains, it is clear that, 
contrary to what some authors (even on the left) claim, imperialism “has not really 
declined at all”; it has only “changed in form over the past half century,” especially if we 
use “a more expansive notion of what constitutes ‘economic territory’” (Ghosh 2017). 
Namely, the notion that is not only limited to land, natural resources, and labor, but also 
one that includes “the search for and effort to control new markets—defined by both 
physical location and type of economic process” (Ghosh 2017). This is illustrated well in 
the case studies presented in the previous chapter, where triad-based multinationals 
operating in Indonesia compete against each other to control the huge local market by 
engaging in production near to it and applying a myriad of marketing strategies—not 






What multinationals must maintain above all is to keep this exploitative system of 
global appropriation going is monopoly control over finance and technology, backed by 
the imperial power of the states at the center of the system. Indeed, as Amin (1997) has 
explained, the control exercised at the center of the world economy is maintained by the 
five monopolies of finance, technology, the planet’s resources, communications, and 
military power. Maintenance of these five monopolies requires the active role of states at 
the center. Today’s “generalized monopoly capitalism,” Amin (2015) argues, relies on 
the combined operations of the triad (United States and Canada, Western Europe, and 
Japan) to ensure the system runs smoothly—with Washington, as the hegemonic power, 
providing the main coordination. Financial, technological, and communications control at 
the center, supported by the military and geopolitical control exercised by the capitalist 
states, enables multinationals headquartered in the major imperial states to relocate 
production globally without fear of appropriation, allowing them to extract the lion’s 
share of the value produced.17  
Indeed, global capital makes sure that its dominance within labor-value chains is 
undeterred. As James O’Connor (1974:195-96) claims in The Corporations and the State, 
multinational monopolies pressured the U.S. government, the European powers, and the 
U.S.-dominated international agencies to “formulate and implement” political-economic 
policies which will create an ‘attractive’ investment climate abroad, in particular in the 
underexploited countries.” Under the pretense of promoting economic development, 
imperialist powers were trying to integrate these “underdeveloped” countries “even more 
closely [into] the structure of world capitalism.”18 The giant corporations dominate U.S. 
																																																								
17 This paragraph is taken from Suwandi and Foster (2016).  





policy and, as Baran and Sweezy (1966:201) argue, they want “monopolistic control of 
foreign sources of supply and foreign markets”—to achieve this, they need to find “not 
trading partners but ‘allies’ and clients willing to adjust their laws and policies to the 
requirements of American Big Business.” 
Examples are plenty. In the last twenty years or so, various treaties, agreements, 
and other regulations—whether global, regional, or bilateral in scope—have been 
“exploding.” These are mechanisms used by global capital to impose “rules, regulations, 
and modes of behavior upon governments and their citizenry.” In addition to the well-
known agreements born out of the womb of Bretton Woods international organizations 
such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank, there have also been a 
series of treaties and agreements that are even more repressive in nature—making the 
policies issued by the IMF and World Bank “almost pale in significance.” And what is 
more important is that “these rules operate even for countries that are not in the positions 
of debtor-supplicants to international financial institutions, and so they require all 
countries to restrict their policies in ways that are directly related to the possibilities of 
generating autonomous development in periphery countries” (Ghosh 2015:147).  
Here are some examples of the multilateral ones that are relevant to our topic of 
labor-value chains: (1) the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMS), 
which was designed to “increase linkages between foreign investors and local 
manufacturers”; (2) the Agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPS) that aimed to protect the monopoly of knowledge by multinationals, but that also 
“restricts reverse engineering and other forms of imitative innovation that have 







Agricultural Market Access (NAMA) at the WTO that are based on cutting more tariffs 
in the global South countries, “which will further deprive them of a crucial policy 
instrument to support their infant industries” (Ghosh 2017).19  
Many of these seem to be the means to perpetuate what Peter Evans (1979) refers 
to as “dependent development,” a concept that is also tightly related to imperialism. As a 
system of accumulation, Evans (1979:37) argues, imperialism “ensures that any profit-
making firm will tend to gravitate toward technology designed for center country social 
conditions and focus on low return, routine kinds of production in peripheral locations, 
but the interests of multinationals powerfully increase these tendencies.” It is precisely 
these interests that drive the creation of treaties and agreements above, as a combined 
effort by multinationals, as the ones whose interests are protected, and global North states 
(especially the triad) where these multinationals are headquartered—whose goal is to 
make it difficult for the emerging countries to catch up so that they could also preserve 
their “old imperial powers.” (Ghosh 2015:158). This is partly a response to the fact that 
the United States, the leader of these powers after the Second World War, has shown 
signs of being “significantly weaker both economically and politically” (Ghosh 2017).  
																																																								
19 Core states like the United States often serve as major players in these treaties and agreements. In 
exceptional cases like what just happened under Trump administration, where the United States withdrew 
from the agreement (and thus very likely stopped it from happening due to the country’s enormous power) 
that was “Obama’s signature trade deal” (Baker 2017, BBC News 2017), the Trans-Pacific Partnership 
(TPP), the move was done not because the United States decided to fight against global inequalities. 
Instead, the decision to withdraw—put forward as a “commitment of the United States to free and fair 
trade” by the White House (see the brief statement issued on the Office of the United States Trade 
Representative at https://ustr.gov/)—is more likely a reactionary political response to the decline of the 
labor aristocracy that hurt the majority of the working class population in the United States. Indeed, what 
people refer to as “globalization” has largely benefitted northern global capital but not the majority of the 
working class in the global North. A new McKinsey report shows that, within the last decade, many 
people—mostly young individuals with low educational attainment and women, particularly single 
mothers—in global North countries have suffered from “worse economic outcomes,” in which 65 to 70 
percent of households in 25 advanced economies “were in segments of the income distribution whose real 






Regionally, institutions such as the Asian Development Bank (ADB) also serve as 
tentacles of powerful global capital. Responding to a series of increases in minimum 
wage, ADB issued a report in 2005 that states that “labor regulations” are a “serious 
concern, more so than labor skills” that hinders Indonesia from improving its investment 
climate. Likewise, minimum wages also “weigh heavily on firm operations,” according to 
the ADB (2005:10) report—a statement that echoes a World Bank report published ten 
years before, where the attempts of the Indonesian government to increase the minimum 
wage after the 1990s crises were met with criticisms that the policy would endanger 
Indonesia’s competitiveness in the investment market (Agrawal 1995).  
A recent ADB article by one of their economists, “Raising Indonesian Labor 
Productivity” (Allen 2016), shows that the institution has plenty of concerns about 
Indonesia—and although it mentions the stagnant real wage in the country, the main 
concern is not with this. Even though labor productivity has been “quite encouraging,” 
with an average rise of 4.3 percent within the last five years, the economist writes, what 
is alarming is the fact that this increase in productivity seems to be “more related to slow 
job growth.”20 The assumption here being that people who work with “short term 
contracts” (which is more common in the job market, according to the article) must work 
harder to maintain their jobs and thus increase productivity for the “wrong” reasons. The 
“right” reason that the author expects is that productivity is high due to “efficiency 
gains.”  
																																																								
20 Productivity has indeed become a focus for the current Joko Widodo administration, another example of 
how the state caters to the interests of capital. It was listed as one of the nine priorities—known as “Nawa 
Cita”—that became the agenda of the administration, and was used as his presidential campaign 
“propaganda” in 2014: “We will increase people’s productivity and competitiveness in the global market.” 
It continues to list the planned agenda, focusing on areas such as infrastructure development (building and 
renovating roads, as well as building airports and industrial zones) to increasing investments through 
several means, emphasizing the need to create more investor-friendly regulations and bureaucracy 





Ensuring that productivity is due to efficiency gains is important because, as the 
author argues, “gains in labor productivity are essential for the economy as a whole to 
maintain competitiveness.” Then, she gives three suggestions to improve efficiency 
gains: “a better linking of wages and productivity, an improved combination of flexibility 
for enterprises and security for workers, and the strengthening of systems and incentives 
for skills formations”—all are well related to the discussion of flexible production and 
systemic rationalization in the previous chapters. The suggestions here may seem benign; 
they even seem to be sympathetic toward workers since a better linking of wages and 
productivity, for example, means that wages need to rise when productivity also rises. 
The article even encourages stronger collective bargaining so that compliance with the 
minimum wage can be improved and pay gains from minimum wage increase can be 
“filtered through to all workers.” Moreover, the author argues that the linking between 
wages and productivity would lead to “stable real unit labor costs and profit growth” 
which is good for employers (Allen 2015).  
However, the issue here is not merely about compliance in paying minimum 
wages. Companies like Java Film and Star Inc. comply well, and they engage in 
collective bargaining with labor unions (although they complain about it). As discussed 
in this dissertation, increases in productivity are integral to the workings of labor-value 
chains, with the aim of keeping unit labor costs low. For global capital, unit labor costs 
indeed need to be stable—but stably low. That is why, as the case studies have shown, 
every time there is an increase in minimum wage, multinational clients would force their 
dependent suppliers to increase productivity and efficiencies, which boils down to 





work. Multinationals would even interfere directly. As expressed in my interviews, they 
would “summon” the executives from Java Film and Star Inc. whenever they saw high 
waste in production—ironically resulting from their unreasonable demands for 
flexibility—that may threaten an increase in selling price for their next purchase. One 
giant multinational client went as far as offering to hire for them a world-class 
management consulting firm, at the client’s cost, to help their suppliers review their 
operations and find efficiencies in their business processes. What would be the benefit for 
the client? As the executive explained, “any savings that we could achieve in these 
efficiencies—it would translate into savings for them in terms of lower selling price.”  
The disconnect between productivity and income is a common case; it suggests 
that “productivity gains were either grabbed by employers or passed on in the form of 
lower prices to maintain competitiveness,” writes Ghosh (2017). Contrary to what the 
ADB assumes, what happens in reality is not exactly that productivity is already high 
(due to low job growth) and then wages should catch up. Instead, it is the other way 
around: whenever there is an increase in wages (should we be so lucky), global capital 
personified in multinationals enforces additional increases in productivity, by any means 
necessary. And in the process, the “flexibility of enterprises” will be improved, but not 
the “security of workers”; and the “systems and incentives” will be strengthened, but 
merely for increasing control over the labor process instead of for “skills formation.” But 
this issue aside, the point remains clear: institutions like the ADB emphasize the 
importance of productivity growth led by efficiency gains so that countries can remain 
competitive in labor-value chains—whether these gains are then captured by oligopolistic 





discourse is important. The labor-value chains framework allows us to see the extraction 
of surplus, driven by capital accumulation, and hidden behind the dominant rhetoric of 
competitiveness, productivity, efficiency, flexibility, and the like. It enables us to 
properly examine the unequal capital-labor relations that characterize globalized 
production.  
The world economy that we know now is, using Amin’s (2013a:19) term, the 
“contemporary capitalism of generalized, financialized, and globalized monopolies,” 
which today “tightly control all the systems of production.” Apologists often frame the 
phenomena discussed in this dissertation as an inevitable, neutral outcome of 
“globalization”—but once we look closely and critically, it is clear that the present phase 
of globalization is none other than a new phase of imperialism, used by capital and its 
state instruments to put forward, in Amin’s (2013b:15) words, a “set of demands by 
which they exert control over the productive systems of the periphery of global 
capitalism (the world beyond the partners of the Triad).”21  
The labor-value chains framework helps us see this. It also helps us see the class 
struggle that occurs in “the hidden abode of production”—class struggle that remains 
alive throughout history: From the workers’ fight to shorten the working day in Marx’s 
era in England, to the threats of protests and strike that keep lurking behind factory plants 
in the 21st century Indonesia—which make their bosses, as well as their bosses’ bosses 
(i.e., multinationals), nervous, no matter how much power they possess. In the end, 
workers are the direct producers of commodities. Even though they can be replaced by 
others from the industrial reserve army, workers’ struggles always manage to present real 
and frightening threats for their bosses. As an elderly man whose son works in one of the 
																																																								





factory plants I studied said to me one afternoon, “Workers are the ones who make the 
goods for the company. If they all refuse to work, surely, the company would suffer. 
Can’t the company see that?” They surely can. And so does global capital who, as Hymer 












I collect data through observation and “key informants interviews” to examine 
how global South capital manages both its workers and relationship with multinational 
clients. The goal here is not to look for a statistically representative group of “samples,” 
but to gain in-depth information from individuals who are knowledgeable of the 
examined issues and willing to share the information (Kumar, Stern, and Anderson 1993; 
Evans 1979). Although some traditional use of key informants technique in anthropology 
is often considered a form of unstructured interview, this technique has been developed 
into different forms, including the “focused use of key informants” where there are some 
structures to the interviews (in my case, semi-structured). Here, the interviewer is 
familiar with the information that will be sought from the interviewees and has a 
framework of questions with her while doing the interviews (Tremblay 1957). In addition 
to observations and interviews, I also analyze the companies’ documents – ranging from 
brochures, videos, annual reports, and executives’ presentation materials – given to me 
during my fieldwork.   
I deliberately avoid mentioning specific information about the companies so that 
their identities can be protected. This includes their exact locations, the names and 
profiles of their customers as well as their competitors, and other characteristics that may 
risk their anonymity. I conducted the fieldwork in three steps: (1) a pilot study at Java 
Film in 2012, in which I attended several management meetings and observed the factory 





management in 2013, along with more factory observations; (3) a series of semi-
structured interviews of the top management at Star Inc. in 2015, along with factory 
observations. The interviews were done mostly in Indonesian, although some participants 
preferred to use a combination of Indonesian and English. Quotes displayed here are 
translated by me.  
I interviewed fourteen Java Film executives and nineteen Star Inc. executives. All 
interviewees are quoted anonymously to protect their identities. Their specific job titles 
and other background information—such as age, years of working, education status—and 
other possible identifying attributes are not revealed in this report. I am using the 
information gained from the interviews in relation to the participants’ knowledge, views, 
and experience as members of the company management—thus, their personal identities 
are largely irrelevant in this context. I am also trying to reveal as little information as 
possible about these companies’ customers and competitors. All are referred to under 
pseudonyms as well. The little information I provide here, such as which country or 
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